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"Division of labor and exchange are the two phenomena which
lead the political economist to boast of the social charac-
ter of his science, while in the same breath he gives expres-
sion to the contradiction in his science - the establishment
of society through unsocial, particular interests."
Karl Marx, The Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts
,
p. 163. (emphasis m the ori-
ginal)
"A psychology for which this , the part of history most contem-
porary and accessible to sense, remains a closed book, cannot
become a geniune, comprehensive and real science. What indeed
are we to think of a science which airily abstracts from this
large part of human labor and which fails to feel its own in-
completeness, while such a wealth of human endeavor, unfolded
before it, means nothing more to it than, perhaps, what can be
expressed in one word - "need ," "vulgar need" ?"
Karl Marx, The Economic
and Philosophic Manuscripts
,
p. 142. (emphasis in the ori-
ginal)
"It is noteworthy that modern doctrines of social change are
initiated by those who have a tendency to anomy. Let us take
for example the case of Karl Marx. He was from his early youth
subjected to some of the conditions that breed anomy."
Robert Maclver, The Ram -
parts We Guard (N'ew York:
MacMillian, 1950) p. 87.
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CHAPTER I
Introduction
All social theory, as expressed in interpretation and
categorization of phenomena, has both a social and political
history. An awareness of the historical development of
theory is necessary for it provides the only firm basis for
evaluating whether scholarship has "progressed," and if so,
in what
. directions and how much. Any conceptualization
which is ignorant of its founders not only does not know how
far it is travelled nor in what direction, but is apt to
suffer from theoretical redundancy, false starts, archaic
doctrines, and fruitless errors. However, the view of the
past is, in part, a function of where the present is, and
recently with the transformation of social theory into so-
cial science, the historical study of preceeding systems of
thought has been thoroughly neglected. With the internali-
zation of the criteria and standards of the natural sci-
ences, all systems of thought which predate the advent of
the scientific method came to be regarded as speculative
and had, if anything at all, only a curiosity value. Social
theory, having now been superceded by the scientific meth-
od, was relegated to the realm of social philosophy and un-
scientific speculation. As Gouldner has observed, current
American social theory has fostered the bizzare assumption
that books and ideas more than twenty years old are beyond
2scientific salvation. 1 Once established on scientific, ob-
jective foundations, the social sciences have tended in-
creasingly to cut themselves loose from history in general.
The twentieth century has witnessed the increasing consoli-
dation and augmentation of the scientific spirit as the do-
minant mode of modern consciousness in both its theoretical
and popular or commonsense forms.
The dominance of this world view becomes apparent in
the revival of the concept of alienation by twentieth cent-
ury social theorists in both psychology and sociology. Al-
though alienation has been the catchword of the post-war era
in the academy as well as in mass culture, the term has ex-
hibited such an extraordinary flexibility and vagueness of
meaning that "it has been suggested that alienation has both
supplanted and supplemented sin as generic concept for de-
2picting a sense of defective aspects of human existence."
Theologians, philosophers, psychoanalysts, and a variety of
social scientists have discovered manifestations of aliena-
tion in an astonishing variety of aspects of Western life,
ranging from the assembly line to the therapist's couch and
including along the way such topics as delinquency among
the young, apathy among the old, status aspirations among
the poor, race relations, social change, urbanization, and
suicide. "At the present time," Nisbet has acknowledged,
"in all the social sciences, the various synonyms of
alienation have a foremost place in studies of human life
3.
.
.the hypothesis of alienation has reached an extraordin-
ary degree of importance.
. .it is more than a hypothesis,
it is a perspective." 3 The concept of alienation has proved
to be such a popular idea for every type of contemporary
analysis that Kalher has remarked "the history of man could
very well be written as the history of the alienation of
man." 4 The concept has even been honored with the publica-
tion of an 'alienation reader.'^
Though apparently a phenomenon of modern man, the in-
tellectual sources of the concept of alienation arc nascent
within eighteenth and nineteenth century philosophy and so-
cial theory. The classical theorists of al ienat ion- -Hegel
,
Marx, and Durkhe im- - though employing the concept in very
different ways, nevertheless, share several contentions and
assumptions. The classical definitions contain radical,
ethical, and political directives and are metaphors for the
analysis of the economic and political organizations of the
European industrial middle class. 6 In these theories there
are no simple, operational definitions at either a purely
psychological or sociological level. The classical concept-
ualizations cannot be defined a priori or abstracted from
historical context, for they imply complete social theories
explaining relationships between social conditions and in-
stitutions and individual behavior. Consequently, these
theories have implicit perspectives on human nature, social
processes, values, and the relationship between man and
society. Being critical concepts, they imply the judgment
of society relative to an ethical ideal in terms of some
future and as yet unrealized possibilities and standards.
None of these theorists were interested in individualistic
or psychological observations of anomie and alienation for
the focus of their theories comes from a definition of man
as social man. Accordingly, both Marx and Durkheim were
critically describing societies in which economic activities
and self-interest had become reified into a collective end.
Man's daily economic life activity within capitalism, para-
doxically, the most all inclusive social activity in indus-
trial society was concurrently the least social due to the
exigencies of the market place and the accumulation of cap-
ital. It was precisely the individualistic images of man in
society, which both these theorists identified as expres-
sions of alienated and anomic life. Although the defini-
tions of anomie and alienation contain different directions
for action, both conceptualizations are essentially describ-
ing the same social conditions, but from opposing vantage
points. Whereas for Durkheim, anomie refers to social con-
trol in a social system and is the spiritual heir to Comte's
positivism and conservatism, alienation for Marx represents
a radical, immanent critique of the legitimacy of social
control exerted by an irrational economic system.
Contemporary theories of anomie and alienation, how-
ever, have confused, obscured, and altered the original
radical and historical content of the original theories.
"Paradoxically," Horton contends, "contemporary definitions
accept what was most problematic for the classical theorists
--the dominant institutions of society." 7 In lieu of cri-
tical thought which emphasizes theoretical self
-reflection
and explicit value judgments, contemporary theories describe
themselves as scientific, empirical, and value free; a
transformation which entails the ablation of a critical and
historical dimension from consciousness. Seeman, in his
seminal paper for American sociologists, entitled "On the
Meaning of Alienation," declares that one of his main tasks
is "to make the traditional interest in alienation more
o
amenable to sharp empirical statement." To
. accompl ish this
goal his construction "clearly departs from the Marxian tra-
dition by removing the critical, polemic element in the idea
of alienation"^ by transforming the critical concepts of
values, ethics, and expectations into the scientific, oper-
ationalizcd definitions of reward value (i.e., reinforce-
ment), behavior (i.e., quantifiable discrete responses), and
expectancy (i.e., probability of expected outcomes for rein-
forcement). 10 When this change from classical to social
learning theory has been achieved "these matters can be em-
pirically rather than conceptually solved." Seeman reas-
sures the reader that although he may experience some uneasi
ness with the change of language, it will quickly pass, for
it is analogous to "that initial strangeness which is often
6experienced when we translate what was sentimentally under-
stood into a secular question." 12 Some minor, though tem-
porary sacrifices, therefore, are necessary for the 'pro-
gressive' transition from a classical to an empirical, value-
free concept of learning theory.
Though the concept of anomie has been less widely em-
ployed by American sociologists, it too has achieved a new
life, particularly in the work of Robert Merton. Merton de-
fines "the sociological concept of anomie" as "a breakdown
in the cultural structure, occurring particularly when there
is an acute disjunction between the cultural norms and goals
and the socially structured capacities of members of the
group to act in accord with them." In other words, a
given society is anomie where there is a disjunction be-
tween the legitimate goals as represented in culture and the
opportunities within the social structure for attaining
these goals. Though Merton' s concept defines anomie as a
social condition in distinction to a psychological state,
the essentially conservative content of the definition is
revealed in the fact that his value-free concept rests on
the uncritical acceptance of the success and self-interest
ethic of the middle class; precisely those values which
Durkheim identified as the prime source of anomie in indus-
trial society. 1 Once the social goals and structure of
American society are accepted as normative, the study of
anomie is explicitly transformed into research into deviance
in all its forms. Accordingly, deviance for Merton "refers
to conduct that departs significantly from the norms set for
people in their social statuses.
. .(and) just be related to
the norms that are socially defined as appropriate and mor-
ally binding for people occupying various statuses.
. .
," 15
Anomie, consequently, becomes interchangeable with social
deviance through an interpretation of values as neutral ob-
jects of a social system leaving the question of whose val-
ues, and why, unanswered.
Merton characterizes this approach to anomie as a theo-
retical effort of the middle range in distinction to clas-
sical theory. This technique basically repackages classical
theories into workable hypotheses by introducing a distinc-
tion between the history of sociological theory and what
Merton calls 'working social theory.' Such a distinction
conveniently excises and allocates the major portions of the
work of Marx, Durkheim, and other classical theorists to
courses in the history of social theory while preserving
social psycholgoical variables derived from these theories
which can be studied with survey methods. The middle range
approach alters and distorts classical theory "by treating
them as if they were composed of interchangeable sections
of a meccano set."
16 Through a process of simplification
and fragmentation, classical theories are divested of their
original, critical and historical meaning by reformulating
these concepts into a set of independent variables which can
9thinking is especially apparent when the contemporary social
scientist thinks about alienation. 18
Method of Presentation
In an endeavor to afford an interpretation of the con-
cept and theory of alienation, which can transcend the
'antinomies of bourgeois thought' as represented in sociol-
ogy and psychology, the dualities of form- content
,
subject-
object, and value-fact must be bridged by a critical inter-
pretation of the phenomenon of alienation. Critical theorv,
as differentiated from traditional theory, which is satis-
fied by extracting a common core of meaning by the suppres-
sion of individual differences among facts, is thought which
attempts to become self-conscious of its philosophical as-
sumptions and its socio-historical framework. It begins
where traditional theory ends. All those aspects which are
considered to be external and extraneous to theoretical ac-
tivity- -"the genesis of particular objective facts, the
practical application of this conceptual system by which it
grasps the facts, and the role of such systems in action"-
-
becomes precisely those elements where critical theory be-
gins its search for its own relation to the socio-historical
matrix. 19 Critical theory surmounts the form-content dicho-
tomy represented in social science as a scientific method-
ology investigating an isolated phenomenon. On the con-
trary, the form of cognition is inherently derivable from
10
the content in a twofold sense; namely, the perceived fact
is codetermined by human ideas and concepts even before con-
scious theoretical activity, and "the object of inquiry is a
social world which bears the mark of deliberate work." 20
The relationship of the form and content of a social process
forms a unity of opposites in the motive force of critical
theory--the dialectic of negativity.
Although the category of dialectic has been integrated
into philosophical systems from Aristotle to Kant, the dia-
lectic of negativity remains Hegel's contribution. In the
Hegelian system, the dialectic is the motive force or energy
of the dynamic thought process and the seed from which
thought unfolds. "Dialectic," Hegel observes, "is not an
external reflection but belongs immanently to the transitor-
iness of all finite, one-sided, and rational positions. It
is their own negation which they are without knowing it. It
2
1
is the moving soul of the world- as -process ." The dialec-
tic is the source of all mediations which bridge the abyss
between the subject-object dualism and accordingly negates
the ' thing- in- i tsel £' whether subjective or objective. By
considering the aforementioned dichotomy as artificial, and
positing it as one internal relationship between opposing
ends, the dialectic maintains the unity of the whole while
affirming the separate aspects of the relation. For the
theory of alienation, it will become the critical nexus of
its genesis and development.
11
The presentation of alienation as a critical theory
presupposes the historical development of the moments (and
not stages, levels, or steps) of the theory as they unfold
through the historical process of social thought. The ana-
lysis of conceptualizations proceeds by acknowledging that
the contending manifestations of the concept are internally
related moments of one unified whole. Progression is not
linear, discrete, nor positive, but rather spiral, continu-
ous, and negative. Although this formulation may appear
obscure and recondite, it can be admirably illustrated by
recourse to the organic life process. An individual has a
history, since throughout his life, he is recognized as the
same person. This unity, nevertheless, is one of contradic-
tory moments--the infant, adolescent, adult, etc. --which
are elements in relation in a continuous process. Movement
through the life history is throughout the negation of suc-
cessive, contradictory determinations of the single individ-
ual. At birth the infant negates its opposing form the
embryo, not through annihilation, but by mediation. The
embryo has been supplanted by the infant in the sense that
by positing the infant, the embryo is already included both
in the concept and the reality of the individual. This pro-
gression of overcoming by advancing to a higher plane
through the mediation of contradictory, though internal re-
lated phenomena, ceases only at death, itself negating life
through the subsumption of all preceding elements of the
life process.
13
CHAPTER II
Hegel
For the contemporary concept of alienation, the nascent
moment of its historical process commences with Hegel. The
Hegelian System is a monistic philosophy of teleology, and,
as such, all elements within the framework have existence
and meaning only in their relationship to the totality. In
tne Encyclopedia
,
Hegel compares his philosophy to a circle
or a movement which constantly returns upon itself. 22 The
Hegelian theory of alienation, consequently, can only be
discerned within an explanation of his idea of philosophy.
Hegel, as the direct philosophical descendant of Kant,
was in agreement with Kant that all knowledge depends on
subjectivity, but vigorously rejected the claim of the total
separation of the mind from the world outside. Specifical-
ly, Kant had claimed that one can never know objects as they
really are in themselves but only as they appear. The Kant-
ian category of the "thing- in- itself" is the source of all
dualities (subject-object, form-content) which enabled him
to disavow the possibility of absolute, unlimited knowledge
in the Critique of Pure Reason . Hegel's comprehensive con-
ception of philosophy, hence, is predicated upon refuting
Kant's limitation of reason. In the Introduction to the
Phenomenology
,
Hegel implicitly critiques the "thing-in-
itself" by observing that such a conceptualization ". . .
14
starts with ideas of knowledge as an instrument, and as a
medium, and presupposes a distinction of ourselves from this
2 3knowledge." Kant, consequently, envisions cognition as
either a manipulation of an ".
. .instrument by which to get
possession of absolute Reality" or reflected through "...
a kind of passive medium through which the light of truth
reaches us
. . .
,"
24 The problematic in either of these
modes of inquiry is that each one ".
. .only brings us back
to the point where we were before," since what we discover
in the first instance is what the instrument has done to the
shape of the object through manipulation; and in the latter
case "the laws of refraction" of the medium rather than the
25
object. Each of these possibilities leaves the "thing-in-
itself" impenetrable with respect to the metaphysical dilemma
of the relation between mind (medium or instrument) and ma-
teriability. The dialectical mode of inquiry is the endea-
vor to transcend the "thing- in- itself" in particular and the
Kantian, transcendental logic in general, by dissolving the
categories of objectivity and grounding them in subjectivity.
The dialectic, however, as a process of inquiry and dis-
course must itself be within history which presupposes that
reality and man's relationship to it are themselves a dia-
lectical process. History, posited as the Universal (i.e.,
totality), is guided and determined by the unfolding of Rea-
son. Reason in the Hegelian system is not the reason of
formal logic, but the collective thinking of humanity, mani-
15
fested in a particular age by the 'spirit* of the people and
concretized in its Historic totality as 'Absolute Spirit'--
the unified self
-consciousness of all human history in one
monistic process. History, accordingly, is the unfolding of
•Absolute Spirit,' a struggle to develop a true human commu-
nity from the existing contradictions of the world. Con-
sistent with this view of history as an ongoing process, an
overcoming of contradictions, Hegel perceives the confusion
of the world as an element in the development of a true com-
munity. All proceeding historical movements and philoso-
phies irrespective of their relative merit, are seen by
Hegel as part of the overall movement of "reason in History."
Thinking, then, the activity of the subject, creates
the world in which man lives, and must produce its own ob-
jects for them to come into being as entities. As an ac-
tive subject, the only reality one is concerned with is the
reality of thought. An object becomes a facticity for the
subject only as a thought entity. The unity of the subject-
object dualism is located within the individual's subjectiv-
ity; the process of thought thinking thought, entailing con-
currently subjectivity and objectivity Cthought -ob j ects) in
one internal relationship.
The unity of mind and matter, nonetheless, does not
exclude the existence of the object nor the "recognition of
the other" (i.e., another individuality) for as O'Neill has
observed, ". . .if consciousness did not encounter the re-
16
sistence of things and others, it could only know things
perceptually and others by anology and it would have no or-
ganic or social life." 26 The individual is caught in the
paradox that he can only become aware of his own subjectiv-
ity in reference to the other-either another subject or an
object. The singularity of the subj ect -ob j ect
,
therefore,
is mediated by the "dialectic of recognition" where the sub-
ject is interacting with the world of things and simultan-
eously attempting to negate the other as his own thought
determination. The subject creates and interacts with his
exterior reality through labor and language; labor object-
ifying the material world and language Coral or written)
affirming the other. The process of ob j ectification , for
Hegel, is the immanent moment of self-alienation. By ac-
knowledging otherness as extraneous to consciousness, ob-
jectification has ceded to the other a portion of consci-
ousness. Accordingly, by positing the other, self-aliena-
tion has ensued at the moment of recognition. Every object-
ification is a real transfer of labor and language to the
other. This transfer has been compared by Mitchell to a
legal transaction of will delivery, such as takes place in
sale or a testament.
27 The subject has become separated and
alien to itself through a willed obj ect ification . Hegel,
consequently, includes every type of obj ectif ication within
the concept of alienation. Alienation and obj ect ification
are one and the same; it emerges with the awareness of
17
otherness.
Language, which at first seems to be consciousness for
oneself, becomes alienated from the self as it becomes con-
sciousness for the other. In the Phenomenology Hegel ar-
gues: "Language is self -separating itself from itself,
which as the pure ego identical with ego becomes an object
to itself, which at once maintains itself in this objective
form as this actual self, and at the same time fuses direct-
ly with otherness and is their self -consciousness .
"
28 In
other words, language is man's alienated self, separated
from consciousness and actualized through the recognition
of otherness.
Labor, or man's power to create his own world through
the appropriation of nature, is necessarily a self-aliena-
tion within Hegel's ontology. The objectivity of the ma-
terial world is regarded as an estrangement of man's rela-
tionship to nature which does not affirm the essence of man.
Ob jecti f ication is regarded as the loss of object and es-
trangement of man's self-consciousness
.
For his description of labor in particular and the eco-
nomic process in general, Hegel is indebted to the classical
political economists, especially Adam Smith. "Hegel's views
on modern society," Avenivi asserts, "are far more a distil-
lation of the Smithian model raised to the level of a phil-
osophical paradigm." 29 In the labor process man can only
achieve greater comfort at the price of an ever greater
18
alienation and abstraction from himself. Hegel observes:
"His labor and his possessions are not what they are for
him, but what they are for all. The satisfaction of needs
is a universal dependence of all on all; there disappears
for everyone the security and the knowledge that his work is
immediately adequate to his particular needs.
. . .
" 30
This problematic of the Hegelian identity of obj ect if i
-
cation and alienation, especially as manifested in the pro-
cess of labor, becomes the pivotal moment and motive force
of the superseding theory of al ienation-
- the conceptualiza-
tion of Karl Marx. Marx develops his theory by accepting
Hegel's concepts and metaphysical logic, and by subjecting
the content of the Hegelian framework to its own method-
-
the dialectic. Marx, thus, turns the Hegelian system
against itself and through its negation the nascent moment
of his own system unfolds. In this dialectical movement he
remains faithful to Hegel's own dictum that every end pro-
duct is itself a new beginning. Marx "thus vindicates a
remark made by Engels. . .that the Hegelian system, compre-
hensive and overpowering as it was, could only be overthrown
from the inside, by thinkers who were themselves Hegel-
ians." 31 The vindication of the Hegelian system becomes
apparent in its own transcendence.
-
19
CHAPTER III
Karl Marx
Marx, in a letter to his father in 1837 in which he at-
tempts to justify his forthcoming switch from the study of
law to philosophy, establishes the problematic which will
guide the unfolding of his thought throughout the develop-
ment of its differing determinations, While attempting to
compare the formal, philosophical development of law to the
doctrine of law in actuality, Marx observes, ".
. .that I
was greatly disturbed by the conflict between what is and
what ought to be.
. .
."
32 Marx discovers his own error in
such a study in the methodological assumption which insists
"
. .
.one could and must develop the one (philosophical his-
3 3tory) apart from the other (material history).
.
."; and
realizes that he has developed a framework ". . .which in
its fundamental schema borders on the Kantian. . . He
discovers the resolution of the form- content duality in the
fact that , "in a philosophical disquisition on law. . . the
one must arise out of the other because form can only be the
continuation of the content." 35 Accordingly, he realized
3 6
".
. .that I could not make my way without philosophy."
In setting out from idealism, however, the replication of
the antagonisms between the 'is 1 and the 'ought,' especially
as represented in Kant, are not transcended. In the Hegel-
ian system, on the other hand, Marx has ". . .hit upon the
20
•Idea 1 Cthe ought) in the real itself." 37 Hegelian ideal-
ism bridges the abyss between the actual and the rational by
discovering the 'Idea' in reality itself. "If formerly,"
Marx asserts, "the gods have dwelt above the world, they
had now become its center." 38 From the beginning, it was
Hegel's apparent ability to realize his philosophy in real-
ity through the mediation of the disparity between the ra-
tional and the actual which provided the attraction for
Marx.
The decisive area of Marx's confrontation with the
Hegelian system is Hegel's Philosophy of Right
,
that element
of the system which expounds Hegel's theory of the political
and social institutions of the Prussian State. For the
Hegelian system to have actually concretized the rational
within the material world, the Philosophy of Right must af-
ford the mediations of the 'Idea' within reality itself. In
Marx's critique of this work, he is guided by the aforemen-
tioned criterion and proceeds in his analysis through two
methodological presuppositions: 1) the Feuerbachian trans-
formative method which stipulates the inversion of the sub-
ject (man) and predicate (his thought) within Hegel's logic;
and 2) by turning the Hegelian dialectic against his theory
of the state, through a critique of Hegel's employment of
uncritical logical mediations- -Marx ' s own discovery and the
juncture which distinguishes him from Feuerbach.
As Marx's critique of Hegel is strongly influenced by
21
the Feuerbachian transformational method and by a critical
encounter with Feuerbach's materialism as represented in his
anthropological conceptualization of man, Feuerbach must be
situated within the intellectual milieu of the post-Hegelian
period. As with Hegel, Marx's interest in Feuerbach's ideas
is an outcome of his attempt to realize philosophy in the
actual world.
Feuerbach, in critiquing Hegel, treats his philosophy
as "theology made into logic." 39 Hegel, by treating the im-
mediate, concrete world of sense perceptions as the most ab-
stract and least concretized manifestation of cognition has
made the real world for man distant and removed from his
everyday life. Hegelian idealism has created "a rational
mys ticism"? 0 by wrongly emphasizing "the distance of thought
from reality to a position beyond a concrete observation,
the feature precisely important to man."^ Feuerbach argues
that speculative philosophy in attempting to transcend re-
ligion has itself undergone a metamorphosis and become a
theology by positing abstract, thought mediations between
man and nature. For Feuerbach, man is inherent in nature
and any mediation between man and nature is false. "Just as
theology," he argues, "dichotomizes and externalizes man in
order to identify his externalized essence with him, so
similarly Hegel pluralizes and splits up the simple, self-
identical essence of nature and man in order to later bring
42
together forcibly what he has separated forcibly."
22
The most prominent feature of Feuerbach' s theory was
necessarily his critique of religion. In the Essence of
Christianit y, he sets as his goal the discovery of the es-
sence of all religions. As man is the only species which is
capable of identifying itself as such, he finds the origins
of religion in man's very sociability. As contrasted with
other species, man can surmount the boundaries of his own-
selfhood by appealing to his relationship with the species.
Hence, each individual is an element of the "infinite resor-
voir of all human potentialities rather than to a finite
limited human individual." 43 When, however, man no longer
apprehends his own essence in himself or in his species, the
nascent moment of religion appears through a projection of
unfilled human needs on "nebulous existence apprehended as
absolute perfection." 44 Feuerbach contends that "the emp-
tier the lives of man, the fuller and more concrete is
God." 4 ^ For man, God becomes everything that man seems not
to be. God is "alienated man" and is nothing but man's
awareness of his alienated essence projected to a perfect,
infinite essence. 4 ^
Feuerbach attempts to bridge the duality of man, his
division between actual existence and alienated substant-
iality within theology, by transposing theology and philoso-
phical idealism into anthropology, the study of man in na-
ture. This science understands man in his everyday life by
assigning primacy to perception and sensation and dispensing
23
with abstract reasoning. The methodological foundation of
this anthropology, as well as of its transcendence of reli-
gion and idealism is argued as follows: "The method of the
reformative critique of speculative philosophy as such does
not differ from that already used in the Philosophy of Reli-
gion. We need only turn the predicate into the subject and
thus as subject into object and principle
-- that is, only re-
verse speculative philosophy. In this way, we have the un-
concealed, pure, and untarnished truth." 47 This metaphysic-
al premise provides an inversion of Hegelianism and trans-
forms the traditional subject of idealism, thought, into the
predicate, while concurrently transferring man, the tradi-
tional predicate, into subject. Man, now shed of all ab-
stract speculations and beliefs, is free to develop a world
based on the perception of objects in their actuality. Al-
though Marx borrows the invertive method, his judgment of
the Feuerbachian system in its entirety is aptly summarized
as follows: "Feuerbach's aphorisms are not to my liking in
one point, that he concerns himself too much with nature,
48
and too little with politics."
Critique of Hegel
Hegel, in the Philosophy of Right , undertakes the ab-
stract reconstruction of the political and social institu-
tions of the Prussian State as manifestations of his total
system of interrelated thought determinations. Implicit in
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this reconstruction is the depiction of the state as emana-
tion of the 'Idea,' the materialized content of 'Absolute
Spirit.' In the Preface to this work, Hegel explicates the
guiding principle of this effort by arguing that "What is
rational is actual and what is actual is rational. On this
conviction.
. .the philosopher takes his stand, and from it
philosophy starts in its study of the universe of mind as
well as the universe of nature." 4 ^ In his endeavor to apply
his metaphysics to the state, he commences with the appear-
ance or the phenomenal form of the state as an a priori de-
termination of the 'Idea,' which inherently bridges the ra-
tionality-actuality dualism, and presupposes that the es-
sence of the concept of the generic state, can be unravelled
from nineteenth century political and bureaucratic institu-
tions per se. From this standpoint, the state of Hegel's
era must necessarily become a fixed and immovable category
within the analytical framework and, as such, introduce an
a priori determinism into the system.
The presumed rationality of the state, induces Hegel
"to import the dialectic into history from the outside" with
the consequence that the categories of his logic are imposed
on the real world; the dialectic being not endogeneous to
the immanent development of the mediations, but, rather, a
forced exogeneous connection to a preformed rationality, the
state. 50 The state becomes the embodiment of the 'Idea,
1
and the bureaucracy, monarchy, and other social institutions
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become the unfolding manifestations of the 'Idea' mediated
through the state. For Marx, this has inverted the develop-
ment of the individual within society by replacing the ac-
tual subject, man, with the immutable contents of the state.
Through an inversion of the Hegelian logic, following Feuer-
bach, Marx proceeds to demonstrate that Hegel's point of
departure made it impossible for him to realize his theory
in practice; for Hegel has "converted the subject of the
Idea into a product, a predicate. He does not develop his
thinking from the object, but he develops the object by a
sort of thinking that he manages, and manages in the ab-
stract sphere. It is not a matter of determining the deter-
minate Idea of political constitution, but rather of con-
necting political constitution with the abstract Idea, es-
tablishing its place as part of (the Idea's) life history--
an obvious mystification."*'* Hegel's sys tematization was
only attainable by sacrificing the tension of an endogenous
mutuality between philosophy and reality, thus mystifying
the real world by glorifying empirical facts as the product
of a hidden spirit--the 'Idea.'
The loss of dialectical tension in the Philosophy of
Right has the additional result of introducing a duality
within the system; empirical facts, as represented by the
institutions of the state, are treated by Hegel as simply
empirical phenomena and as rational forms which mediate the
Idea within reality. Hegel, through employment of media-
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tions which have jettisoned the dialectic, has constructed
a system where the state is related to its institutions in
such a way that the actual concrete parts are treated as
logical metaphysical determinants which mediate the govern-
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ment. Marx argues that Hegel has invested empirical real-
ity with a 'philosophical halo.' "Hegel gives his logic,"
Marx maintains, "a political body; he does not give the lo-
gic of the political body." 53 Hegel has provided ".
. .no
link which one could get from the general idea of organism
to the determinante idea of the state organism or the poli-
tical constitution, and there will never be such a link." 54
The 'Idea,' which could have been the cri teri a for j udging
the rationality of the state, emerges as the reified, mys-
tification of the state in all its manifestations.
From the critical analysis of Hegel's political philo-
sophy, Marx constructs the foundation of a fundamental cri-
tique of the comprehensive Hegelian system. He commences
his evaluation of Hegel with the root of the entire system,
the Phenomenology , "the true point of origin and the secret
5 5
of Hegelian philosophy."
Marx unearths both the "outstanding achievement" and
the germ of "the uncritical positivism and the equally un-
critical idealism" of Hegel's philosophy within the Pheno -
menology . 56 He argues that Hegel posits both man and na-
ture, as divergent manifestations of abstract consciousness
and, as such, "the human character of nature and of the na-
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ture created by man-
-man's products
-- appears in the form
that they are products of abstract mind and.
. .therefore,
phases of mind- thought entities.*' 57 In a world composed
only of consciousness thinking thought, "the only labour
which Hegel knows and recognizes is abstractly mental la-
5 8bour." This conceptualization of man and his interaction
with nature mediated and created by thought, implicitly gen-
erates a theory of alienation which understands human es-
trangement only in the separation of pure thought-entities
from the abstract, thinking individuality. For Hegel, Marx
observes: "It is not the fact that the human objectifies
himself inhumanly,
. . .but the fact that he objectifies
himself in distinction from and in opposition to abstract
thinking, that constitutes the posited essence of the es-
trangement and the thinking to be superseded." 59 Through
the positing of alienation as the loss, the negation of
one's consciousness as manifested immanently in the process
of objectifying itself, "the supersession of the alienation
is therefore likewise nothing but an abstract, empty super-
session of that empty abs traction- - the negation of the ne-
gation." 60 The abstract, thinking subject transcends the
loss of the object, its own estrangement, by 'retracting the
alienation into self through the realization that self-con-
sciousness is mind and self - consciousness is object (object-
ified self-consciousness), and, therefore, subjectivity is
the essence of the obj ectivity- - the negation of the negation.
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In propounding the aforementioned history of the alienation
process and the process of retraction, Hegel, according to
Marx, is clearly enveloping both man and nature within mys-
tification for ".
. .abstraction comprehending itself as ab-
straction knows itself to be nothing." 61
Although Marx rejected the abstract idealism of the
Hegelian system, he acknowledges: "that the outstanding
achievement of Hegel's Phenomenology and of its final out-
come, the dialectic of negativity as the moving and generat-
ing principle, is thus first that Hegel conceives the self-
creation of man as a process, conceives obj ectification as
loss of the object, as alienation. . .that he thus grasps
the essence of labor and comprehends objective man. . .as
the outcome of man's own labor.""
The Hegelian dialectic of negativity, the process of
man's sel f- creation through obj ectification and loss of con
sciousness, is penetrated by Marx through the mediation of
a dialectic which is grounded in the material world of na-
ture; itself in reciprocal relationship with consciousness.
The problematic of this mediation encapsulates the tension
of the transition between the Hegelian and Marxist philoso-
phies in general and of their conceptualization of aliena-
tion in particular. The objective world, for Marx, is the
real and necessary realm in which man fulfills himself in
opposition to the purely phenomenal world of the Hegelian
spirit. This posits man as a conscious being but, further-
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more, envisions man's relation to the world as one of activ-
ity, mediated through concrete labor within nature. Man, as
consciousness, is transformed into man, as objective, sensu-
ous being. Ob j ectif icat ion within nature is conceived as
the primary, ontological moment of man's existence and sur-
vival
.
Theory of Alienation
The theory of alienation, as expounded in the Economic
and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
is the embryonic formulation,
the basic method and vision of the entire Marxist philoso-
phy. Although these conceptualizations change and develop,
receiving their most concrete and mature formulation in
Capital
,
the indictment of capitalist society in this expo-
sition initiates many of the themes--in the treatment of the
division of labor, private property, dehumanization of la-
bor, class struggl e- -which form the foundation of Marx's
theory. The differing, dialectically interrelated moments
of estranged labor, as Struk suggests, gives "blood and
life" to the Hegelian concepts of ob j ecti fication and alien-
ation. 63 Although the method is dialectical, the critique
of externali zation and alienation is situated within the
material world. The alienation process, which for Hegel,
was an ontological manifestation, is for Marx, situated
within the class conflict of the worker and capitalist over
wages in an historical, political milieu.
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Although of modest length, the Economic and Philoso -
phical Manuscripts are a synthesis and dialectical interpen-
etration of classical political economy, Hegelian idealism,
and the materialism of Feuerbachian anthropology. Simultan-
eously emerging within these critiques are a theory of human
alienation or estrangement which uncovers the common source
of the various manifestations of alienation within alienated
labor (i.e. wage labor); the outlines of an historical con-
ception of human nature and experience even more comprehen-
sive than the Hegelian version; and finally the philosophic-
al critique of political economy which provides the founda-
tion of a transcendence of alienation to an unalienated
state. Each of these themes is developed within one uni-
fied, interrelated framework with the arguments proceeding
at different levels concurrently.
Within these manuscripts, Marx's area of speculation is
the domain of human culture and history. Although the cur-
rent historical phase of production and culture is domin-
ated by capitalism, Marx's theoretical formulation unmasks
its claim to universality. To establish this mode of pro-
duction as a transitory and alienated manifestation, Marx
develops both a philosophical and historical conceptualiza-
tion of labor, the crucial element and the "Archimedean
point of his great synthesis."
64 Both of these objectives
are necessary in order to develop wage labor as a particular
and alienated form of labor and to describe a condition
of
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existence where man's ability to objectify nature is in an
unalienated form. Consequently, Marx develops a philoso-
phical interpretation of man's existence which emphasizes
labor as "man's act of self-creation or self objectifica-
tion." 65 Labor or the ob j ectif ication and appropriation of
nature is the activity through which man becomes conscious-
ness of his nature as man. In other words, man's objecti-
f ication of nature as an ahistorical, necessary means of
survival must be distinguished and separated from man's
alienation from nature, a specific, historical form of man's
existence peculiar to capitalism. For Marx, man's separa-
tion from and loss of his product, life activity, poten-
tialities, and community with his fellow man, converges in
alienated labor which is grounded within capitalism. Man's
alienation is an integral element for the dynamic of capi-
talism; as necessary for its existence as breath is for
life.
The concept of labor's sel f-alienation , conversely
provides the key to unraveling the mystification of clas-
sical political economy. Political economy, as the theore-
tical elaboration of the laws of capitalist society and
thereof alienation, must be deciphered to discover this un-
derlying rationality and logic. Qnly by proceeding from the
premises of political economy and accepting its language
(i.e., private property, wage labor, etc.) and its laws
(i.e., labor theory of value) can Marx assert that ". . .un
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der the semblance of recognizing man, political economy,
whose principle is labor, rather carries to its logical con-
clusion the denial of man.
. .
,"
66
All the heterogeneous aspects of alienation converge in
the notion of labor as the ontological necessity of exist-
ence. Alienated labor, as such, is not merely an economic
fact or a psychological state of being, but the actual de-
valuation of human life. Marx provides not only a descrip-
tion of man's existence in a reality where his essence has
become subordinated to things, but includes the mediations
which explain the elemental causes of this fact. By situ-
ating man's alienation in a particular, historical situa-
tion, an opposing state of unalienation could be formulated
in the material world by a subsumption of capitalism without
recourse to nostalgic moralizing postulates or religious
eschatologi es
.
Nature as a Product of Man
Although the ontological question of man's existence
and origin has been a traditional area of speculation for
both theology and philosophy, Marx radically transforms the
framework of this inquiry by defining man as a specific part
of nature, as "the self -mediated being of nature."
67 By es-
tablishing a reciprocal interaction between man and nature,
Marx explicitly rejects any arguments which rely on abstract
spiritual beings or transcendental spirits to explain man's
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relation to nature. This means that humanized nature knows
no substantial forms which are integral to itself or precede
human consciousness. Once this observation is established,
it is easy to see that the question of an absolutely inde-
pendent reality is incorrectly posed. Nature exists for man
only in so far as he knows it, and this knowledge only be-
comes accessible through man's life activity labor or "man's
act of sel f -creation or self-objectification . *' 68
Labor or the process of obj ectif ication within nature
is defined by Marx as the universal, ahistorical phenomenon
by which man creates objects which are external i zations of
his powers. Labor, accordingly, as universal life activity,
is explicitly differentiated from wage labor, a specific
form of the, all inclusive general category. This dichotomy
between labor and wage labor- - be tween the universal and the
particular- -allows Marx to observe man as actuality (wage-
laborer) within capitalism and potentiality (what Marx
calls: "the real human being") without the introduction of
a dualism. 69 This distinction will form the framework for
Marx's latter indictment of wage-labor through its juxtapo-
sition to the potentiality of man's life activity.
Marx's concept of labor, therefore, is far more than an
economic category employed by political economists or busi-
nessmen. Labor is man's existence in its totality. As
such, it is to be interpreted in the broadest possible sense
to include art, literature, music, law, philosophy, and all
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other facets of intellectual labor. Man in distinction to
all other species can only realize his essence or true na-
ture, if and only if, he realizes it as something objective
by using his 'essential powers' to create an external, ma-
terial object. It is only through "man's act of self-crea-
tion or self-obj ectif ication" that man becomes conscious of
7 0his nature as man. "Labor," as Marcuse observes, "under-
stood in this way, is the specifically human affirmation of
being in which human existence is realized and confirmed." 71
Through the process of obj ectif ication , the whole of
nature becomes the medium of man's life. Accordingly, man
is the only universal being in the sense that the entirety
of both unorganic and organic nature is amendable to his
control. Marx identifies "man. . .a species being, not only
because in practice and theory he adopts the species as an
object but. . .because he treats himself as a universal and
7 2therefore a free being." In other words, the specific
quality of human freedom has its roots in man's ability to
appropriate any object and exhaust and realize its inner
possibilities through his labor. This freedom is in con-
trast to the condition of an animal which produces only un-
der the exigency of immediate physical need. Whereas an
animal produces onesidedly, man produces universally. "An
animal," Marx asserts, "forms things in accordance with the
standard and the need of the species to which it belongs,
whilst man knows how to produce in accordance with the
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standard of every species.
. .
,"
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Labor, the mediation
between man and nature, therefore, distinguishes man as the
only 'species being' for the "whole character of a species
. .
.is contained in the character of its life activity; and
free, conscious activity is man's species character." 74
Following directly from man's species character as an
objectifying being is the fact that: "man makes his life
activity the object of his will and consciousness. ... It
is just because he is a species being that he is a conscious
being i.e. that his own life activity is an object for
7 5him." Labor, which first appears merely as a means to
satisfy the need to maintain physical existence, furthermore,
creates objects which man internalizes through his conscious-
ness. Man is established by his objects which concurrently
confirm his objective life activity. Marx argues: "That
the object of labor is, therefore, the ob j ect ification of
man's species life for he duplicates himself not only, as in
consciousness, intellectually, but also in actuality, in
reality and therefore he contemplates himself in a world
that he has created." 76 This observation succinctly de-
scribes the unique reciprocal interaction between man's
consciousness and the objective physical world, Man can
only know objectivity through his conscious perception of
reality. Nevertheless, his consciousness becomes self-evid-
ent through the process of obj ecti fication . In their mutual
interpenetration all subjectivity is objective whereas all
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objectivity is subjective or as Kosok observes: ".
. .sub-
jective awareness without objective content is empty, while
objective content without subjective awareness is blind.
77
.
.
This circular mutuality of interdependence is pre-
cisely the dynamic of Marx's ontology and "the root of the
fact that obj ectification can become reification and exter-
nalization can become alienation.'* 78 Although for Marx
"thinking and being are thus no doubt distinct, but at the
same time.
.
.inunitywith one another," he has established
the ontological framework for alienated labor. 79
Man, as a species, furthermore, is a being not only
conscious of his obj ectifications but has a consciousness of
the species to which he belongs, or, to put it another way,
is a being whose essence does not coincide directly with
his own individuality. Man is the only life form that can
have such a species consciousness subjectively, in his con-
scious awareness of the species to which he belongs. In op-
position to the atomistic views of the possessive individ-
ualism which dominated the thought of political economy,
Marx asserts that: "Man is in the most literal sense of the
word a zoon politikon (i.e. political animal), not only a
social animal, but an animal which can develop into an in-
dividual only in society. Production by isolated individ-
uals outside of society. . .is as great an absurdity as the
idea of the development of language without individuals liv-
8 0
ing together and talking to one another." Objectifica-
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tion or labor, then, is essentially a social activity and
objectifying man is social man. Labor is the sphere of com-
mon life activity where men, in and through their objects,
become cognizant of one another through cooperation and
their self-created reality. All human labor is labor with
and for other men for each product produced by the individ-
ual simultaneously reveals his abilities and powers to other
men through his objects. As with subjectivity and objectiv-
ity, Marx captures the mutual interpene trat ion of the indi-
vidual and society. "Above all," he acknowledges, "we must
avoid postulating 'society'.
. .as an abstraction vis-a-vis
the individual. The individual is the social being." An
apparent dualism, accordingly, is subsumed through recipro-
city of the poles in one internal relationship which acknow-
ledges individuality only in its affinity with society. For
to postulate "a being which is not itself an object for some
third being has no being for its object. . .", therefore,
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it is "an unobjective being. . .a nullity--an unbeing."
Alienated Labor
Marx's theory of alienation, as expounded in the Paris
Manuscripts , is the portrayal of man's existence within cap-
italist society and, as such, the depiction of man in a re-
ality where all the fundamental relations, which emcompass
the unity of man and nature as developed within his ontology,
are fragmented and distorted. The state of alienation rep-
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resents the actuality which man endures in a specific eco-
nomic system; one where he lives at the lowest compatible
level necessary for "cattle-like existence." All of those
qualities (ob j ectificat ion
,
sociability, etc.) which dis-
tinguishes the human species from animals have been altered
and disfigured to the point where even man has become an an-
thropomorphism in the eyes of man. Capitalism is man's af-
fliction where his species powers have disappeared with the
consequence that man has become a mere abstraction, a "hole
in the air," estranged from all those qualities on which is
based his claim to humanity.
What distinguishes Marx's explanation of alienation,
however, is his discovery of the convergence and genesis of
all the diverse elements of estrangement within alienated
labor. Though other theorists have captured the agony of
man within capitalism, Marx is the only one who unravels the
causes of this state of being within capitalism's distortion
of the relation of man to nature and man to man. The cate-
gory of alienated labor, formalized within capitalism as
wage-labor, is the probe which Marx applies persistently to
decipher and separate essence from appearance in a reality
where everything appears to be what it is not.
Wage labor, the actuality of man's life activity within
capitalism, is "externalized labor, labor in which man ali-
enates himself. . .a labor of self-sacrifice, of mortifica-
tion." 83 Productive activity itself is described by Marx
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as active alienation, the alienation of activity, the ac-
tivity of alienation." 84 Labor, the distinctly human activ-
ity of objectif ication, must be sold by man in the market
in order for him to secure the necessary means of subsist-
ence. Man's life activity, the objective manifestation of
his own essence, then, does not belong to him for the "pro-
duct of his activity is not the object of his activity." 85
Man does not produce clothing, tools, or machinery for him-
self. What he does produce for himself is a wage and, ac-
cordingly, the goal of his labor "does not appear as an end
in itself but as the servant of the wage." Labor is exter-
nal to the worker for "it does not belong to his essential
8 7being. 11 Man "does not affirm himself but denies himself,
does not feel content but feels unhappy, does not develop
freely his physical and mental energies but mortifies his
8 8body and ruins his mind." In other words, one of the in-
herent character i st i cs of humanity , the abil i ty to appropri-
ate nature and confirm one 1 s essence through the object,
has vanished within capitalism, for the wage has replaced
the product as the outcome of the labor process. The re-
sulting debasement of the human condition is poignantly ar-
ticulated by Marx when he declares: "If the silkworm were
to spin on order to continue its existence as a caterpillar,
it would be a complete wage-worker." 89 Man's 'species life'
must be bartered for the necessity of subsistence and his
real objectivity as a member of the species has transformed
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his advantage over animals into a disadvantage.
Though, compared to a feudal serf or slave, a wage
worker appears to possess freedom, the appearance is an il-
lusion. The price the worker must pay for this apparent
freedom is that not only must he struggle for his means of
existence, but he also must compete against all other wage
workers to obtain employment in the first place. The para-
doxical result of the development of wage labor is that al-
though man has received the abstract right to enter into a
contractual wage relationship with any capitalist or buyer
of his labor, he has concurrently become exposed to the laws
of the market place. Accordingly, "the worker has become a
commodity and it is a bit of luck for him if he can find a
90buyer." As any other product on the market, the price of
his labor is subject to supply and demand and, in the in-
stance where there exists a surplus of workers--a condition
endogeneous to capitalism- -he loses his right to work al-
together. If on the other hand, he does secure employment,
the wage he receives is the lowest compatible for subsist-
ence. Marx argues that capitalism advances the proposition
that the worker, "the same as any horse, must get as much as
will enable work." 91 "The wages of labor have thus exactly
the same significance as the maintenance and servicing of
any productive instrument. . .or as the oil which is applied
92
to wheels to keep them turning."
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If wage labor is the activity of alienation, then, the
end product of such activity is logically estranged from the
worker for "how could the worker come to face the product of
his activity as a stranger, were it not that in the very act
of production he was estranging himself.
. .
."
93 in all
societies man's productive activity is objectified. What
distinguishes the capitalist mode of production is that the
objectification of labor is not appropriated by the direct
producers but belongs to the capitalist. The wage earner
has no direct control over what becomes of his product. The
worker can only indirectly take possession of a fragment of
what his labor has created through the intermediary of wages
he receives from the capitalist for his labor. 94 This dis-
placement of the worker from his object by the mode of pro-
duction creates an historical circumstance where ". . .the
object which labor produces. . . confronts him as something
alien; as a power independent of the producer." 9 ^ In the
production process the worker has no input into decisions
regarding the creation or dispensation of the results of his
labor. The entirety of man's unique creative abilities has
been subtracted from his being, leaving only the actual phy-
sical drudgery to the worker. Since as a 'species being,'
the worker invests his life in the object, the wage worker
is entrapped in the paradoxical situation that the greater
his activity, the less his appropriation of objects and the
further his species powers are diminished. Regardless of
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the duration and intensity of his labor, the fruits of his
activity will accrue to the capitalist. According to Marx
the results of man's labour is subtracted from his being.
"Therefore, the greater is this product, the less is he him-
self." 96
If the object of production is not a realization of
man's personality but its negation, it is not only external
to his existence, but "becomes a power on its own confront-
9 7mg him." The most obvious phenomenal expression of this
unique, historical circumstance is the concept of private
property; the direct material expression and consequence of
alienated labor. Marx argues that wages and private pro-
perty are identical since "wages are a direct consequence
of estranged labor, and estranged labor is a direct conse-
q o
quence of private property."
Although property is evident in all states of society,
the form of the property relationship between individuls di-
verges. In primitive societies the social form of property
is communal or tribal, mediated by social relationships of
kinships; whereas for feudalism the basic form of property
is landed property, conditioned and controlled by the force
of common law. With the advent of capitalism, private pro-
perty becomes the standard form of man's products. The his-
torical social relationship mediating this form is wage la-
bor—the condition where the worker does not own the product
of his labor. Private property, therefore, is the unique
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form which is the perceptible expression of man's estrange-
ment from his product. The degradation of labor in capital-
ist society, Marx argues, is expressed in "private property
. .
.the material, summary expression of alienated labor"
which embraces both man's relationship to his activity and
the product of his labor." By developing the concept of
alienated labor as a historical phenomenon, Marx has uncov-
ered its necessary material expression-
-private property.
Accordingly, the material perceptible form of private pro-
perty "is the material perceptible expression of estranged
labor." 100
But if man's way of objectifying himself is an alien-
ated drudgery, so also is his way of appropriating his
alienated products. What Marx calls the 'sense of having'
dominates man; for under the dominance of necessity, man
perceives objects as valuable not for what they are them-
selves, not for their specific nature, but simply as things
to be possessed. Man's sense have been repressed and his
capacities underdeveloped because "private property has
made us so stupid and one-sided that an object is only ours
when we have it. . .in short, when it is used by us." 1
The specific nature of man nurtured by capitalism is pre-
eminently the possessive individual with the specific nature
of each object a welter of possessiveness . Private property
changes every human need into the crude need of possession.
Indeed, under the sway of private property the degree
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of possessiveness has progressed to the point that the need
for money--the means to the end of possession-has become an
end in itself. "The need for money," Marx argues, "is there-
fore the true need produced by the modern economic system,
and it is the only need which the latter knows." 102 Money
is the universal manifestation of private property and, as
such, man's alienated self, since it is the most general ex-
pression of man's estranged life activity as represented in
the material object. Since it reduces all human labor to
quantitative, interchangeable units devoid of any specific
quality it depicts "the complete domination of the alienated
thing over man.
. .the complete indifference both with re-
gard to the nature of the private property, and to the per-
sonality of the private property owner." Human reality
has been metamorphasized into the upside-down world of the
cult of money.
Moreover, money's power has replaced man's capacities
and his personality in general. In the system of exchange
which has developed under private property, only money pos-
sesses "the property of buying everything, by possessing the
property of appropriating all objects, money is the object
104
of the omnipotence of its being." "It therefore func-
tions as almighty being," 105 Man's distinctive, species
powers have receded to the vanishing point for his personal
attributes have become a function of his purchasing powers
and not of his immanent self. Money has become everything
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which man no longer is. Its divine power lies in its char-
acter as man's "estranged, alienated and self
- disposing spe-
cies nature. Money is the alienated ability of mankind." 106
Money, then, has inverted the world with a man's faculties
determined by his quantity of money. Marx's description of
the degradation of capitalist man, in a world of things
which have an autonomous life in contempt of human needs and
potentialities, is the total indictment of that society:
"That which is for me through the medium of money- -that
which I can pay for--that am I, the possessor of money. The
extent of the power of money is the extent of my power.
Money's properties are my properties and essential powers--
l n 7the properties and powers of its possessor."
Political Economy: Alienated Consciousness
t —- - .
One of the essential premises within Marx's concept of
man is the mutual dependency between man's labor and his
consciousness of this life activity. Through the objectifi-
cation of nature, man externalizes his subjectivity and de-
velops consciousness of his objective reality. Man's alien-
ated, objective existence, accordingly, must necessarily be
reflected in his consciousness of capitalist society. The
conceptual system, or ideology, which is a sufficient ex-
planation for such a society must itself be the theoretical
expression of alienation. Political economy, the scientific
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expression of capitalism, thus, ideologically reflects ali-
enation, as expressed in its insistence that its concepts
have obtained an objectified, ontological reality and have
attained a validity external to specific human relationships
which in actuality it is expressing. 108 Political economy,
as the theoretical manifestation of capitalism transforms
man's productive activity into "objective laws" which exist
outside of man and independently regulate his activity. The
laws of political economy are only the ultimate expression
of man's alienated existence for, ".
. .political economy
has merely formulated the laws of estranged labor." 109 Po-
litical economy, like Hegel's ontology, has inverted man's
consciousness; however, in contrast to Hegel who made man a
predicate of his consciousness, political economy has mys-
tified human reality by positing man as a predicate of his
product
.
Though political economy mystifies man's potential
state of being, Marx recognizes it as the authoritative de-
scription of the actual conditions of man's existence within
capitalism. Its principal merit is that it conceives labor
as the source of all wealth. The labor theory of value,
the major contribution of classical political economy, was
initially postulated by Adam Smith who observed that, "it
was not by gold or by silver, but by labor, that all the
wealth of the world was originally purchased; and its value
. . .is precisely equal to the quantity of labor which it
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can enable them to purchase or command." 110 In contrast to
the mercantilists, who believed the source of wealth to be
precious metals, and the physiocrats, who recognized land as
the essence of wealth, the classical political economists re-
turned all wealth to man by acknowledging human labor as the
creator of all wealth.
In consequence of Adam Smith's discovery of the labor
theory of value, the critique of classical political economy
acquires a definitive importance in Marx's framework, for it
provides the vital link which enables him to elaborate his
philosophical, ontological analysis of labor and labor's
self -al iena tion in a more concrete form. Both interpreta-
tions converge in the concept of labor as the essence of
production.
Throughout the Paris Manuscripts and all further ela-
borations of his theory, Marx accepted many formulations
from the political economists as accurate descriptions of
the contemporary political and economic reality. Neverthe-
less, he quickly exposes the defects of political economy,
especially the insoluble contraction between the theoretical
premise of the primacy of labor as the producer of all
wealth and the actual position of the worker. Although "po-
litical economy," Marx argues, "starts from labor as the
real source of production. . .to labor it gives nothing,
and to private property everything." 111 The political eco-
nomist has brought into the open man's alienation from na-
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ture and his fellow man, but in a mystified form which the
economist does not recognize or understand; for political
economy has depicted the manifestations of capitalism-
-pri-
vate property, wage labor, exchange, etc. --as natural, ne-
cessary phenomena. Consequently, "political economy starts
with the fact of private property, but it does not explain it
to us. It expresses in.
. .abstract formulas the material
process through which private property actually passes, as
these formulas it then takes for laws. It does not compre-
hend these laws.
. .
,"
112
i n other words, political eco-
nomy takes a course directly opposite to that of the actual
historical development of the phenomena it is trying to ex-
plain. It begins with the results of the historical process
and forgets the process. Hence, it endows the present with
the stability of ahistorical, natural phenomena and only at-
tempts to unravel their meaning and not their historical
genes is .
From Alienation to Value
Through the philosophical critique of the categories of
political economy, Marx has laid the foundation of the link
"between the actual world and the potentially rational. The
Paris Manuscripts identify the concept of labor as the point
of mutual penetration of man's actual historic situation
within capitalism and his potential existence as a 'species
being' in an unalienated society. By distinguishing between
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labor as man's fundamental, universal life-activity, and
alienated labor, the particular form it assumes in capital-
ism, the general and specific nature of labor is preserved
within one internal relation without obliterating their het-
erogenity. In the further elaboration of his theory of
alienation, Marx abandons the study of man's essence in or-
der to firmly root the exploration of alienated labor within
history, primarily through the critique of political eco-
nomy. It is through his revolutionary grasp and rigorous
insistence of man's special teleogical nature through labor,
that enables Marx to demonstrate that the conditions poli-
tical economists assume were lawlike and permanent were no-
thing more than the crippling transient forms of class so-
ciety. After having perceived the alienation of human rela-
tions within the labor process, Marx turns to a detailed
critique and characterization of the social relations of
production within capitalism. In his succeeding works, Marx
transforms, "the theory of al ienation of human relations into
a theory of reification of social relations" in order to
"create a path from Utopian to scientific socialism, from
negating reality in the name of an ideal to seeking within
113
reality the forces for further development and motion."
Although the source of man's alienation has been uncovered
by Marx within the concepts of political economy in the
Paris Manuscripts , the analysis therein is in embryonic form
and the mediations for a succession to a rational society
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are underdeveloped. Through the historical analysis of the
mode of production and the accompanying social relations
among people, Marx converts the theory of alienation into
its actual historical manifestations. The ontological ana-
lysis of labor and alienation is accorded historical sub-
stance by developing empirical explanations for these pheno-
mena in society. In the transition from the Manuscripts to
Capital
,
the epistemological
,
philosophical, and ontological
premises of the conceptualization of alienation are contin-
uous. What does emerge in Marx's additional works is a con-
ceptual and empirical shift; the incipient theory of alien-
ation is progressively elaborated in a more concrete form.
Marx, in the first volume of Capital , unravels and de-
ciphers the dynamic and language of capitalism through the
introduction of a sociological critique of political econo-
my. He discovers in the social nature of the objective eco-
nomic categories the essence of capitalism through his
unique critique and explanation of the theory of value as
the phenomenal form of reified social relations among in-
dividuals. Whereas political economy was concerned with
value in order to determine market prices and analyze sup-
ply and demand tendencies of the market, Marx approaches the
theory of value as an expression of social relations which
are transformed into a material form in the process of pro-
duction. Social relations are objectified or reified into
things and material objects are personified by the capital-
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ist mode of production. Alienation is not an external con-
sequence of capitalism; it is an endogeneous necessity of
wage labor. Through the critique of the mutually related
elements of the concept of value— the labor theory of value,
the fetishism of commodities, abstract labor, and exchange
of equivalents-
-the objective facticity of capitalism is un-
masked to reveal the exploitation and degradation of man.
Fetishism of Commodities
It is neither by whim nor chance that the opening argu-
ments of Capital are devoted to the exploration of the com-
modity form and its peculiar, fetishistic character; for as
Marx argues, "a commodity appears, at first sight, a very
trival thing, and easily understood. Its analysis shows it
is in reality, a very queer thing, abounding in metaphysical
subtleties and theological niceties . " The mystery of the
commodity form as Luckacs asserts, "must not be considered
in isolation or even regarded as the central problem in eco-
nomics, but as the central problem of capitalism in all its
aspects . m11 ^ The essence of the commodity form is that a
relationship between people in the production process takes
the character of a thing and acquires a 'phantom objectiv-
ity. 1 This gives the product or commodity an autonomy which
seems, "so strictly rational and all embracing as to conceal
every trace of its fundamental nature: the relation between
people." 116 For in the capitalist era, there is ultimately
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no problem that does not have its root in the commodity
structure. Once Marx has delineated the fetishistic quality
of commodities as the necessary appearance of all products
within the market, his task turns to unraveling the logic of
this form within its genesis in the production process
. Al-
though the fetishism of the products refers to man's miscon-
ceptions of the products of labor once they enter the realm
of exchange, the inevitability of this mystification is
rooted in a specific type of labor-alienated, wage labor.
The labor process itself is not immune to the power of the
commodity form, for labor's self-realization within capital-
ism is only attainable if it, likewise, assumes the form of
a commodity to be bought and sold on the market. The labor
theory of value and the fetishism of commodities are inher-
ently two sides of the same coin--two distinct ways, inter-
nally related to view capital ism- - in that both uncover the
social character of the reified economic categories within
the pseudo- ob j ectivity of things.
The commodity form, the historic manifestation of man's
alienation from the product of his activity, is simultan-
eously both the dominant reality and illusion of the capital-
ist era. As such, it is the first economic category that
Marx unfolds in Capital . This procedure offers an important
methodological criterion in understanding the critical mode
of Marx's thought; for the methodological premise to which
he assigns exceptional importance is the category of media-
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tion
.
In Capital
,
Marx asserts that, "vulgar economy feels
completely at home in the estranged form of appearances of
economic conditions.
.
.but all scientific knowledge would
be superfluous if form of appearance and essence of things
117immediately coincided." "That in their appearance things
often represent themselves in inverted form is pretty well
known in every science except Political Economy." 118 In
such passages Marx is presenting the decisive, conceptual
distinction between the appearance of a phenomenon and its
essence or inner nature. Although political economy us-
ually collapses these two distinct moments of thought into
the phenomenon's appearance or empirical immediacy, Marx's
endeavor is to formulate the categories which will mediate
between immediate facticity and essence by explicating the
inner connections between these two opposing thought deter-
minations. Without recourse to this methodological injunc-
tion, the mystified and reified character of the commodity
form would have remained hidden.
The problem of the commodity, therefore, consists in
penetrating its immediate appearance by overcoming its fet-
ishistic boundary and discovering its contradictory aspects.
Although no one can deny that a commodity is a thing, it is
an object with a two-dimensional character. "Every commo-
dity," Marx maintains, "has a twofold aspect, the use-value
and the exchange value."
119 In possessing a use-value, the
54
commodity is in no way peculiar for objects of human pro-
duction in every historical age and form of society possess
a use-value. The use-value is an expression of the useful-
ness of the object for man and is a direct relationship be-
tween the consumer and the thing consumed. The qualitative
dimension of an object or the "utility of a thing makes it
a use-value" for each specific object has its own distinct
properties which satisfy human needs. 120
It is in the possession of an exchange value, that a
commodity exhibits its unique characteristic which is pecu-
liar to the capitalist mode of production. Marx commences
his analysis with the well known fact that all commodities
can be equalized with one another and that any given com-
modity can be equated with an infinite number of other commodities
on the exchange market. In other words, irrespective of
their use value or qualitative dimension, an equal exchange
between any two commodities is a possibility by equating
their quantitative dimension providing the two are available
in appropriate proportions. Every item produced in a com-
modity society has a price or an exchange value which de-
termines the quantity of any other commodity it will ex-
change for. Even in an extreme case, "the exchange value
of a palace can be expressed in a definite number of tins
of boot polish." 121 Quite irrespective of the specific
character of the needs they satisfy as use values, commodi-
ties can take one another's place in the act of exchange.
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Despite their varied appearances and usefulness, all commo-
dities possess a common denominator in the quantitative form
of their exchange value. Regardless of their concrete, qua-
litative content represented by their use value, all commo-
dities are abstractly equal in their form. Thus a commodity
has a dual character: a content determined by its use-value
and a quantitative form prefigured by its exchange value.
Within the domain of the latter characteristic, Marx will
uncover the inner connections between the appearance and
the reality of the commodity.
Although at the surface of appearance the "exchange
value appears to be something accidental and purely relative
and consequently an intrinsic value, an exchange value. . .
inherent in commodities, seems a contradiction in terms. "122
This observation is demonstrable by the common sense recog-
nition that any given commodity possesses not only one but many
different exchange values relative to various items. The
exchange value of one suit, for instance, may be equal to
the exchange value of six shirts, or the value of four pairs
of shoes, etc. Consequently, when comparing the various ex-
change values of a specific commodity, Marx notes that the
values must be expressible in some common denominator;
otherwise they could not be equalized in the act of ex-
change. There must exist some specific standard of compari-
son to calibrate the quantitative value of the various com-
modities. Moreover, Marx maintains that the "exchange
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value, generally, is only the mode of expression, the phe-
nomenal form, of something contained in it, yet distinguish-
12 3able from it." Exchange value is only the appearance of
the universal commonality which all commodities partake; for
this common something cannot be a specific, inherent quality
of the commodity as the exchange of commodities is charac-
terized by the total abstraction and independence from its
use value aspect.
What, then, is the common source and standard of mea-
sure of exchange value, if one leaves out of consideration,
the use value dimension? Marx discovers it in the "only one
common property left, that of being products of labor." 124
The exchange value of a commodity, which at the level of
surface appearances is the quantitative relationship between
things, is in actuality only an outward form or manifesta-
tion of the fact that labor is the common denominator and
measure of exchange value. Whereas use value mediates a
relationship between man and his object, exchange value is
solely a relationship between people engaged in social pro-
duction. Thus the objectivity of the primary quantitative
category and factuality of capitalism has been metamorpha-
sized by Marx's analysis into an expression of the peculiar
social character of the labor that produces commodities.
Men can only compare and exchange the end products of their
labor through the value of things with the ramification that
social relations between individuals appear to take the form
57
of things. Marx asserts that in a type of social produc-
tion where labor produces commodities "the social relations
of men appear in the reversed form of a social relation of
12 5things." Social relations cannot be directly expressed
for there is no conscious direction or plan to production.
Marx contends that, "the absence of direct regulation of the
social process of production necessarily leads to the indi-
rect regulation of the production process through the mark-
et, through the products of labor, through things." 126
The doctrine of fetishism, therefore, specifies those
elements of a commodity society where appearances must be
demolished if the reality is to be grasped. It analyzes the
mechanism by which capitalism appears to its agents as some-
thing other, than it really is. The expression of human re-
lationships through things is not merely a consequence of
capitalism, but an endogeneous
,
inseparable element of the
production of commodities. The essence of the commodity
form arises from the inversion which takes place between man
and his product. Man can only affirm his sociability
through hi s labor , but since his labor is expressible at the
phenomenal level only in the form of the exchange value of
his product, he can solely enter into relationships with
other producers through the mediation of things. Man, as
such, has become the predicate of his product, which is the
true -autonomous subject of the capitalist mode of production.
"A commodity," Marx argues, "is therefore a mysterious thing,
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simply because in it the social character of men's labor
appears to them as an objective character stamped upon the
product of his labor." 127
The mystifying aspect of fetishism has the practical
effect of imposing a blanket of ignorance on anyone attempt-
ing to understand the structure of society. The commodity,
an objectified expression of an intersub j ective relation-
ship, has become the master of man in a manner corresponding
to the spirits of the religious world. Marx considers the
"mist enveloped regions of the religious world" as an ap-
propriate comparison to the illusions manifested in the
fetishism of commodities. Whereas in religion, ".
. .the
productions of the human brain appear as independent beings
endowed with life, and entering into relation both with one
another and the human race," in the world of commodities
"the products of men's hands" have become independent be-
12 8ings, subjects unto themselves. In both cases, man's
subjectivity has undergone reification; for in the commodity
form a human relationship has been transformed into one be-
tween objects, while in religion man's subjectivity has been
converted into an endproduct rather than a cause of an ab-
stract spirit.
Although both processes misconstrue the appearance of
a phenomenon as its essence, there is an essential distinc-
tion between the form of illusion involved. Geras has dis-
tinguished between two types of illusion: (1) those appear-
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ances, in which social relations present themselves, and are
not mystifactory as such, in as much as they do correspond
to objective reality; nevertheless, they become mystified
when they are considered as inherent element of nature or
of some subjective intention of man; (2) those appearances,
or manifestations of form which are truly false, illusions
in the full sense, inasmuch as there exists no objectified,
phenomenal form of the mediation between man and spirit.
This observation does not deny the factuality of religious
institutions, bureaucracies, etc.; nonetheless, in questions
of faith and scripture the basis for affirmation is strictly
a subj ectivistic interpretation.
The fetishism of commodities, however, coincides with
those appearances which are illusionary but concurrently
objectively grounded within social reality. What consti-
tues the complex bewilderment of the commodity form is that,
"fetishism is not only a phenomenon of social consciousness,
130but of social being." The fact that the exchange value
of a commodity is but the appearance of the relative amount
of social labor congealed in the product does not invalidate
the realities of the value relations. Where the commodity
form prevails, man can only survive by participation in com-
modity production. Accordingly, relations between people
really do take the form of relations between things since
man has no choice but to affirm his social being through la-
bor which creates commodities. "Bourgeois society," Karl
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Korsh has observed, "is just that particular form of the
social life of man in which the most basic relations es-
tablished between human beings in the social production of
their lives becomes known to them after the event, and even
then only in the reversed form of things." 131 What consti-
tutes the all encompassing mystification of the commodity
form is that reality itself confirms the illusion through
the social mode of production. The fetishistic character of
things is not merely a subjective illusion such as religion.
Man's social being, mediated through his labor, becomes the
wellspring for the mystification of the commodity; as man
affirms his human powers he simultaneously creates the illu-
sionary appearances of the value form.
Abs tract Labor
If the fetishism of commodities has its origins in the
peculiar social character of the labor that produces them,
in terms of content, what type of labor is materialized in
the products? At this juncture, through the theory of com-
modity fetishism, the concept of alienated or reified labor
becomes the link between the theory of alienation in the
Paris Manuscripts and the theory of value developed within
Capital . 152 Although Marx abandons the word alienation, he
continues to develop the content which he had expressed by
the word: namely, man's estrangement from and loss of his
life activity. However, Marx goes far beyond his early for-
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mulation by grounding the philosophical critique within the
economic realities of capitalism. Through the analysis of
the exchange value of a commodity, he uncovers the link be-
tween commodity fetishism and alienated labor--labor turned
into a thing.
Since the quantitative differences of the commodity as
an exchange value are merely the quantitative differences of
the amount of labor congealed in them, labor which creates
exchange-value must represent homogeneous labor, or labor in
which the individual, concrete characteristics of work ac-
tivity are obliterated. Just as the exchange-value of a
commodity is independent of the qualitative differences ex-
pressed in a commodity's use value, labor, the source of
exchange value, must by necessity exist in an abstract,
quantifiable equivalent form which is oblivious to qualita-
tive differences between various kinds of labor. If this
were not the situation, it would be impossible to equate the
exchange values of various commodities in as much as the
qualitatively different types of labor which produce them
could not be equalized proportionally in the act of ex-
change. For example, if, say, tailoring and weaving were
not reducible to the common denominator or property of being
abstract, human labor, their products, linen or suits, would
not be exchangeable with each other. Accordingly, concrete,
qualitatively, differentiated labor which is a creative ex-
pression of an individual's personality cannot take place
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within the production process of capitalism. Everything
ceases to be valuable for itself or by virtue of its inner
value (artistic, ethical), for an object has value only as
a thing to be bought and sold on the market. 133 in a com-
modity economy labor is not creative activity; it is labor,
".
.
.reduced to simple labour, labour so to speak, without
any qualitative attribute." 134 Thus the pecularity of the
transformation of concrete labor into the quantitative di-
mension of universal labor is, "that concrete labor becomes
the form under which its opposite, abstract human labor,
1 r r
manifests itself." JO As with the illusionary aspects of
the commodity form, the appearance of a phenomenon masks its
true essence, for the process in which different sorts of
labor are reduced to some abstract standard is, ". . .es-
tablished by a social process that goes on behind the backs
of the producers." 13 ^ Although the worker is involved in
the production of a material object, his concrete work ac-
tivity is only the medium for expressing the quantity of
abstract, labor congealed in the commodity. The labor
which created it is of significance only as an expression
of a specific, quantitative value.
If all human labor is expressible only as an abstract,
quantitative value on the market, what is the actual, phe-
nomenal manifestation of labor as it exists within capital-
ism? It is in this context that Marx explains the wage form
within the domain of the labor theory of value and the ad-
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joining theory of surplus value or profit. Within this
analysis, Marx moves from the realm of circulation of com-
modities on the market to the process of production for
only this change of terrain can demystify the appearances
137
of wage labor.
Labor Power
Marx proceeds in the analysis of wage labor from the
fact that on the average when commodities are exchanged for
one another on the market, equivalent vales are exchanged
between buyers and sellers. Consequently, in the realm of
circulation, all commodities are sold at their real values
and equal exchanges among commodity owners is the rule ra-
ther than the exception. When capitalists face one another
in the market place, profit or surplus value cannot origin-
ate through the act of exchange for all quantitative values
are equalized with the outcome that commodities are bought
and sold in appropriate proportions according to their ex-
change-values. Nevertheless, although not the source of
surplus value, the market place is the domain where surplus
is realized for the capitalist only makes a profit when he
receives more money for his commodity than he pays out to
produce it. As Marx notes, "it is therefore impossible for
it to originate apart from circulation. It must have its
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origin both in circulation and not yet in circulation."
The problem for Marx is to reconcile the existence of sur-
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plus value "on the basis of the laws that regulate the ex-
change of commodities, in such a way that the starting point
is the exchange of equivalents." 139
If the origin of surplus value cannot logically origin-
ate in the exchange value of a commodity on the market, the
only alternative is that the use-value or consumption of
some commodity within the realm of production must be the
source of surplus value. As the labor theory of value had
discovered the source of all value within labor and its mag-
nitude within labor-time, wage labor, the historical form
within capitalism, must itself be posited as that commodity
which is the well-spring of surplus. As is the case with
all other commodities, wage labor must contain both an ex-
change value and use- value. At this juncture, Marx makes
the essential distinction between labor as a use-value, as
the ob jectification of nature and, labor-power as an ex-
change-value or the manifestation of the wage form on the
market
.
In Capital Marx defines labour-power as the capacity
for labor which is composed of "the aggregrate of those men-
tal and physical capabilities existing in a human being,
which he exercises whenever he produces a use-value of any
description."
140
It is the potential for doing work which
every laborer possesses as his only commodity; consequently,
it is labour-power that the worker sells and the capitalist
buys on the market. Labor as a use-value cannot be con-
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ceived as a commodity for each qualitative working skill
could not be exchanged on the market as different use values
would not possess a common denominator for comparison. Ac-
cordingly, labor-power as expressed by the wage form on the
market is the phenomenal expression of abstract labor.
Labor-power, as the capacity or potential for useful work,
is shorn of any qualitative characteristics with the
result that the worker alienates the use-value of his commo-
dity in order to sell his labor. As Marx argues, "labour
power takes in the eyes of the labourer himself the form of
a commodity which is his property; his labour consequently
becomes wage- labour .
"
141 The commodity form has penetrated
the consciousness and being of the worker to such an all en-
compass ing
,
degree that each worker must treat himself as a
commodity to survive for only as a thing on the market can
labor be realized. As Oilman has pointed out, "to keep from
142dying the worker sells his life."
Paradoxically, the social relations which accompany the
sale of labor power as a commodity on the market appear as,
"
. . .a very Eden of the innate rights of man." 14 *^ In order
for the laborer and the capitalist to meet in the market and
exchange their respective commodities, certain preconditions
must be established within the market which Marx character-
izes as the "rule of Freedom, Equality, Property, and Ben-
tham." 144 The wage worker must be, ". . .free in the double
sense, that as a free man he can dispose of his labour power
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as his own commodity.
.
.» and as Marx caustically notes,
free in the sense that, ».
. .he has no other commodity for
sale, is short of everything necessary for the realization
of his labour-power. "145 Although the worker apparently
possesses free will to sell his labor power to whom he plea-
ses, in actuality, due to the 'invisible hand' of the market
he barters his labor power for the value of the means of
subsistence necessary for his maintenance as a commodity;
that is, of course, if he is lucky enough to find a buyer
for his labor power in the first place. The appearance of
freedom is in actuality the forced compulsion to either sell
oneself for a wage or perish for there is no middle ground.
Moreover, wage laborers must be "free from, unencumbered by,
any means of production of their own" for "the capitalist
system presupposes the complete separation of the labourers
from all property in the means by which they can realize
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their labour." The market has accorded the worker the
freedom to have nothing.
In the sphere of circulation, the worker receives his
equality in as much as his labor power is a commodity. Con-
sequently, he is accorded the same right as all other things;
namely, the equality to be exchanged for equivalent value.
When the wage laborer and capitalist enter into a wage deal,
both receive equivalents for the exchange of their respect-
ive commodities. Although unencumbered by any elements of
the means of production, the worker does have the right to
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dispose of his property, labor power. In order for the
capitalist and laborer to enter into a wage agreement, the
worker ».
.
.must constantly look upon his labour as his own
commodity," which he "
. . .places at the disposal of the
buyer temporarily, for a definite period of time." 147
Therefore, for the worker to confirm his social and creat-
ive powers, he must sell himself daily, a piece at a time.
Once the capitalist purchases labor power on the mark-
et, the worker's creative power or use-value belongs to the
buyer. "The capitalist," Marx remarks, "buys labour-power
in order to use it; and labour-power in use is labour it-
self." Though the capitalist purchases the potential to
do work through its exchange value in wages, he receives in
return the right to consume this commodity by setting the
laborer to work under his control. This transaction is com-
parable to the purchase and consumption of any other commo-
dity with the critical exception that labor-power is the
source of all value. Nevertheless, for the wage worker and
capitalist it is akin to any other thing- -commensurate , for
instance, to a machine or raw mater ials -- and , as such, ex-
changeable for its equivalent value in money in a fair and
equalitable exchange. This transaction, however, has two
immediate, observable consequences for both the worker and
capitalist: "First the labourer works under the control of
the capitalist to whom his labour belongs. . . . Secondly,
the product is the property of the capitalist and not the
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labourer, its immediate producer." 149 Hence, in exchange
for a quantitative value, the worker has totally alienated
both his creative powers and his product as soon as he en-
ters into a wage agreement. Nonetheless, from the point of
reference of both parties, the transaction has remained com-
pletely faithful to the laws of commodity exchange since "to
the purchaser of a commodity belongs its use, and the seller
of labour-power, by giving his labour, does no more, in re-
ality, than part with the use value that he has sold." 150
In the domain of exchange, then, the worker has not been
exploited, cheated, or forced to part with his commodity
since he has received its value in the form of wages which
correspond to its real value.
Surplus Value : The Illusion of the Wage Form
With regard to one aspect of the capitalist mode of
production, both Marxists and bourgeois are in complete
agreement: the essential feature of capitalism is the ne-
cessity to create profit or surplus which accrues to the
capitalist. The capitalist mode of production ushered in
the first epoch where the production of goods as commodities
presupposes production of exchange rather than use values
in order to realize a profit. Accumulation, or the capital-
ist's appropriation of the greatest amount of surplus value,
is not a choice but an imperative of capital. Capitalism
cannot be conceived without the process of accumulation; for
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capital, accumulation is as necessary as breathing is for
human life. Accumulation is the motive force, the driving
energy, which propels the system forwards (or backwards) in
its ever increasing need for self
-expansion
.
From this analysis the logical question, then, is:
What is the source of surplus value, especially with respect
to the fact that all exchanges are ones • of equivalence? It
is precisely in this context, Dobb argues, where the import-
ance of the distinction between labor and labor power
arises: "an importance essential for the context of ex-
ploitation as a key to understanding the bourgeois mode of
production." 151 By separating the potential from engaging
in labor from actualized labor, Marx can show how theie can
be inequality in equivalent exchange and demonstrate the
mechanism for both the creation of surplus through exploita-
tion and its appropriation by the capitalist. This demon-
stration is imperative, for as Marx asserts, "if you cannot
explain profit upon this supposition (i.e., equivalence and
152the theory of value), you cannot explain it at all." " The
bourgeois accumulation of surplus based upon the exploita-
tion of labor must be consistent with market competition,
for it is not sufficient to explain it by departures or im-
perfections in market mechanisms. A theory based upon un-
equal exchange, lack of competition, or superior bargaining
power on the part of the capitalist was the type of explana-
tion Marx was avoiding since it would actually strengthen
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the hand of the capitalist who would merely respond to criticism by
"demanding really free trade" which would put an end to "'unequal
exchanges' and exploitation."153
What, then, makes labour power that unique commodity "whose use-
value possesses the peculiar property of being a source of value,
whose consumption, therefore, is itself an embodiment of labour, and,
consequently, a creation of values"? 154 Marx provides a partial answ-
er by observing that "the consumption of labour-power is at one and
the same time the production of commodities and of surplus value." 150
Surplus value is endogeneous to the production of commodities which
are created by the use- value or consumption of labour-power. What dis-
tinguishes these interrelated elements - surplus value, commodities,
and labour-power - is that all are forms of exchange value. Labour-
power in wages, commodities in price, and surplus value in profit.
Nevertheless, it is only through the use-value of labour-power or act-
ual productive activity, that commodities and surplus value are creat-
ed in the first place. Labour-power, then, is unique among all other
commodities, since its materialized expression, labour, is the source
of all other commodities and consequently, surplus as well since the
two are inseparable. Labour-power, therefore, must have a use-value
which creates a greater amount of exchange value then its own value
for a surplus to be realized. Labour is required to produce a bundle
of commodities which exchanges for a greater value than that which was
expended by the capitalist in the purchase of labour-power in the form
of wages. "Therefore," Marx asserts, "the value of labour-power, and
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the value which that labour-power creates in the labour process, are
two entirely different values; and this difference of two values was
what the capitalist had in view, when he was purchasing the labour-
power."156 Capitalism has only one goal, the creation and accumula-
tion of surplus value and only one source for the production of that
surplus- -the difference between the value paid for labour power, and
the value created by its use value. This difference is literally the
blood and guts of capitalism.
Although the source of surplus value has been uncovered within
the purchase and consumption of labour power, this process must be
consistent with the laws of equal exchange for Marx to have penetrated
the logic of capitalism. In order to complete this task, Marx divides
the working day into two parts, necessary labour and surplus labour.
When the capitalist purchases labour power at its value, he pays the
worker wages which correspond to his means of subsistence. As labour
power exists only as a capacity, its realization presupposes a living
individual. Therefore "...the value of labour-power is the value of
the means of subsistence necessary for the maintenance of the labourer
which depends upon the average wage accorded to the proleteriant with-
157
in a specific historical period." Thus, part of the working day
is necessary to keep the worker alive during twenty four hours and is
designated as that part of the working day which is necessary labour.
This is the value which appears in the commodity which , is sufficient
to cover the wages the labourer receives. If the working day stops
at this juncture, Marx argues, "our capitalist stares in astonishment"
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for "the values of the product is exactly equal to the value of the
158
capital advanced." In such a hypothetical case, surplus value has
not been created since the capitalist would be able to sell his pro-
duct for just enough to reimburse his costs. However, the capitalist
in purchasing labour power paid the value for a day's labour time and
possesses the use of this commodity for a day regardless of the fact
that one-half of the day's labour time is sufficient to pay for it.
Anything less than a full day's labour for its real value would, ac-
cording to the laws of equal exchange, actually cheat the capitalist!
Consequently, the labourer works a full day and the value created in
the last half belongs to the capitalist in the form of surplus value.
These circumstances, that the value the capitalist receives from the
consumption of labour, is double what he pays for it is "without doubt,
a piece of luck for the buyer, but by no means an injury to the sell-
er."
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Within the context of the exchange of commodities, everything
is fair and square for "equivalent has been exchanged for equivalent.
The capitalist simply purchased labour-power at its value, and then
consumed its use -value.
As the capitalists' accumulation of surplus value confirms, the
exchange of equivalents between worker and capitalist only an ap-
parent exchange. Although the wage form in this sense is illusionary,
illusion dominates reality, for the wage form "extinguishes every trace
of the division of the working day into necessary labour and surplus
labour, into paid and unpaid labour. All labour appears as paid la-
bour."
161
To the extent that this illusion of fair exchange predomi-
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nates in the mode of production and the market place, man's understand-
ing of the economic and social structure is mistaken. Thus the buying
and selling of labour power creates not only a surplus for the capital-
ist, but as Marx makes clear, produces an entire ideological superstruc-
ture directly from the process of production and exchange. Both the
generation of surplus value and the reproduction of the relationship
between capital and labour occur together in one process. Hence the
decisive importance of the transformation of value and the price of
labour power into the form of wages lies in the fact that "this phen-
menal form, which makes the actual relation invisible, and, indeed
shows the direct opposite of that relation, forms the basis of all the
juridicial notions of both labourer and capitalist, of all the mysti-
fications of the capitalist mode of production, of all the illusions as
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to liberty, of all the apologetic shifts of the vulgar economists."
The nascent, essential moment of ideology and false consciousness is
derived from the labour process and exchange with the consequence that
the worker is participating in his own intellectual subservience and
confusion when he is forced due to his class position to sell he la-
bour power for a wage. The wage form is the phenomenal expression of
'the fact that exchange and the labour process are two interrelated
moments necessary for the generation and realization of surplus value.
Moreover, it forges the foundation of the ideological apparatus of cap-
italism. The logic of the theoretical, legal, and state apparatus is
predicated upon the wage form, thereby confirming this illusion as the
phenomenon which is most real within the capitalist world. "The spe-
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cific economic form," Marx argues, "in which unpaid surplus labour is
pumped out of the direct producers, determines the relationship of
rulers and ruled, as it grows directly out of production itself and,
in turn, react upon it as a determining element."163 At the bottom
of the mystery of wages is "the hidden basis of the entire social struc
ture, and with it the political form of the relation of sovereignty
and dependence, in short, the corresponding specific form of the state.
Value
The labour theory of value identified the content of value as
labour, and the theory of surplus value disclosed how surplus is ap-
propriated by the capitalist through the exchange of wages for labour
power. The commonality which unites these formulations and the cor-
responding concepts of commodity, labour power, abstract labour, and
equivalent exchange, is that all of these formulations are express-
ible in the value form. As Marx argues, although political economy
has analyzed value and its magnitude "it has never once asked the
question why labour is represented by the value of its product and
labour time by the magnitude of that value."
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The significance Marx
attaches to this question can be determined by his contention that one
of the chief failings of classical political economy is "that it has
never succeeded by means of its analysis of commodities, and, in par-
ticular, of their value, in discovering that form under which value
becomes exchange value. Even Smith and Ricardo. . .treat the form of
value as a thing of no importance."
166
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That the classical economists never had bothered to ask these
question, let alone perform the analysis, is not attributable to the
fact that their attention was solely dirrected to the analysis of
the magnitude of value (prices and wages). Rather, the value form
was never perceived as a question for inquiry because the classical
economists took for granted the value form of labour as an immutable,
ahistorical fact of nature and accepted it as a natural law. Thus
if "one treats this mode of production as one eternally fixed by na-
ture for every state of society, we necessarily overlook that which
is the differentia specifica of the value form, and consequently of
the commodity- form, and of its further developments, money- form, capi-
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tal-fonn, etc." By failing to analyze value as an historically
transient social form, political economists hypostatized the value
form, and consequently their analysis of social forms "take a course
directly opposite to that of their actual historical development.
The characters. . .have already acquired the stability of natural self-
understood forms of social life, before man seeks to decipher not
their historical character (for in his eyes they are immutable) but
. ,,168
their meaning."
Counterposed to this ahistorical formulation of the value- form,
Marx identifies it as the specific, historical form of capitalist pro-
duction: "The value form of the product of labour is not only the
most abstract, but is also the most universal form, taken by the pro-
duct in bourgeois production, and stamps that production as a parti-
cular species of social production, and thereby gives it its special
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historical character."169 The value form, then, is the historical
manifestation of capitalism's organization of social labour which con-
t
trols every exchange as well as the relaions of production. What this
means is that the value- form is the representation of the regulation
of human work activity.
Every society must possess some mechanism or system of alloca-
ting the total pool of social labour to the diverse components of
the economy. Capitalism, however, has no explicit, open system of
allocating labour since planning at the societal level is forbidden
by the exigencies of the free market. Nonetheless, some system of
allocation must by operative for, if capitalism is to accumulate ef-
ficiently, capital must flow to those sectors of the economy where
the profit rate is greatest. The value form is the conceptual repre-
sentation of the allocation of socially, abstract labour into a reified
form. As Rubin contends "the entire system of value is based on the
grandiose system of sponteneous social accounting and comparison of
the products of labour of various types and performed by diffemet in-
170dividuals as parts of the total social abstract labour." Value,
therefore, is the expression of the historically specific production
relations of independent commodity producers and sellers within the
total economy. It is the embodiment and reflection of alienated labour
and its social allocation by the 'invisible hand' based on the cri-
terion of profit maximization. The value form, in the strict sense ,
is only possible with the advent of the capitalist system an its neces-
say type of labour, alienated labour. The analysis of value in all its
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manifestations in Capital is the conceptual link to the analysis of
alienation in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
. Both works
are critiques of alienated labour and the worker's degraded condition
in capitalism.
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CHAPTER IV
Emile Durkheim
As Gidden f s comments "to move from Marx to Durkheim is
not only to move from an earlier to a latter generation of
social thinkers, it is also in effect a major change in in-
stitutional context and intellectual tradition." 171 As Marx
was the intellectual descendent of German Idealism and Hegel,
Durkheim. was "the spiritual heir of Comte" with "all the
principal elements of his.
. .thought.
. .to be found fore-
shadowed in Comte's writing.
. . . Every element in his
thinking is rooted deeply in the problems immanent in the
system of thought which Comte was so eminent an exponent." 172
This distinction in perspective and epistomology , as repre-
sented in the opposing theories of Marx and Durkheim, depict
the two principal attempts in the nineteenth century to de-
scribe and analyze the economic and political organizations
of European capitalism and industrialism. Though both Durk-
heim and Marx are essentially depicting the same social in-
stitutions and historical epoch, their theoretical perspect-
ives are from polar opposite rationales; the consequence of
different values, assumptions, and premises concerning social
processes, human nature, and the essence of society. Durk-
heim' s counterperspect ive is especially discernable in his
conceptualization of anomie; a social state of normlessness
and anarchy caused by the decomposition of an orderly func-
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tioning society.
As was the case with Marx's theory of alienation, Durk-
heim was not concerned in an abstract, suprahistorical or
psychological definition of anomie. Even within his own
works Durkheim's conceptualization of anomie alters depending
upon the context and theme of his subject matter. Though
anomie is always posited within a social context, in The
Division of Labor in Society
,
the focus is on identifying
anomie as a structural dilemma of several abnormal types of
the division of labor--the anomie division of labor and the
forced division of labor; while in Suicide
,
the concentration
is on the pathological result of the chronic disorder of the
economy as represented in anomie suicides. Although for
Durkheim, suicide--on the face of it, the most private of
acts only affecting the individual -- is always a social phe-
nomenon explainable by resource to a sociological explanation
(i.e., religious affiliation, religious sacrifice or moral
code, economic crisis), this shift of orientation away from
an investigation of the division of labor and social rela-
tions of production represents a conservative commitment to
a Comteian model of modern society which saw it as basically
involving to order and stability. 173 Therefore, in discuss-
ing anomie, even within the progression of Durkheim's works,
one must be singularly cautious in grounding the concept with-
in the context of the specific argument. There is no simple,
a priori definition of anomie.
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Notwithstanding this consideration, for both pragmatic
as well as ideological reasons, the logic that arranged and
interpreted the facts of suicide has been the Durkheimian
legacy appropriated by American sociologists to the almost
complete exclusions of his concept of an anomic division of
labor. Appropriately, Robert K. Merton, in one of the few
reviews of the Division of Labor
,
concurrently foregoes any
comment on the anomic and the forced division of labor and
attributes a definition of anomie to the Divis ion which cor-
responds more appropriately to Durkheim's description of
anomie in Suicide . 174 Nevertheless, the Division of Labor
offers several advantages relative to Suicide for understand-
ing the concept of anomie. In the first place, this work
provides the initial genesis of the concept within Durkheim's
work. Anomie is situated within a fully developed theory of
the labor process and the social relationships engendered by
the division of labor. Moreover, the major theme of Durk-
heimian thought, the relation between the individual and so-
ciety, is explored historically, both in pre-capitalist and
capitalist socio-economic formations with emphasis on the
transition from feudal to capitalist social relations of pro-
duction. Finally, the concept of anomie is posited relative
to the process of social solidarity and legitimation of so-
cietal controls and constraints on man. In this respect
Durkheim is clearly responding to one of the central para-
doxes of capitalism: How can an economic system which empha-
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sizes individual self-interest, competition, and the absence
of any overriding social plan or control (thus the 'invisible
hand' of the market) maintain solidarity among the popula-
tion? This problematic is especially crucial for the coher-
ence of Durkheim's theoretical endeavor, considering his
transcendental conception of society's primacy over the indi-
vidual; where man is considered "a bundle of desires, which
need to be regulated, tamed, repressed, manipulated and given
direction for the sake of social order." 175
Sociological Method
The Divis ion of Labor
,
as Nisbet acknowledges, "is the
single work in which, it can be unexceptionally said, all of
Durkheim's themes and insights are set forth in tentative
fashion. "176 It is a complex work with several 'tangled
threads' of arguments, though it is acknowledged as the most
fascinating demonstration of Durkheim's conceptualization of
17 7
society. Appropriately, the initial chapter of the Divi -
sion displays the rules and rationale of Durkheim's sociolo-
gical method, which, though further elaborated and formal-
ized within The Rules of the Sociological Method , remained
constant throughout the corpus of his writings. As Durk-
heim's conception of vigorously applied science- - through the
maintenance of a complete dichotomy between form (i.e.,
epistomology and methodological premises) and content (i.e.,
phenomena) --has implicit, conservative implications for his
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conceptualization of theory and society, the scientific and
positivist spirit of his work must be explored at the outset.
This has the further advantage of contrasting positivism to
the dialectical epistomology of Hegel and Marx, which ex-
plicitly derives form from content.
The Divi sion of Labor was concerned, quite literally, to
prove that the function of the division of labor in modern
society was the moral integration of individuals through
their pursuit of complementary and symbiotic specializations.
The function of the division of labor was, according to Durk-
heim, social constraint of individuals-
-
M
a completely moral
phenomenon." However, morality as a concept was contaminated
with theological and metaphysical connotations. The Kantian
categorical
. imperative was, for Durkheim, a method of argu-
ment which "is reduced to a game of concepts . "1'8 Neverthe-
less, how could one observe a moral phenomenon since "taken
by itself (it) does not lend itself to exact observation nor
179indeed to measurement." Observation as method was an ab-
solute necessity, for the fundamental characteristic of the
positivist revolution according to Comte "consisted in trans-
ferring to observation the preponderance hitherto exercised
by the imagination (i.e., theology and metaphysics). 1 * 180 Of
course, observation is only possible if an external index can
be substituted for the phenomena (moral constraint) which is
an internal fact. For Durkheim, in the Division , "this visi-
ble symbol is law." 181 Durkheim argues, ". . .despite its
83
immaterial character, (social solidarity) resides not in a
state of pure potentiality but manifests its presence by
sensible indices." In this respect, law is the prototype
of what Durkheim characterizes as a 'social fact.' Two pri-
mary qualities of law will be transmitted in The Rules of the
Sociological Method
,
into the eternal, identifying character-
istics of social facts in general. Durkheim defines the spe-
cificity of social facts based upon the criteria of 'exteri-
ority' and 'constraint.' Laws are external to the individual
in the sense that they are constituted by multiple interac-
tions between individuals which allow them to function inde-
pendently of any one individual. Furthermore, laws exist
prior to the existence of the individual since "every man is
born into an on-going society which already has a definite
organization or structure, and which conditions his own per-
sonality. . . ."-LOJ Secondly, laws provide a moral con-
straint by specifying obligations to which the individual
conforms to on the basis of fear of societal sanction. Indi-
viduals must accept the legitimacy of these constraints in
order to maintain a functioning collectivity. "Let all so-
cial life disappear," Durkheim contends, "and moral life
will disappear, since it will no longer have any object-
ive. "184 Morality, or constraint, is inseparable from so-
cietal conditions.
Laws, then, are the phenomena which compose the 'data
base' for Durkheim's observation of social solidarity. His
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hypothesis is the presumption that as social life becomes
more complex and organized, the more numerous and diverse the
forms of judicial codes and laws. "Our method," Durkheim
declares, "has now been fully outlined. Since law reproduces
the principal forms of social solidarity, we have only to
classify the different types of laws to find them from the
different types of social solidarity which correspond to
1 1 1 8 5it." This mode of investigation is the 'positive' method
based on the assumptions of the natural sciences where elec-
tricity is measured "through its psychochemical effects,
force through movement." 186 Accordingly, the phenomena is
not observed or measured directly. Only the effects of phe-
nomena can be known since ".
. .we can know causes scientif-
ically only by the effects that they produce" from which
"science chooses from (those) effects only the most obj ective
1 R 7
and most eas i ly me asurable . " "This book," then, as Durk-
heim states at the outset, "is above all an attempt to treat
the facts of moral life according to the method of the po-
1 o o
sitive sciences."
Mechanical Solidaritv: Pre- industrial Social Relations
r ———— — — _ —
In order for Durkheim to analyze the significance of the
division of labor and its relationship to morality, he has to
compare and contrast the organizing principles of less de-
veloped societies with those which govern the organization of
advanced societies. Durkheim employs a broadly evolutionary
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classification scheme of social structures, distinguishing
between 'mechanical' societies-
- emphasi zing undifferentiated
unity of tasks, beliefs, and sentiments and rigid social con-
trol; and 'organic' social solidarity-
- involving independent
and multiple roles, beliefs, and sentiments. Mechanical so-
lidarity, then, will provide the ground to evaluate the ef-
fects of the division of labor.
Mechanical solidarity characterizes primitive and feudal
societies which are both pre- industrial and pre-capitalist.
Such societies are clan-based with well-developed kinship
systems. This type of society exhibits little interdepend-
ence and manifests social bonds outside the family which are
relatively weak and infrequent. Durkheim characterizes this
social type^as a collective type since it is a society with
a more or less organized totality of beliefs and sentiments
which are imposed uniformly on all members of the group.
In such a social formation the members are analogous to "so-
cial molecules" which "can act together only in the measure
they have no actions of their own as the molecules of inor-
190ganic bodies." The individual is attached to society in
a manner analogous "to the cohesion which unites the elements
of an inanimate body. . .the link which thus unites the indi-
vidual to society is wholly analogous to that which attaches
a thing to a person." 191 In other words, in primitive socio-
economic formations autonomous individuals do not exist nor
do they have any independence from the social collectivity.
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"Where this type of solidarity is highly developed, the indi-
vidual does not appear.
. .individuality is something which
the society possesses.
. .
,"
192
What type of law, then, characterizes societies exhibit-
ing mechanical solidarity? Durkheim identifies in these so-
cial formations the preponderance of penal law which possess
repressive sanctions consisting of the imposition of some
type of punishment for an individual's transgression. Ac-
cordingly, repressive law is characteristic of that sort of
transgression which is a 'crime.' Though crimes "must have
a common foundation, for they everywhere affect the moral
conscience of nations in the same ways and produce the same
results," this constraint cannot be intrinsically located
within the criminal act itself, for what constitutes a crime
presents too much diversity from society to society .
A
crime, henceforth, must violate some sentiment which is ex-
ternal to the act itself. The commonality which Durkheim
identifies among all crimes ". . .is that they consist. . .
in acts universally disapproved of by members of society. . .
that is, the crime shocks sentiments which, for a given so-
cial system, are found in all healthy consciences." 19 '*
Crime, as such, violates the moral basis of society and can
only be defined relative to a specific social collectivity.
The universal and diffuse moral basis which is offended
by a criminal act is designated by Durkheim as the collective
conscience. Specifically, it is, "the totality of beliefs
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and sentiments common to average citizens of the same soci-
ety formCing) a determinate system which has its own life
.
.
.it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is by
definition, diffuse in every reach of society." 195 For Durk-
heim, the collective conscience is the 'social fact' par ex-
cellence exhibiting both exteriority and constraint. The
collective conscience is exterior to the individual in as
much as "it is.
. .independent of the particular conditions
in which individuals are placed; they pass on and it re-
mains.
.
,"
196 it is not merely the sum total of individual
consciences but "an entirely different thing from a particu-
lar conscience." 197 The relation of the collective to the
individual consciousness is a dialectal one of the universal
to the particular. This relation, of course, does not deny
the individual conscience for it is only through it that the
collective conscience can be realized. Nonetheless, the col-
lective conscience represents a transcendental, psychial rep-
resentation of society which is the constraining force on the
. individual. Its existence is prior to that of the individ-
ual .
If the collective conscience is universal throughout so-
ciety, what composes its content? Here, foreshadowing his
future theory of religion, the collective conscience under
I no
mechanical solidarity is defined preeminately as religion.
"Religion," Durkheim states, "pervades the whole of social
life, but this is because social life consists almost exclu-
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sively in common beliefs and practices which derive from un-
animous adherence.
. .
."199 Under mechanical solidarity,
religion "pervades everything; everything social is religi-
ous; the two words are synonymous." 200 "It is, thus, very
probable.
.
.that religion corresponds to a region equally
very central in the common conscience." 201 The degree of co-
hesion as expressed in the collective conscience depends upon
the degree to which beliefs are practiced and explicitly de-
fined; the stronger the degree of definition, the less room
they leave for individual divergence and initiative. Thus
where mechanical solidarity predominates, the beliefs and
creeds are extensive and men's movements are limited and
constrained.
Finally, Durkheim identifies a particular socio-economic
structure under mechanical solidarity which he calls seg-
mental. Societies, in which the principal bonds of cohesion
are segmented, are composed of juxtaposed self-contained
units, such as the family clan in antiquity and the manor in
feudalism. As such, units are economically self-sufficient:
any part of a segmented society can break away without much
loss to any other. In this respect, there is a significant
convergence between Marx and Durkheim in their descriptions
of pre-capitalist social formation, though the implications
of their analyses differ. Social solidarity, characterized
by the absence of the division of labor, well-developed mark-
ets, 'free' labourers, and extensive exchange relations, cor-
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responds approximately to what Marx characterizes as feudal
or pre-capitalist production relations. This fact does not
mean, however, that the two conceptualizations are identical,
for clearly Durkheim is characterizing all social formations
from antiquity to the onset of capitalism as mechanical
whereas Marx is primarily interested in feudalism, the trans-
itional phase of capitalism. Nevertheless, feudalism is the
last form of society which is predominantly mechanical and
segmental. Though in feudalism, the labor and the means of
production (i.e., tools) belong to the serf and the land be-
longs to the lord, the combination of the two elements for
production purposes occur through the force of law or custom,
202both backed by juridicial sanctions. By force of law, the
serf works a plot of land belonging to the landlord and in
return the serf must pay rent and serve a corvee (i.e., work
a given number of days on the manor, usually with his own
tools). Law, rather than exchange or contract, maintains
production relations and solidarity. A segmental society, as
such, corresponds to what Marx characterizes as pre-capital-
ist relations of production.
Organic Solidarity : Industrial , Society and Exchange
In identifying 'organic solidarity 1 in distinction to
mechanical solidarity, Durkheim is remaining faithful to his
methodological premise of observing laws and juridicial
structure to determine social type. Historically, Durkheim
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documented the progressive displacement of repressive law by
restitutive law; a displacement which is correlated with the
degree of development of society. The more complex the type
of social development, the greater the relative proportion of
restitutive laws in the juridicial system. In fact, Durkheim
acknowledges that even regardless of quantity "the very na-
ture of the restitutive sanction suffices to show that the
social solidarity to which this type of law corresponds is of
a totally different kind." 203 Restitutive law, in contrast
to repressive law which mandates punishment "is not expia-
tory, but comes of simple return to state." 204 Thus if two
parties enter into a contract and one fails to uphold his ob-
ligation, the offender is not inflicted with a penal sent-
ence; instead, "he is simply sentenced to comply with it
(i.e., contract)." 205 Thus, the judge does not speak in
terms of punishment; rather the judge orders the contractual
agreement reinstated to its normal form.
As a repressive function was defined relative to the col-
lective conscience, the definitive and distinguishing element
of restitutive law is that its "rules. . .either do not to-
tally derive from the collective conscience, or are only fee-
ble states of it." 206 Whereas "repressive law corresponds to
the heart, the centre of the common conscience," restitutive
law "is born in the very ex-centric regions" of the common
conscience. 207 Instead of being diffused and generalized
throughout society, restitutive law creates specialized
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organs consular and administrative tribunals and councils of
arbitration; and particular functionaires-
-magistrates
, law-
yers, etc. This specialization and concentration of the
rules, though creating codes more or less outside the common
conscience, is still "a social thing and has a totally dif-
ferent object than the interest of the pleaders." 208 Accord-
ingly, restitutive law and consequently, society, cannot be
reduced to that of a conciliator or private interest; rather,
this form of law adjudicates the rights of some particular
interest relative to the traditional rules of society.
Again, the particular interests can only be defined relative
to a functioning society with the priority of the totality.
Whereas the content of repressive law was identified
primarily with religious constraints which "attach the par-
ticular conscience to the collective conscience directly and
without mediation"; restitutive law is associated exclusively
with contract between "restricted, special parties in society
whom they bind." 20 ^ Consequently, in the latter case, rela-
tionships between individuals occur through contracts which
somehow must be mediated with society. The content of res-
titutive law, thus, corresponds to the body of 'real rights'
exemplified by the "law of property. . .the most perfect ex-
ample of them." 210 However, as Durkheim argues, the personal
relations established by 'real rights' constitute "a definite
system which has as its function, not to attach different
parts of society to one another, but on the contrary, to put
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them outside one another to mark clearly the barriers which
separate them." 211 Thus 'real rights,' left by themselves,
"do not correspond to a positive social link," in fact, they
actually correspond to a 'negative solidarity.' 212
What, then, constitutes the mediation of the individual
to society if 'real rights' in themselves, actually work
against social solidarity? Here solidarity stems simply not
from acceptance of a common set of beliefs and sentiments,
but, as Durkheim argues from the mediating effects of the
division of labor. Solidarity, in the absence of a strong
common conscience, depends upon reciprocity and cooperation
among individuals, "and that, in its turn, does not come
about without the division of labor." 213 Cooperation, stem-
ming from the division of labor, expresses "the multiplicity
of contracts which have as their objects the adjustment of
special, different functions to one another: contracts be-
tween buyer and seller, contracts of exchange, contracts be-
tween employer and worker, between tenant and landlord, be-
tween lender and borrower. . . ." Contracts, then, the
judicial expression of cooperation par excellence, ±0 is the
symbol of exchange. 216 Thus the relations expressed by co-
operation and the solidarity which they defend, result from
the division of labor. This type of solidarity, designated
by Durkheim as 'organic,' historically expands within a so-
ciety simultaneously with the growth of the division of
labor.
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Concommitant with increased cooperation among the popu-
lation, the division of labor is associated with an increased
specialization of work activity and function. Thus the pro-
gression of organic solidarity is necessarily dependent upon
the declining significance of the collective conscience.
Durkheim points out that such an outcome is inevitable since
"it is in the nature of special tasks to escape the action of
the collective conscience, for, in order for a thing to be an
object of common sentiments, the first condition is that it
is common, that is to say, that it be present in all consci-
ences.
. . .
But the more specialized they are, the more
circumscribed the number of those cognizant of each of
them. ,,z,1D Thus the collective conscience is "only a very
217
restricted part" of advanced societies composed of "weak
impressions and has only a weak power to carry the individual
218
in a collective direction." Hence associated with the rise
of the division of labor and the decline of the col lective
conscience is a concurrent increase in individualism.
At this point, one of the essential problematics of
Durkheim thought appears: namely, the concurrent growth of
individualism with increased cooperation due to the division
of labor. "In effect, on the one hand," Durkheim acknow-
ledges, "each one depends as much more strictly on society as
labor is more divided; and, on the other hand, the activity
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of each is as much personal as it is more specialized."
Thus Durkheim through his own concept of the division of
94
labor identifies one of the central contradictions in capital-
ism; that social labor is realizable only through private,
individual labor. Moreover, unbridled individualism is an-
athema from Durkheim 1 s perspective. However, at this point
of his argument, he argues that the social differentiation
represented by individualism is subordinated to and comple-
mentary with organic solidarity. "Here, then, the individ-
uality of all grows at the same time as that of its parts.
Society becomes more capable of collective movement, at the
same time that each of its elements has more freedom of
2 20movement." Using an analogy drawn from biology, Durkheim
contends that the unity of the organism is as great as the
"individuation of the parts (organs) is more marked." 221 Ac
cordingly, so long as the development of individualism con-
tributes to the collective solidarity of society, it is a
positive phenomenon. Nevertheless, the circumstance of in-
dividualism, or what Durkheim calls, the 'cult of the indi-
2 2 2
vidual,' supplanting the coherence of social solidarity
remains as a possible logical outcome of his theory.
That the increasing division of labor in modern society
threatened its social cohesion was precisely the view of his
intellectual forebearer, Comte. For Comte, though acknow-
ledging that the division of labor permitted "a felicitous
development of the spirit of detail otherwise impossible,"
also contended that "it spontaneously tends, on the other
hand, to snuff out the spirit of togetherness or, at least,
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to undermine it profoundly." 223 The division of labor, as
such, must create an intellectual and moral situation which
demands a "permanent discipline able to prevent or increas-
ingly contain this discordant fight." 224 In the Comteian
position "division is dispersion" for it brought with it "a
total disposition towards a fundamental dispersion of ideas,
sentiments, and interests.
. .
.»
22 5 For Comte, only the
discipline and constraint of moral norms will provide the
order and stability necessary in a society with an advanced I
division of labor. In this respect, Comte himself is a
polemical target of the Division of Labor and the concept of
organic solidarity. Durkheim has flatly rejected the Comte-
ian analysis that the division of labor induces social disorder
Therefore, Durkheim occupies a third position: on the one
hand, opposing the Marxist position that the division of la-
bor, as one of the central contradictions of capitalism,
leads to crisis and its own immanent negation; while on the
other, opposing Comte' s overstatement of the dispersive ef-
fects of the division of labor. Whereas, Marx neglected the
moral elements of the division, Comte failed to see the so-
cial solidarity produced by the division of labor, which with
its web of interdependence, was gradually being substituted
for the earlier solidarity which rested mainly on shared
77 f\
moral beliefs
.
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Contract
,
Exchange
, and Solidarity
The primary manifestation of organic solidarity in in-
dustrial society is the contract, the document which mediates
exchange between individuals on the market. Here, Durkheim
clearly distinguishes his conception of contract and exchange
from that of the utilitarians, specifically directing his
critical attack against Herbert Spencer. Spencer, as a phi-
losophical utilitarian, tended to view everything social as
either a direct emanation from individual nature or as a
highly intellectualized contract among human beings. 227 Thus
Durkheim claims, that for Spencer, "society does not have to
intervene to assure the harmony which is self-established." 228
Without the constraint and stability of society, "the only
remaining link between men would be that of an absolutely
free exchange" with "as Spencer says, all industrial affairs
taking place through the medium of free exchange." 22 ^ Ac-
cordingly, "this relation becomes dominant in society in so
far as individual activity becomes dominant." 230 In the
utilitarian concept of society, then, "social solidarity
would then be nothing else than spontaneous accord of indi-
vidual interests, an accord of which contracts are the nat-
ural expression." Exchange and contract, in other words,
would not be properly social.
The inaccuracy of the utilitarian scheme lies in the
fact that it characterizes the division of labor, contract,
and exchange as solely economic, "stripped of all regulation
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and resulting from the entirely free initiative of all par-
ties." If all that individuals did, was solely exchange
the products of their labor on the market, the resulting
state of affairs would be "a state of war, with every other
since nothing comes to modify egos, and any truce in this ex-
ternal antagonism would not be of long duration.'* 233 A so-
ciety based solely on the maximization of individual inter-
ests (i.e., utilitarianism) would soon disintegrate for as
Durkheim. argues "there is nothing less constant that inter-
est. Today, it unites me to you; tomorrow, it will make me
*^ A
your enemy."- The purely economic and utilitarian concept
of maximization of satisfaction of needs, represses one es-
sential dimension of exchange; namely, what Marx character-
izes as the superstructure, and Durkheim identifies as the
complex of norms, regulations, and customs which presuppose
the existence of contractual agreements. All contracts and
exchanges are dependent upon two social facts; first, the ob-
vious—the existence of a society--and finally, a 'community
of beliefs' based on cooperation. Thus when "society inter-
venes more, we have not the right to say that the individual
spontaneity suffices more and more in all spheres. " c On
the contrary, as contract relations expand due to the divi-
sion of labor, social control actually increases, even though
individualism also becomes more pervasive.
The moral solidarity engendered by the contract becomes
self-evident when one considers that for two parties to co-
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operate harmoniously, it is not sufficient for them to enter
into a relationship or to even feel the state of mutual de-
pendence which they find themselves. 236 It is absolutely ne-
cessary that for the duration of the contract, the conditions
for cooperation be fixed. "These rights and duties," Durk-
heim contends, "must be defended, not only in view of the
situation such as it presents itself at the moment when the
contract is made, but with foresight for the circumstances
which may arise to modify it. Otherwise, at every instance,
there would be conflicts and endless difficulties.
. .
."
2 37
This consideration leads to a body of contract law which de-
fines and determines the juridicial consequences of exchange.
Moreover, contract law must express the normal conditions or
norms of exchange in order that one knows beforehand the con-
sequences and rules of specific agreements. If it were ne-
cessary each time to establish firmly all the conditions and
norms for agreements, "we would be put to route. . . . 1,238
Thus from Durkheim's point of view, the law of contract "is
no longer simply a useful complement of individual conven-
tions; it is their fundamental norm. Imposing itself upon us
with the authority of traditional experience, it constitutes
the foundation of our contractual relations." 2^ According-
ly, in lieu of the moral solidarity and constraint engender-
ed by the common conscience, "the law of contracts exercises
over us a regulative force of the greatest importance, since
it determines what we ought to do and what we can require." 240
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Society, then, is not a passive third party in contractual
agreements, but rather, represents the totality of conditions
which presuppose any contract.
Finally, in addition to the constraints which contract-
law imposes on society, solidarity is enhanced by general
customs which are created by the division of labor. These
customs become apparent in the manner in which one makes and
executes contracts in special occupations, though these rules
are not sanctioned either directly or indirectly by any
code.^ These rules of occupational morality, particularly
apparent in the so-called liberal professions, "force the in-
dividual to act in view of ends which are not strictly his
own, to make concessions, to consent to compromises, to take
into account interests higher than his own." 242 ' Accordingly,
in the law profession there is a special code of ethics while
in medicine, physicians are bound by the Hippocratic Oath.
Thus, for Durkheim, there is no apparent contradiction
in the fact that individualism and morality grow concurrently
with the division of labor. As Durkheim observes, "it is
wrong to oppose a society which comes from a community of be-
liefs to one which has a co-operative basis, according to the
first a moral character, and seeing in the latter only an
economic grouping. In reality, co-operation also has its own
intrinsic morality." 243 At this point in the argument,
though, Durkheim speculates about a possibility: "There is,
however, reason to believe. . .that in contemporary societies
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this morality has not yet reached the high development which
would now seem necessary to it." 244 Hence, although Durkheim
has successfully posited a solution to the problematic of in-
dividualism and moral constraint, with the division of labor,
the problematic has, in essence, been displaced to the rela-
tionship between the actual conditions of moral development
in contemporary society and his functional analysis of the
division of labor.
Abnormal Forms : The Division of Labor within Capitalism
In the final section of the Division of Labor
,
Durkheim
transposes his referential point from the functional analysis
of the division to an examination of its contemporary mani-
festations in society. Accordingly, Durkheim is confronting
the capitalist system of the late nineteenth century, and it
is at this point where his analysis runs into difficulty.
"Though normally," Durkheim contends, "the division of labor
produces social solidarity, it sometimes happens that it has
oit-
different, and even contradictory results." These contra-
dictory results are what Durkheim characterizes as "abnormal
forms" of the division of labor. If the growth of the divi-
sion of labor is not inevitably associated with a concommit-
ant increase of organic solidarity, however, what explains
these abnormal or pathological forms which are so exclusively
predominant within capitalism. The urgency of this problem-
atic, for Durkheim, is emphasized by the fact that in 1886,
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the year that he was drafting the Division of Labor
,
there
was increasing class and industrial conflict in France, cul-
minating in the great Decazeville strike. 246 Thus it is es-
sential for the entire logic of his argument concerning the
division of labor to find out what makes it deviate from its
natural course, "for if we do not prove that these cases are
exceptional, the division of labor might be accused of logic -
ally implying them. 1,247
The first abnormal form of the division of labor which
Durkheim acknowledges is instances within the economy where
"certain social fucntions are not adjusted to one another." 248
Durkheim uncovers two forms of this pathological type; name-
ly, "industrial or commercial crises" and "the conflict be-
2 4Qtween capital and labor." With respect to both the degree
of class conflict and the frequency of economic depressions,
he acknowledges a continuous increase during the nineteenth
century. Moreover, Durkheim does not deny that both of the
above pathological phenomena are accompanied by an increase
in specialization of industrial function and the concommit-
ant cultivation of the division of labor. What, then, can
explain these conflicts, if the division of labor is not in-
extricably involved?
In order to counteract the claim that the division of
labor, per se, is the cause of economic conflicts, Durkheim
distinguishes between the division of labor as the state of
mutual dependence in which organic solidarity is engendered,
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and the rules, customs, and juridicial forms (i.e., super-
structure) which are associated with the division of labor.
Durkheim claims that "in the normal state, these rules disen-
gage themselves from the division of labor" and become "a
prolongation if it." 250 These rules are the ".
. .ways of
definite action, which are identically repeated in given cir-
cumstances, since they cling to general constant conditions
of social life" and become habits which "are transformed
into rules of conduct." 251 However, and this is essential
for Durkheim' s position, these rules do not "create the state
of initial dependence in which solidarity organs find them-
selves, but only expresses in clear-cut fashion the result
of a given situation." 252 In other words organic solidarity
is exclusively the result of the division of labor which pre-
supposes the existence of rules. Nevertheless, the rules are
the result of the division of labor and constitute the com-
ponent elements of the "network of links which little by lit-
tle have been woven and which makes something permanent of
253
organic solidarity."
Class conflict and economic crisis, then, are cases
where "this regulation either does not exist, or is not in
accord with the degree of development of the division of la-
bor. Today, there are no longer any rules which fix the num-
ber of economic enterprises, and, in each branch of industry,
production is not exactly regulated on a level with consump-
tion." 254 The division of labor, as such, has temporarily
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outstripped the development of appropriate moral regulation
as expressed in the rules. "What is certain," in this situa-
tion, Durkheim argues, "is that this lack of regulation does
not permit a regular harmony of functions." 255 Although ex-
plicitly refraining from arguing for restrictive legislation
to regulate the market and industry, Durkheim castigates clas-
sical economists, who claim that with the 'invisible hand'
"harmony is self
- established when necessary, thanks to rises
and declines in prices which according to needs stimulate or
slacken production." 256 For Durkheim, such a conception is
fallacious for harmony "is established only after ruptures of
equilibrium and more or less prolonged disturbances." 257
Moreover, without extensive regulation, the disturbances are
naturally more frequent as functions become specialized and
fragmented
.
If market forces failed to afford equilibrium and har-
mony in the economy, it was not astonishing that the rela-
tions between capital and labor were in disarray. Thus, the
contract relations between capital and labor were in the same
state of 'juridicial indetermination ' as the market. In this
respect, Durkheim espouses the norm under capitalism: "A
contract for the hire of services occupies a very small place
in our Codes, particularly when one thinks of the diversity
and complexity of the relations which it is called up to reg-
ulate." 258 In other words, the regulation of labor does not
exist since it too must respond to market pressures. For
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Durkheim, the totality of these ruptures of equilibrium are
all varieties of the same species and constitute the defini-
tion of his first account of anomie. "If the division of I
labor does not produce solidarity in all these cases, it is
because the relations of the organs are not regulated, be-
cause they are in a state of anomy." 259 This, Durkheim's
first account of anomie is clearly in terms of the absence of
a body of rules governing the relations of social functions.
Here as elsewhere in Durkehim's writings, the concept of
anomie can only be understood relative to the background of
the 'normal' or 'natural' condition from which it is held to
260be the pathological deviation. The essential normal fac-
tors with which it is here contrasted are extensive economic
planning, and the normative regulation of industrial relations
and contractual relationships between capital and labor.
Thus, anomy, as was the case with the concept of alienation,
can only be grasped as the absence of the 'normal' condition-
al which serves as the reference point for the pathological.
If anomy, or lack of regulation in all phases of eco-
nomic and social life, is not caused by the division of la-
bor, "whence comes this state?" Durkheim diagnoses the cause
of the abnormal condition as the result of the growth of the
market and industry to national and international scale.
This situation breaks contact between producers and consum-
ers. Organic solidarity, normally dependent upon the growth
and extension of the market as well as the division of labor,
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has metastisized into disease when "the producer can no
longer embrace the market in a glance, nor even in thought.
He can no longer see its limits, since it is, so to speak,
2 6 Xlimitless." Thus, in contemporary society, "production
becomes unbridled and unregulated" and "from this come(s) the
crisis which periodically disturb(s) economic functions." 262
The extension of the market and the growth of great in-
dustry is, moreover, indicted as the essential cause of work
conditions which are abnormal: "machines replace man; manu-
facturing replaces hand-work. The worker is regimented, sep-
arated from his family throughout the day." 263 As the lab-
ourer "does not know whether the operations he performs are
tending, if he relates them to no end, he can only continue
to work through routine. Every day he repeats the same move-
ments with monotonous regularity, but without being interest-
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ed in them, and without understanding them." This leads
to circumstances where the labourer "is no longer anything
but an inert piece of machinery, only an external force set
going which always moves in the same direction and in the
same way." 265 For Durkheim this creates a moral situation
where "one cannot remain indifferent to such debasement of
human nature" in as much "the peril does not threaten only
266
economic fucntions, but all social functions. . . ."
The perplexity with this account of anomie is that al-
though it precisely pinpoints the central ills of capitalism
--unregulated competition; class conflict; routinized, de-
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grading, and meaningless work- -it characterized them all as
abnormal forms of the division of labor. 267 This procedure
hinders any investigation into the causes of these ills for
Durkheim did not consider them inherent; instead he enter-
tained an evolutionary optimism concerning the alleviation of
these pathological forms. These forms were to be explained
by the temporary and transitory lack of appropriate economic
controls, appropriate norms governing industrial and con-
tractual relationships, and the appropriate forms of work or-
7 f\ R
ganization. In the future these absences would be reme-
died by allowing the operation of interdependent functions to
produce its natural consequences. Thus, these abnormal forms
were not due to the division, per se • but rather to the fact
that the division has not had sufficient time to establish
solidarity between the different organs in society. For
Durkheim, this solution provides the answer to the apparent
contradiction of the simultaneous growth of human degradation
and the division for "contrary to what has been said, the di-
vision of labor does not produce these consequences because
of a necessity of its own nature, but only in exceptional
9 f\ Q
and abnormal circumstances . n<- D ^
The Forced Division of Labor
While normally the functioning of organic solidarity en
tails the existence of normative rules which coordinate the
relationships between different occupational groups, this
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circumstance cannot be achieved if these rules are unilater-
ally imposed by one class on another. "It is not sufficient,"
Durkheim contends, "that there be rules.
. .for sometimes the
rules themselves are the causes of evil. This is what occurs
in class wars." 270 He characterizes the 'institution of
classes and castes' as a 'forced division of labor' which
comprises a further abnormal form since it is a source of
dissension rather than solidarity. The imposition of rules
which discriminate against the lower classes causes inequal-
ities among individuals. Through the force of custom or law,
social functions within the division of labor are closed to
them. Hence "for the division of labor to produce solidar-
ity, it is not sufficient, then, that each have his task; it
is still necessary that this task be fitting to him." 271
Contemporary society, then, fails to achieve organic so-
lidarity "because the distribution of social functions on
which it rests does not respond, or rather no longer responds,
2 72
to the distribution of natural talents." Thus Durkheim
conceives of inequality as the structural misallocation of
individuals to social roles within the division of labor.
As "the agreement between the aptitudes of individuals and
the kind of activity assign to them is found to be broken in
every region of society; constraint alone, more or less vio-
lent and more or less direct, links them to their functions.
Consequently, only an imperfect and troubled solidarity is
possible." 273 "Thus civil wars arise which are due to the
manner in which labor is distributed. 1,274
Again, at this juncture, Durkheim specifically argues
that "this result is not a necessary consequence of the divi-
sion of labor" but comes about under only particular circum-
stances; that is, when it is an effect of an external
2 75force." This external force, which causes the pathologic-
al form, interferes with the internal spontaneity of the di-
vision of labor causing a disturbance to the initiative of
individuals. Hence harmony and equilibrium between individ-
ual natures and social functions cannot be realized and con-
straint must be applied to individuals. Constraint, in this
case, though, means more than mere regulation and solidarity:
"Constraint which only begins with regulation, no longer cor-
responding to the true nature of things, and, accordingly, no
longer having any basis in customs, can only be validated
through force. *' 27 ^ i n contrast to this abnormal type of con-
straint, Durkheim posits the normal division where labor is
divided spontaneously. He asserts that "the division of la-
bor produces solidarity only if it is spontaneous and in pro-
? 7 7portion as it is spontaneous." This spontaneity does not
simply imply the absence of violence or constraint "but also
of everything that can even indirectly shackle the free un-
,,278
folding of the social force that each carries within him.
For Durkheim "labor is divided spontaneously only if society
is constituted in such a way that social inequalities exactly
express natural inequalities" and that the division of labor
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is untouched by some external cause. 279 "It has only to be
itself, to let nothing coming from without denature it; that
is enough." 280
A further repercussion of the forced division of labor
is a lack of reciprocity or equivalence in the exchange of
wages, goods, and services between capitalists and labor.
When exchange of equivalents deviates from equilibrium due to
the influence of 'abnormal factors,' the public conscience
"finds unjust every exchange where the price of the object
bears no relation to the trouble it cost and the services it
2 81
renders." Moreover, for equivalence to be conceivable "it
is necessary that the contracting parties be placed in condi-
7 8 7tions externally equal" oc for "all superiority has its ef-
fect on the manner in which contracts are made." 283 Durkheim
strikes a radical note, not alien to Marxism, when he de-
clares: "If one class of society is obliged, in order to
live, to take any price for its services, while another can
abstain from such action thanks to resources at its disposal
which, however, are not necessarily due to any social super-
iority, the second has an unjust advantage over the first at
law. In other words, there cannot be rich and poor at birth
without there being unjust contracts." 284
The Division of Labor : Social Solidarity or Anomie ?
In an essay published in 1903, C. Bougie', later one of
the leaders of the French sociological school but then a
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young disciple of Durkheim, stated that "from Durkheim' s de-
fense of the division one gains almost as pessimistic impres-
sion as that given by its socialist critics." 285 Bougie's
evaluation accentuates both the brilliance and the "remark-
able contradiction in the work of so eminent a logician"
which the Division of Labor expresses. 286 At the onset, in
no uncertain terms, Durkheim attempted to rescue the division
of labor from both Comte's and Marx's critiques. In under-
taking to formulate a third position, even the virtuosity of
his logical and historical analysis could not provide the
ground to support his thesis. Unfortunately, for Durkheim,
reality (i.e., capitalism) contradicted and undermined his
major thesis; namely, that the division produced and enhanced
social and moral solidarity within society. Nevertheless, he
was not blind to the debasing effects of industrial speciali-
zation on human nature nor to the debilitating consequences
of cons traint and inequality accompanying contractual rela-
tionships on the market.
Although Durkheim claimed that the increasing division
of. labor is a normal phenomenon producing social organization,
every contemporary form was either labeled anomic or forced.
Unregulated competition; class conflict; degrading, monoton-
ous, and meaningless work; inequality of opportunity among
social classes; and non-equivalence in contractual exchanges
between capitalists and wage laborers were all considered by
Durkheim as aberrant, pathological forms of the division.
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The anomic and forced division of labor resulted from a lack
of a proper coordination of functions and the fact that the
division had momentarily outran the formalization of rules
and customs necessary to regulate industry and exchange.
Thus where Comte was pessimistic as to the future of what he
called 'the fundamental redistribution of human labor,' Durk-
heim was an evolutionary optimist believing that the division
would naturally advance solidarity rather than disintegra-
tion .
In comparison to Marx's critique of capitalist society,
it is readily apparent that all the elements that Durkheim
designated as abnormal were for Marx the inherent essentials
of capitalism as a system. Though adequately pinpointing the
central ills of capitalism, Durkheim's designation of them as
abnormal eliminates the division of labor and implicitly the
capitalist system, as their cause. Whereas for Durkheim, the
eradication of dehumani zat ion of the worker is based upon the
moral consolidation of the division, Marx's hope and expecta-
tion is that the division of labor and capitalism will be
radically transcended altogether.
Historically, how has Durkheim's doctrine fared relative
to the actual development of industrial work and organization
in the twentieth century? Georges Friedmann has remarked
that had Durkheim lived, "in order to maintain the purity of
his theory of organic solidarity, he would have been obliged
to consider 'abnormal' most of the forms taken by labor in
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modern society, both in industry and in administration, and
even more recently in commerce." 287 Mechanization, rational-
ization, and specialization, inspired by the demands of cap-
italism and the profit motive, have even removed occupations
such as agriculture and craftsmanship from Durkheim's defini-
tion of the normal division of labor. Ironically, in the very
year that he published the Division of Labor
,
Frederick Tay-
lor, the father of Scientific Management, decided to devote
himself to spreading his beliefs as a "consulting engineer
specializing in the systematic organization of workshops and
2 88in costs." The stop watch and rationalization procedures
of Taylor and his successors within management have consist-
ently aimed at attaining immediate efficiency and cost-ef-
fectiveness 'by ferreting out unnecessary delays and increas-
ing the intensity and rapidity of highly simplified work
operations on the assembly line. All forms of the excessive
reduction of job content by specialization within the divi-
sion of labor has historically falsified Durkheim's proposi-
tion concerning solidarity. In fact if one were to inspect
the abnormal forms of the division of labor, it becomes dif-
ficult to find one clear-cut case of the normal division in
any society.
Considering that Durkheim is writing several generations
after the Industrial Revolution and after Smith, Ricardo,
Babbage, Marx, and many others, what accounts for this major
contradiction in his theoretical conceptualization which
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calls into question the content of the entire book? Though
formulating the rudiments of a materialistic critique of in-
dustrial society, he clearly rejects an analysis which would
examine the reasons why the inequality of wealth and position
has not disappeared and given way to new social arrangements
more in keeping with the normal divisions of labor. In the
chapters devoted to the abnormal forms of the division, where
concrete evidence of industrial and class inequalities should
be, there is a striking and unfortunate prevalence or organ-
ic, anatomical, and physiological analogies. Gouldner attri-
butes this failure to the fact that Durkheim was deeply com-
mitted to Comteian assumptions concerning moral consensus as
an indispensible element to social solidarity . 289 Moreover, it
would have been difficult, if not impossible, to explore the
causes of the pathological forms within a Comteian model of
modern society which basically envisioned it tending toward
order and stability with a minimum of internal class con-
flict. Therefore, for Durkheim, as well as Comte , the basic
features of the new society were already in existence. Mod-
ern industrialism, the division of labor, and capitalism, as
such, were institutions and structures which needed no jus-
tification per se; rather, the positivist's problem was to
develop a new moral order consistent with them, so that the
new society remained stable and developed in an orderly man-
ner. "Their central task," Gouldner argues, "was not de-
fined as producing social changes so much as facilitating a
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natural tendency toward social order. Their problem was, in
short, that of 'finetuning' the new industrial order rather
than basically reorganizing it."^^
The Sociological Response
: Mystification or Clarification ?
The reception and interpretation of the Divis ion of La-
bor by the American sociological establishment affords an in-
triguing and lamentable chapter of the assimilation of clas-
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sical theory into mainstream sociology. This work has
been particularly troublesome for American commentators since
Durkheim is acknowledged as one of the 'founding fathers' of
the discipline and thus cannot be disgarded to the periphery.
In fact two of sociology's 'superstars,' Robert Nisbet and
Robert K. Merton owe major debts to Durkheim: Nisbet acknow-
ledging Durkheim as one of the major contributors to the 'con
servative tradition of sociology' in general and his own writ
ings in particular, and Merton developing (and distorting)
the concept of anomie into one of his major theoretical con-
tributions to sociology. Accordingly, the interpretations of
the Division
,
especially the section on 'Abnormal Forms,' by
Nisbet and Merton, affords both insights into the ideological
nature of American sociology as well as the premises of their
own theories.
In 1934, four years prior to his seminal essay on ano^
mie, Merton published an essay entitled "Durkheim's
Division
of Labor in Society" following the English
translation of
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this work. Besides the initial imbecilic review by Faris,
this essay was the first statement analyzing Durkheim's work
in depth. 292 Merton's evaluation is mixed. Although he
finds that "in general.
. .it presents as incisive and sug-
gestive analysis of a determinant social process and its
structural correlates," "its conclusions are too sweeping"
and "its method is at times faulty." 293 Even with these re-
servations, though, Merton acknowledges that "from the vant-
age point afforded by four decades of subsequent research it
remains one of the peak contributions of modern sociology." 29 ^
Notwithstanding this accolade one is unsure that Merton has
read the entire work for there is no mention whatsoever of
Book Three of the Divis ion of Labor
,
specifically the chap-
ters devoted to the 'Abnormal Forms.' This is a very strange
omission, indeed, since it includes the section which intro-
duces the concept of anomie for the first time in Durkheim's
writings. One wonders, then, where Merton uncovered the con-
cept of anomie, since in his essay, he discusses it without
mentioning the abnormal forms of the division of labor.
Though Durkheim specifically elaborated the concept of anomie
relative to the division of labor, Merton indicates that Durk-
heim's description of anomie corresponds to the following:
"For where interest is the only ruling force each individual
finds himself in a state of war with every other since no-
thing comes to modify egos, and any truce in this eternal an-
tagonism would not be of long duration."
295 Though this defi-
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nition of anomie corresponds closely to the one given of ano-
mic suicide in Suicide
,
in the context of the Division of La-
bor, Durkheim is arguing the above statement in the context
of a polemic against Herbert Spencer's utilitarian conceptu-
alization of contractual relationships on the market. For
Spencer, according to Durkheim, "social solidarity would be
. .
.nothing else than the spontaneous accord of individual
interests" and "society would be solely the stage where indi-
viduals exchange the products of their labor." 296 If this
were the true situation, the Hobbesian 'state of nature'
would ensue which leads Durkheim to conclude that this cir-
cumstance is not possible in society. What Merton, therefore,
attributes to Durkheim as a definition of anomie was rather
Durkheim' s description of the logical outcome of the utili-
tarian position concerning society. Durkheim's conceptuali-
zation of society, per se, rules out such a definition within
the context of this work, and in no respect can it be attributed
to his definition of the anomie division of labor. What one
does discover in Merton's description of anomie is a forerun-
ner of his normative transformation of critical content in
the concept of anomie in his own essay, "Social Structure and
Anomie." In contrast to Merton's argument which represses
any discussion and analysis of the 'abnormal' division of la-
bor, Robert Nisbet directly confronts the contradiction be-
tween the intent and conclusion of the Division of Labo r. In
a lengthy interpretation of Durkheim's entire opus, Nisbet
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skillfully articulates the contradiction, and then in a con-
voluted, ideological argument of the first order attempts to
rescue Durkheim from himself. In the process, Nisbet reveals
more concerning his own ideological premises, than shedding
any light on Durkheim' s argument in the Division.
Nisbet begins by correctly arguing that the Division was
conceived to prove that the function of the division of labor
was the integration of individuals within society and the
progressive displacement of mechanical solidarity, the tra-
ditional mechanism of social constraint. Though this was the
motivation of the work, Nisbet claims that it was not its
conclusion. If the progressive displacement of the 'common
conscience' by organic solidarity and cooperation created by
the division was not the theme, what is? Though logically
one could readily agree with C. Bougie's argument that Durk-
heim' s defense of the division is an implicit critique of its
actual failing, Nisbet argues a completely antithetical the-
sis. For Nisbet, the distinctive contribution of the Divi -
s ion of Labor lies in the fact that, even in the process of
arguing what he had conceived as the initial thesis of this
work, he saw the inherent weaknesses of that argument when
pushed to its logical conclusions and, seeing them, subtly
but powerfully altered his thesis. According to Nisbet,
what Durkheim really demonstrated was that "although the con-
ceptual distinction between the two types of solidarity or
association was a real one, the institution of the second
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(organic) had to be deeply rooted in the continuation of the
.
.
.first (mechanical)" since the replacement of one for the
other would lead to a 'sociological monstrosity.' 297
At this point, even Nisbet admits that to uncover his
novel interpretation of the Division is an arduous task since
"the unraveling of the somewhat tangled threads of Durkheim's
demonstration is not an easy one. Indeed, in a sense the
book is a kind of palimpset, and more than a little ingenuity
is needed to discern the point at which the secondary argu-
ment (i.e., Nisbet's interpretation) begins to overshadow the
initial thesis." 298 Even more ingenuity, though, will soon
be needed to discern the evidence for this secondary argu-
ment .
What is the crucial evidence? Nisbet contends that "the
secondary argument, that argument that close analysis reveals
to be developing from about the midpoint of the book, is best
expressed in the following passage." 299
The division of labor can. . .be produced only in
the midst of the pre-existing society. There is a
social life outside the whole division of labor,
but which the latter presupposes. That is, indeed,
what we have directly established in showing that
there are societies whose cohesion is essentially
due to a community of beliefs and sentiments, and
it is from these societies that those whose unity
is assured by the division of labor have emerged. 300
Nisbet assures his readers that "this passage is a cru-
cial one" for his argument but, unfortunately, even here
"Durkheim is being a little less than candid." 301 Why? Be-
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cause even in this passage, "it is hardly true that he has
been stressing the continuing necessity in modern organic so-
ciety of sinews of stability that are mechanical in charac-
ter." 302 Nisbet argues that the conclusive proof, "the wa-
tershed of Durkheim's argument," is "his brief analysis of
contracts and of the indispensable root of contract in non-
contractual forms of authority and relationships.
. .
."303
As Nisbet, himself, "is being a little less than candid"
the "unraveling of the somewhat tangled threads" of his argu-
ment is arduous. To expedite and clarify matters, the es-
sential propositions of his interpretation will be categor-
ized as the following: (1) in the first place, Nisbet claims
that the necessity for a secondary argument is based on the
fact that logically, Durkheim's thesis concerning the divi-
sion of labor and organic solidarity pushed to its ultimate
conclusion leads to the Hobbesian state of war or what Nisbet
characterizes as a 'sociological monstrosity'; (2) secondly,
that at about the mid-point of the book, Durkheim emphasizes
that society and social life exist outside of and presuppose
the division of labor. Thus according to Nisbet the failure
of the division to create solidarity is not imperative for
the proof of Durkheim's argument concerning morality; (3)
finally the prime example of constraint and stability which
is mechanical in character is the noncontractual forms of au-
thority which are essential for contract and exchange.
Nisbet's first proposition is false. Durkheim's argu-
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merit does not fail due to its internal logical consistency.
The contradiction develops, rather, in his analysis of the
contemporary forms of the division of labor. Here the in-
consistency is between the actual material conditions of so-
ciety and the potential contingencies of social solidarity
created by the division of labor according to Durkheim'
s
theory. It is precisely to maintain the logical consistency
of the division of labor as the cause of organic solidarity,
that Durkheim designates the contemporary forms as abnormal,
anomic, and pathological. Labeling the present forms of the
division as abnormal explicitly preserves the thesis and lo-
gic of this work for Durkheim observes that "if we do not
prove that these cases are exceptional, the division of labor
might be accused of logically implying them." 304 Thus the
pathological forms could be counterposed to the theoretically
normal form of the division of labor which would become the
chief source of social solidarity and "at the same time, the
foundation of the moral order." 305 Far from seeing the in-
herent weaknesses of his argument when pushed to its limits,
Durkheim states in the conclusion that "specialization ought
to be pushed as far as the elevation of the social type, with
out assigning any other limit to it." 306 In fact, only when
the division of labor became more developed would the patho-
logical forms recede.
Nisbet's second proposition is more complex and in-
volved. Although it is certainly true that in Durkheim's
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theory society exists independent of the division of labor,
the context of Nisbet's argument is deceptive. The perplex-
ity of Nisbet's contention involves his categorization of
the transcendental, primacy of society as a secondary argu-
ment counterposed to the thesis of the progressive develop-
ment of organic solidarity through the mediation of the divi-
sion. What Nisbet is arguing here is that these two pheno-
mena, society and the division of labor, can be separated and
juxtaposed. Thus, when the initial thesis, the creation of
organic solidarity through the division, fails, the secondary
argument, the social constraint of society, per se , will
maintain solidarity. Durkheim, however, categorically never
made such a distinction between society and the division. To
posit such a separation indicates a total misinterpretation
of Durkheim' s purpose in this work. Durkheim specifically
developed the thesis of organic solidarity to maintain the
theoretical primacy of society. Throughout, the relationship
between society, organic solidarity, the division of labor is
a dialectical one of the universal (society) to its particu-
lars. For Durkheim, the division of labor was a mediation
emanating from society providing constraint and stability
for the individual. Durkheim never argued, as Nisbet implies
that the division of labor can be posited in distinction to
society. Thus Nisbet's "two argument" theory is false.
Again, it is instructive to analyze the context of the quo-
tation Nisbet has chosen to support his argument.
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From analyzing Durkheim's statement, one surmises that
Durkheim had formulated two distinct concepts of the division
of labor. If at the mid-point of his work, Durkheim argues
that society and social life presuppose the division of la-
bor, the initial formulation must have posited the opposite;
namely, a division independent of and distinguishable from
society-
-a theory which corresponds to the utilitarian notion
of the division. Even a cursory reading of the Divison of
Labor, however, disproves Nisbet's absurd contention. Durk-
heim's statement is not the beginning of a secondary thesis;
rather, it is polemic directed against the utilitarians and
their conception of 'autonomous individualities' as the
foundation for society as well as the division of labor.
Though the passage apparently supports Nisbet's contention,
in the context of the Pi vis ion
,
Durkheim is arguing against
the utilitarian conceptualization of the division and socie-
ty. Nonetheless, Nisbet would have one believe that Durkheim
is refuting one of his own prior arguments within the context
of this work.
Finally, to characterize Durkheim's analysis of the
noncontractual elements and forms of exchange as mechanical
is also false. Again, this contention implies that Durk-
heim's concept of contract and exchange consisted exclusively
of a system of economic relations and private arrangements.
On the contrary, it was precisely the complex of norms, regu-
lations, and customs inherent in the basic structure of the
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division which was identified as the sine qua non of orgsanic
solidarity. For Nisbet to label the complex of regulations
(i.e., superstructure) as mechanical in nature is a total
distortion of the entire purpose and theme of Durkheim's
theory. Possibly, this is the reason why Nisbet limits this
section of his argument to one line, foregoing any quotations
to prove his argument.
Why, then, has Nisbet, the major American Durkheimian
scholar, misinterpreted and distorted the major themes of
the Pi vis ion of Labor so completely? Nisbet 's own rationale
for his analysis emphasizes that "Durkheim's 'reversal' of
argument. . .is crucial to an understanding of his life's
work and is the only way in which his succeeding works can
be made congruent with this one. It is a matter of record,
of course, that Durkheim never went back, in later studies,
to any utilization of the distinction between the two types
of solidarity, nor to the division of labor as a form of co-
hesion, much less to any rationalization of conflict and ano-
mies in society as mere "pathological forms of divison of
labor." 307
Congruency, however, did not inhibit Durkheim from add-
ing the now classic preface to the second edition of the Di-
vision of Labor in 1902 where he makes his celebrated propo-
sal for the establishment of occupational associations which
will, he argues, reproduce the solidarity that has disappear-
ed in religion and local community. Although this proposal
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does represent an alteration and implicit acknowledgement of
the failure of the division of labor to engender solidarity,
Durkheim is still insistent in identifying the anomic state
of the division of labor as the cause "of the incessantly re-
current conflicts, and the multifarious disorders of which
the economic world exhibits so sad a spectacle."^ 8
Theoretical congruency or faithfulness to the under-
standing of Durkheim' s life work, however, are not the essen-
tial considerations for Nisbet's mystifying reading of the
Divis ion of Labor . Although all of Nisbet's arguments- -"the
altered thesis," "the secondary argument," and "the reversal
of argument" -- are contingent upon the discussion of the abnor-
mal forms of the division of labor for their rationale, Nis-
bet makes no reference to this section of the work. Of
course, Nisbet tells us that Durkheim' s thesis fails, but ne-
glects to attribute the failure to the fact that every con-
temporary form of the division was labelled by Durkheim as
abnormal. Could it be that the implicit structural critique
of the division of labor in capitalism, acknowledged by Durk-
heim's students, is threatening to Nisbet's idea of a "Socio-
logical Tradition" steeped in conservative origins? Of
course, this is not meant to imply that Durkheim is a radi-
cal, but, nonetheless, the implications of the Division are
clear, especially more than a half century after publication.
Or could it be that Nisbet's 'mental gymnastics,' which makes
his essay "a kind of palimpsest" beset with qualifications
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and misrepresentations, is due to the fact that he is speci-
fically attempting to mystify and obscure this facet of the
book? If Nisbet had truly been concerned with faithfulness
to the Division of Labor
,
he would have let Durkheim speak
for himself.
Durkheim's formulation in the Divi sion of Labor had pos-
tulated the division of labor as a normal structural develop-
ment necessary for the maintenance of social solidarity.
Nonetheless, abnormal forms had developed within industrial
society. The first of these was anomie, or the deregulation
of moral norms and social relations leading to reputures of
societal equilibrium whereas the other was designated as the
forced division of labor, or the structural misallocation of
individuals to social roles within the division of labor.
Gouldner has argued that at this juncture, Durkheim could
have pursued either of two different directions: "He could
have focused either on the problem of anomie or the study of
the forced division of labor." 309 Gouldner contends that the
choice of the latter would have led Durkheim to a greater
convergence with Marxism. Eventually an investigation of the
forced division of labor would have necessarily led to an in-
vestigation of class differentiation and the power relations
which maintain them. Durkheim, however, chooses to focus on
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the problem of anomie. Gouldner attributes this selection to
Durkheim' s commitment to Comteian assumptions concerning the
need for moral consensus as essential for social solidarity
rather than to his belief that the division of labor would
wither away in the course of societal evolution. Thus be-
cause "he views modern society in the Comteian manner, as re-
quiring moral rearmament rather than economic reconstruction,
. .
.Durkheim focuses on the problem of anomie.
. .
,"
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Durkheim elaborates his formulation of anomie within his
discussion of anomie suicide in Suicide
. For Durkheim, how-
ever, suicide is not conceived as a psychological or exist-
ential crisis. It is not explainable by individual psycho-
pathology or as an indication of immorality. Rather suicide,
as expressed in suicide rates of particular cultures, reli-
gious groupings, or historical epochs, is a social fact, cap-
able of explanation in its own terms. Similar to this utili-
zation of punative and restructive laws as indicators of so-
cial structures and social solidarity, the suicide rate is a
measure of social solidarity or the degree the individual is
structured in society. Relatively high suicide rates are
symptomatic of the breakdown or social regulation and con-
straint whereas the converse signifies a high degree of com-
mon sentiments and social regulation. "Thus, suicide for
Durkheim," as George Simpson argues, "shows up the deep cri-
sis in modern society, just as the study of any other social
fact would. No social fact to him has been explained until
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it has been seen in its full and complete nexus with all
other social facts and with the fundamental structure of so-
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ciety." Suicide, then, is a phenomenon characteristic of
a basic flaw in the social fabric, indicative of an underly-
ing problem in social structure and social institutions.
Durkhcim first employs the phenomenon of suicide as a
measure of solidarity in the Pi vi s ion of Labor in a section
exploring the causes of the progressive development of the
division. According to the prevailing theory of Durkheim's
era, the progressive differentiation of labor had its origin
in man's increasing desire to increase his happiness. It was
thought that as work becomes more specialized, productivity
increases and more and better products are produced by in-
dustry. Since man needs all of these things, "it would seem,
then, that he must be so much happier as he possesses more,
and, consequently, that he may be naturally incited to look
for them." 312 As Durkhcim argues, explanations of the origin
of specialization as a result of increased happiness also pro
vides a theory that "advances under the influence of exclu-
sively individual and psychological causes. To propound this
theory, it would not be necessary to observe societies and
their structures." J
As one of his refutations of this forenamed theory,
Durkheim utilizes the phenomenon of suicide. At first,
Durkheim's choice of suicide, to refute a psychological, in-
dividualistic explanation seems inconsistent, since suicide
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is usually regarded as the most private of acts, affecting
only the individual and depending exclusively on psychologic-
al factors. But precisely by demonstrating that suicide
is a sociological phenomenon, the psychological argument of
increasing happiness propounded by Durkheim's opponents can
be refuted by proving the contrary; namely that as the divi-
sion of labor increases, the suicide rate, likewise, in-
creases .
Thus the number of suicides is utilized as an objective
measure of the average unhappiness in society since the only
objective, material proof "that life is generally good is
that the great mass of men prefer it to death." 314 Durkheim
argues that suicide scarcely appears historically with the
exception of industrial civilization. Though in primitive
societies, suicides are occasionally numerous, these present
very particular circumstances. "In all these circumstances,
man kills himself, not because he judges life bad, but be-
cause, the ideal to which he is attached demands the sacri-
fice." 315 Thus in India, for instance, because of moral and
religion prescription it was common for widows to commit sui
cide. In these cases, though, suicide "is not an act of des
pair but of abnegation." 316 Only with the growth of civili-
zation does the true, or sad suicide appear in an endemic
form. Moreover Durkheim observes that the suicide rate is
greater in cities than the countryside; greater among the
liberal professions than among peasants; greater among "coun
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tries where scientific, artistic, economic activities are
carried to a maximum"; and greater among men than women be-
cause "women have had less part than man in the movement of
civilization." 317 Thus, Durkheim argues, "we are before a
phenomenon which is linked not to some local and particular
circumstances, but to a general state of social milieu." 318
"What the mounting tide of voluntary deaths proves is not
only that there is a greater number of individuals too unhap-
py to live. . .but that the general happiness of society is
decreasing." 31 ^ Thus Durkhiem brings his argument to a close
by contending that "this concommi tance is sufficient to prove
that progress does not greatly increase our happiness, since
the latter decreases, and, in very grave proportions, at the
very moment ,when the division of labor is developing with an
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energy and rapidity never known before."
Anomie Suicide
Suicide continues Durkheim' s preoccupation with the
theme of social dissolution, a pervasive one in nineteenth
century thought. 321 For Durkheim "the exceptionally high
number of voluntary deaths manifest the state of deep dis-
turbance from which civilized societies are suffering, and
bears witness to its gravity."
322 Moreover its root causes
"are closely connected with the practical problems of the
present time. The abnormal development of suicide and the
general unrest of contemporary socieites spring from
the same
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32 3causes." Accordingly Durkheim's notions of egoistic and
anomic suicide are grounded in the discussion and critique of
the institutions of contemporary, industrial society. For
the purposes of this discussion, anomic suicide will be dis-
cussed as it extended Durkheim's concept of anomie and is de-
rived from the lack of moral regulation within major sections
of modern industry.
Durkheim investigates the relationship between suicide
and anomie by examining the effects of economic crisis on the
suicide rate. Although his finding that periods of economic
depression show a marked increase in suicides is not start-
ling, the appreciable rise in the suicide rate in times of
economic prosperity is puzzling. Why should voluntary deaths
increase when general living conditions are advancing if eco-
nomic deprivation was generally believed to be the cause of
suicide? Durkheim responds that it is not poverty that
causes suicide, but the disturbance in societal equilibrium
or collective order which is the culprit. The deregulation
of moral constraints caused by the rapid increase or decrease
in material circumstances take their toll in a considerably
higher number of suicides. Consequently, "every disturbance
of equilibrium, even though it achieves greater comfort and
a heightening of general vitality, is an impulse to voluntary
death." 324 The explanation of this type of suicide, then,
must be in terms of the antecedents of the anomic condition
or moral strain which is the constant in societal disequili-
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brium.
Durkheim formulates a twofold response to the paradoxic-
al relationship between societal equilibrium and suicide,
both of which provide critiques of the concept of limitless-
ness as applied to human nature and social structure, parti-
cularly industry and trade. For Durkheim the dissolution of
social solidarity is predicated upon the fact that industry
and the economic system in general has created and extended
human wants and needs without concurrently providing the ne-
cessary moral regulation. Juxtaposed to his conception of
human nature which considers man's innate and organic and
psychological constitution incapable of setting limits on any
activity or desire, the exigencies of the economic system has
produced circumstances of unbounded greed, competition, and
normlessness leading to suicide.
To understand the primacy Durkheim assigns to moral con-
sensus and restraint in the relationship between society and
the individual, it is necessary to note his ideas concerning
the innate nature of man. Durkheim views man as homo duplex,
the constitutional duality of the soul and the body; the sa-
cred and the profane; and the spiritual and the material.
Compared to the animal, who in normal circumstances maintains
bodily equilibrium by fulfilling its physical and organic
needs, man's physical needs are secondary to his will. Al-
though the biological needs of man cannot increase indefinite-
ly, "nothing appears in man's organic nor in his psychologic-
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al constitution which sets a limit" to "the quality of well-
being, comfort or luxury legitimately to be craved by a human
being." 325 Historically, human desires have increased since
the beginning of civilization, receiving more and more satis-
faction. Human nature, then, cannot assign the limits neces-
sary for one's well being since passion and pleasure are unli-
mited for the individual. "Irrespective of any external reg-
ulatory force," Durkheim argues, "our capacity for feeling is
in itself an unsuitable and bottomless abyss." 326
Counterposed to man's unbounded capacities, Durkheim
posits the restraint and force of society. Durkheim, how-
ever, is not posing the traditional "Hobbesian problem," of
man against society, restrained by external force. For Durk-
he im societal regulation must be obeyed through 'respect and
obligation not fear. "When it is maintained by custom and
force, peace and harmony are illusionary, the spirit of un-
rest and discontent are latent, appetites superficially re-
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strained are ready for revolt." It is precisely "man's
characteristic priviledge. . .that the bond he accepts is not
TOO
physical but moral; that is social. " oco Consequently, the
"greater, better part of his existence transcends the body,
. .
.escapes the body's yoke, but is subject to that of so-
ciety." 329
When society, however, is disturbed by an economic cri-
sis or some beneficial, but abrupt transition, it is incapa-
ble of momentarily exercising its influence. Thus in these
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circumstances regulation and constraint is lacking, the lim-
its between the possible and impossible become unknown, with
the consequence that anomic suicide becomes endemic. Indi-
vidual appetites are stimulated, needs multiply, and passions
become less disciplined with the state of deregulation or
anomy augmenting them precisely when they need more disci-
plining .
Anomic suicide, then, is a concrete representation of
economic anarachy firmly grounded within the institutional
order of modern society. Individual normlessness is not an
abstract, amorphous condition of man, but as Durkheim points
out is clearly imbeded in economic relationships and struc-
tures. Unsurprisingly Durkheim argues that ambition and com-
petition, likewise, are endemic during economic transitions
with the consequence that the 'ends-means' arrangement within
society becomes distorted. As "overweaving ambition always
exceeds the results obtained. . .nothing gives satisfaction
and all. . .agitation is uninterruptedly maintained without
appeasement." 330 Goals cannot be satiated since the "unat-
tainable goal can give no other pleasure but that of the
race itself." 331 Economic competition and its individual
manifestation, ambition, inherently possesses no limits; the
•race itself* is both the means and the ends. Consequently
"once it is interrupted the participants are left empty-
handed" without appeasement or satisfaction.
At this point in the argument, Durkheim's formulation
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of anomy is limited to acute economic crisis, a circumstance,
in itself, which would cause the suicide rate to vary peri-
odically. But what, then, can explain these conditions as a
regular and constant factor of society? As was the case in
the Division o f Labor
,
Durkheim identifies the cause as the
continuous and uncontrolled growth and extension in spheres
of trade and industry. Within the economic institutions of
society, anomy is in an endemic and continuous state.
In surveying the results of nineteenth century economic
progress, Durkheim returns to the themes of the Division
,
be-
moaning the dimunition of religion (i.e., the collective con-
science) and occupational groups which regulated relations
between worker and employer. Government, the primary insti-
tution of regulation and control, similarly, has succumbed
to the needs of industry: "instead of regulating economic
life, (it) has become its tool and servant." 332 According to
Durkheim a crude economism has reduced the power of the state
to another means of accumulation of profits. Industry has
become the supreme end of both individuals and state organs
with the consequence that appetites have become freed of any
limiting authority. The infinite extension of the market has
made the entire world the industrialist's customer. As Durk-
heim declares, "how could passions accept their former con-
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finement in the fact of such limitless prospects?"
Industrial and commercial functions, then, have created
circumstances where "the state of crisis and anomy is con-
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stant and, so to speak, normal." 334 in contrast to his eval-
uation in the Division
,
where the anomic division of labor
was defined as abnormal, Durkheim now finds the normal func-
tioning of the economy abnormal. "The doctrine of the most
ruthless and swift progress" has been raised to a mark of
moral distinction. 335 The longing for infinity, the arousal
of unbounded greed, and the wish for unattainable goals has
made reality, itself, valueless by comparison with the dreams
of fevered imaginations; reality is therefore abandoned, "but
so too is possibility abandoned when it in turn becomes real-
7 X f\ity." The desire to accumulate "novelties, unfamiliar
pleasures, and nameless sensations" in an infinite quantity
is the complement of the accumulation of profits.
Talcott Parsons f Interpretation
As previously noted, American sociology has consistent-
ly drawn upon the theory of anomie in Suicide while either
ignoring or denigrating Durkheim f s discussion of the anomic
division of labor. Undoubtedly, the precursor of this read-
ing of Durkheim lies in Talcott Parsons' interpretation of
anomie in the Structure of Social Action .
Although Parsons provides a lengthy discussion of most
of the major themes in the Division , he strategically omits
acknowledgement of Book III of the Division , the section de-
scribing the abnormal forms of the division. Parsons be-
latedly mentions Durkheim 1 s discussion of the abnormal forms
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only in his chapter discussing Suicide
. However, this ac-
count is limited to one sentence: "Anomie already had a part
in the Division of Labor
,
but a relatively minor one descrip-
tive of one of the 'abnormal' forms of the division of labor,
that is, one in which organic solidarity was imprecisely re-
337alized." That Parsons feels that this is a sufficient
evaluation and explanation of the anomic division of labor
(he completely omits the forced division of labor), a theo-
retical argument integral for understanding Durkheim's theory
in the Division
,
is directly related to his interpretation
which separates Durkheim's theory of moral order from his
theory of institutional structure and places its entire em-
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phasis on the quest for order and control. Within Par-
sons' interpretation, then, the theory of anomie is completely
divorced from its institutional, social, and historical con-
text. Moreover, the account of the evolution of social in-
stitutions and their influence on the form of solidarity in
a specific political and historical context is lost. What
Parsons substitutes as the background for Durkheim's writ-
ings on anomie is the contrast between moral consensus or the
absence of such consensus (anomie) which leads him to por-
tray the central Durkheimian problematic as the ahistorical
quest for a solution to the problem of social order and con-
trol. 339
For Parsons to successfully argue this position, it is
not sufficient to ignore the abnormal forms of the division
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of labor. He must still account for the major theme of the
work; namely, the transition from traditional society where
a rigid, authoritarian collective conscience predominated, to
industrial society where organic solidarity, mediated by the
division of labor has supplanted the collective conscience as
the primary foundation for social solidarity. Parsons' solu-
tion is to argue that the Division represents only a passing
phase in Durkheim's development, "an early formative period
. .
.in which he was still feeling his way to the fundamental
problems." 340 This initial phase was subsequently followed
by three others, each representing a fundamental change "from
one set of sharply formulated ideas to another ." 34 * There-
fore the Pi vi sion is treated as an unsuccessful theoretical
attempt to solve the problem of moral order, rather than as
a work which sets forth the integral concepts and themes
34 2
which guided Durkheim's lifelong writings.
Specifically, Parsons rejects Durkheim's formulation of
organic solidarity since he "has conspicuously failed to ac-
count for the specific element of organic solidarity beyond
the general formula that it must lie in features of the so-
cial milieu." 343 When Durkheim goes beyond the general, his
theory of organic solidarity depends upon external sanctions
for obedience to rules. Parsons' describes this solution as
"the breakdown of utilitarianism into radical positivism"
since restraint is considered to reside outside the individ-
ual. Parsons claims that Durkheim followed this route be-
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cause his positive methodology dictated that the conception
of normative rule must be independent of the individual
actor
.
However, in Suicide
,
Durkheim shifts his analysis from
external to internal constraint, acknowledging normative and
consensual values as the primary determinant of order. In-
stead of treating the category of social as external to the
individual, Parsons argues that Durkheim shifts the consen-
sual system to the individual personality. Since individual
desires are defined by Durkheim as inherently unlimited, "it
is an essential condition of both social stability and indi-
vidual happiness that they should be regulated in terms of
norms. "^ 44 These norms are no longer external but enter di-
rectly into the constitution of the individual's personality.
Thus the theory of moral obligation is based directly on the
process of individual action from the subjective point of
view. When the hold of norms over individuals has broken
down, the resulting state of disorganization is anomie. Ac-
cording to this account, anomie, or the absence of norms is
counterposed by Durkheim to the normal condition of societal
equilibrium characterized by mass conformity.
Unfortunately, Parsons' interpretation of the theory of
anomie, solely in terms of moral consensus, totally ignores
Durkheim' s connection of the moral theory to social and poli-
tical institutions. By separating the concept of anomie from
the specific historical context of the division of labor,
the
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free market, and large scale industry, Parsons has made Durk-
heim's description of the crisis in modern society incompre-
hensible. Indeed, even the chapter on anomic suicide which
explicitly is the raw material for Parsons' interpretation is
undecipherable apart from Durkheim's critique of industrial
and commercial functions where "the state of anomy is con-
stant and, so to speak, normal." Though Parsons is correct
in identifying Durkheim's conception of human nature as one
which inherently cannot provide limits on desires and needs
and, accordingly, must be restrained by society, his inter-
pretation fails when he abstracts this moral imperative from
the social mediations of the economy. As Giddens argues "the
polarity is not between the existence of morals and its ab-
sence, but between the rigid moral conformity of the tradi-
tional collective conscience and the looser, more institu-
tionally complex, structure of organic solidarity . "345 gv
ablating Durkheim's concern with the evolution of social
structures, he transforms Durkheim's historical account into
one emphasizing suprahistorical moral structures. If Durk-
heim was attempting to uncover the absolutes of moral struc-
tures, how can one explain his proposed solution, in both the
final chapter of Suicide as well as in the preface of the
Division , of occupational associations to alleviate the prob-
lem of anomie? Why would Durkheim specify institutional and
structural arrangements for a resolution of anomie, if the
anomic condition was simply characterized by the absence of
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common values?
Furthermore, Parsons' characterization of the transition
from the Division to Suicide as primarily determined by a
shift of emphasis from external to internal constraint is
mistaken. The Hobbesian problem, which Parsons continually
refers to as the guiding light of Durkheim's work, was, in
fact, clearly rejected by him in the Rules
. In the Division
Durkheim never provisionally adopted the position of society
as externally constraining the individual through repressive
sanctions. In fact, Durkheim argues that the Hobbesian prob-
lem is riddled with misconceptions. Not only does Ilobbes po-
sit a false duality by counterposing society against the in-
dividual, but he is led to the contradictory position "that
the individual is himself the author of a machine which has
for its essential role his domination and constraint." 34 ^ In
the Division Parsons claims that this is approximately Durk-
heim's attitude. Though Durkheim does make constraint the
characteristic of all social facts, "this constraint does not
result from more or less learned machinations, destined to
conceal from men the traps which they have caught themselves.
It is due to the fact that the individual finds himself in
the presence of a force which is superior to him. . .the su-
periority of society (which) is not simply physical but in-
tellectual and moral. . . ," 347 From the beginning Durkheim
recognized that the superiority of societal norms was spir-
itual rather than repressive or physical.
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Undoubtedly, Parsons' interpretation of the main cur-
rents of Durkheim's writings had laid the foundation for sub-
sequent renditions by American sociology. Certainly, both
Merton's account of the Division and his theory of anomie as
well as Nisbet's overall evaluation are profoundly influenced
by Parsons. In each instance these sociologists engage in a
series of mental acrobatics in their efforts to ignore or
denigrate selected portions of Durkheim's writings while ac-
cording inordinate emphasis to other elements. Specifically,
the absence of meaningful inquiry into and discussion of
Durkheim's theory of institutions and pathological forms of
the division of labour (one gets the impression that the
final section of the Division vanished from the copies sold
to American social scientists) leads one to look for the rea-
sons for such a strategic omission. Unlike Marx, Durkheim is
acknowledged as one of the founding fathers of modern socio-
logy and his writings, as such, are widely read and incor-
porated into mainstream sociology. Misinterpretation cannot
be ascribed to Durkheim's obscurity nor the abstruseness of
his writings. Rather, the enigma of Durkheim's relationship
to American sociology must be understood in ideological
terms; for inherent in the theoretical assumptions of main-
stream sociology has been an emphasis on individual conform-
ity, social equilibrium, and control. An analysis which ac-
knowledges structural contradictions and identifies the ten-
dency for social crisis with the division of labour and the
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market is not compatible with the broad outlines of struc-
tural-functional theories of society. Though Durkheim did
imagine that the abnormal forms were momentary aberrations
which would eventually disappear, this contention, fifty
years later , is untenable . If this Durkheimian problematic
was recognized by Parsons and his school, they would have
been forced to confront the causes of social and economic
crisis in modern society.
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CHAPTER V
i
Twentieth Century Theorists-
Robert K. Merton and Melvin Seeman
The passage from the nineteenth to the twentieth century
with respect to social theory constitutes the realization of
the scientific spirit. Critical, self
-reflection, now ob-
solete, has been relegated to the realm of unscientific spec-
ulation and metaphysics. The critical analysis of society,
the dominant theme of the classical theorists, has been sub-
merged within the endless quest by empirical sociology, for
objective data and facts and technical methodologies leading
to trivial results, significant effects, and variables to the
neglect of society as a totality. Today, theoretical socio-
logy stripped of substantive content remains in name only.
What persists is "sociology minus society"^48 and the substi-
tution of 'objective,' 'value-free' methodologies for theory
itself. Classical theory, formulated upon a full foundation
of assumptions concerning values, human nature, social pro-
cesses, and the interaction between man and society has been
replaced by "theories of the middle range" and theories whose
range extends no further than the boundaries of a Skinner
Box- -theories whose only expl icit assumptions appear to be
ones concerning statistical laws and the reliability of ques-
tionnaires. The 'sociological imagination' has conjured a
statistical nightmare of computer readouts and increasingly,
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esoteric statistical techniques. Methodology has replaced
both content and theory.
Possibly, this descent from critical thought to posi-
tivistic science receives its most striking exemplification
in contemporary theories of alienation and anomie. Though,
in contemporary theories of alienation and anomie, one finds
references to Marx and Durkheim as their predecessors, cur-
rent definitions have changed the classical meanings from
evaluations about man in society into a thing itself.
Cleansed of historical content, ethical values, and the rela-
tionship between individuals and society, the concepts of
alienation and anomie have become 'things' to measure, mani-
pulate, and experiment with. The contemporary theories seem
to be linked with the classical theories only in that they
have a common designation.
Twentieth century American sociology has contributed two
independent directions for empirical research of the concepts
of anomie and alienation. Whereas Robert K. Merton develops
a functional theory of anomie emphasizing social structure
and individual adaptations to its exigencies, Seeman and Rot-
ter unfold a social psychological approach to alienation
based upon learning theory and emphasizing feelings individ-
uals have about themselves and the environment. In several
major papers, these theorists redefined alienation and anomie
by jettisoning the original critical content as employed by
Marx and Durkheim. In lieu of a theory of society, these
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contemporary theorists emphasized atomistic theories usually
employing survey research techniques to determine the degree
of alienation or anomie in a social system or individual
psyche. In the deluge of papers following the initial refor-
mulations, researchers merely utilized the operationalized
definitions as starting points for further empirical re-
search. When critical papers did emerge, these review es-
says were directed towards minor refinements or additions to
Merton's and Seeman's theories rather than critical assess-
ments of the historical development of these concepts. As
Richard Schacht had noted, often a contemporary writer merely
lists a number of completely different, and in some cases
mutually exclusive uses of either term and subsequently
speaks of all of them as so many "dimensions," "aspects," or
TAG
"elements" of alienation. The implicit, and frequently
affirmed explicit implication being that whatever is being
investigated as an aspect of alienation or anomie refers to
one unified phenomena. In many instances, sociologists claim
the intellectual heritage of Hegel, Marx, or Durkheim even
when utilizing one of the operationalized definitions. Ac-
cordingly, the proceeding analysis is not an attempt at a
traditional review of the literature; rather, it undertakes
a critique of the contemporary concepts to uncover and expose
the transformations which have taken place relative to clas-
sical theories.
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Social Structure and Anomie
Durkheim's concept of anomie achieved a new life in
Robert Merton's seminal paper, "Social Structure and Anomie."
Appearing in 1938, two years after his review of The Division
o_f Labor
,
this essay afforded a major reformulation and revi-
sion of the classical theory of anomie in terms of a cultur-
al and social explanation of deviant behavior. Its signific-
ance for the discipline of sociology has been major. "With-
out a doubt," Albert Cohen has observed, "this body of ideas,
which has come to be known as 'anomie' theory, has been the
most influential single formulation of the sociology of devi-
ance in the last 25 years, and Merton's paper, in its origin-
al and revised versions, is possibly the most frequently
quoted single paper in modern sociology . "350
Merton's theory of anomie, as expoused in "Social Struc-
ture and Anomie," is the quintessential example of functional
theory applied to the analysis of society. Social customs,
institutional norms, cultural goals, and deviancy are explained
solely in terms of their function and usefulness relative to
the existing social structure, itself never specified. From
the functionalist perspective, the very existence of an in-
stitution or social arrangement implies a priori its ration-
ality and ongoing usefulness. Functional ism specifies that
if a social relationship or process exists per se, it must
facilitate exchanges on which both the individual and the
collectivity benefit. Thus, the task of the theoretician is
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to search out the function of social relations in lieu of a
political, ethical, or philosophical judgment of the social
relations themselves. Political and Utopian goals are either
ignored or treated as neutral objects of the social system
being observed. At the onset, then, Durkheim's value ladden
concept will be formulated in Merton's scheme as a value-free
object of the social system. Though this neutral, objective
attitude towards social phenomena claims to be a value-free
analysis of society, it must by default identify with pre-
vailing cultural norms of society in order to make its eval-
uations fundamental to functional analysis. Otherwise, how
could one determine if a specific social phenomena or behav-
ior is functional or dysfunctional? In attempting to under-
stand Merton's theory of anomie, one must remain cognizant of
these caveats, for it is precisely the foregoing assumptions
of functional theory which are proclaimed as the basis for
its objectivity and value neutrality. Moreover, it helps ex-
plain the ambiguity of all of Merton's key concepts- - social
structure, cultural goals, anomie, and deviancy- -which are
formulated as operational i zed definitions rather than as full
theories of human nature and societal processes.
Though Merton's essay is entitled "Social Structure and
Anomie," his formulation is primarily a theory of deviant
behavior. His aim "is to discover how some social structures
exert a definite pressure upon certain persons in the society
to engage in non- conforming rather than conforming behav-
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ior." If one can uncover variations in the rates of de-
viant behavior which are dependent upon social class or ra-
cial status, deviancy can be attributed to the individual's
position in the cultural and social structure rather than to
psychological abnormality.
This analysis, then, is totally collateral to the dis-
cussion of social structure for evaluations of conforming and
non- conforming behavior. Though one might expect a lengthy
discussion of American society and social structure to pro-
vide a foundation for the theory of anomie and deviancy, Mer-
ton, instead, arbitrarily posits the social system into two
analytically separable elements. "The first," according to
Merton, "consists of culturally defined goals, purposes, and
interests, held out as legitimate objectives for all or for
T C T
diversely located members of society." They can be "de-
fined as that organized set of normative values governing be-
havior which is common to members of a designated society
. . .
."
35:5 In short, "they are the things worth striving
for." 354 In distinction to cultural norms, the second ele-
ment of the social system is the institutional norms which
regulate the social structure. These norms constitute the
"organized set of social relationships in which members of
7 p r
the society or groups are variously implicated," and which
"defines, regulates, and controls the acceptable modes of
i „3S6
reaching out for these (i.e., cultural) goals.
Within a given society the ends (cultural goals) and the
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means Csocial structure) may be in disequilibrium for "the
cultural emphasis placed upon certain goals varies independ-
ently of the degree of emphasis placed upon institutional-
7 r 7
ized means." Within the confines of this formulation, two
hypothetical polar cases of aberrant social structures are
possible. The first type "may develop a very heavy.
. .stress
upon the value of particular goals, involving comparatively
little concern with the institutionally prescribed means of
striving toward these goals. The limiting case.
. .is
reached when the range of procedures is governed by technical
(i.e.., efficiency) rather than by institutional norms. "358
In these circumstances, the quest for goal satisfaction dic-
tates the means utilized. On the other hand, the "second
polar type is found in groups where activities originally
conceived as instrumental are transmuted into self-contained
practices, lacking further objectives." 359 Ends are forgot-
ten with the concurrent reification of means leading to rig-
idly prescribed behavior. Between these extremes are hypo-
thetical cases which maintain an approximate equilibrium be-
tween means and ends by satisfying the two elements of the
social system simultaneously. Satisfaction must be "reckoned
in terms of the product (goals) and in terms of the process
(means), in terms of the outcome and in terms of the activ-
,,360lties ."
In Merton's formulations anomie "is conceived as a
breakdown in the cultural structure, occurring particularly
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when there is an acute disjunction between the cultural
norms and goals and the socially structured capacities of
members of the group to act in accord with them.3 61 Speci-
fically in the pursuit of goals "the technically most effect-
ive procedure, whether culturally legitimate or not, becomes
typically preferred to institutionally prescribed conduct"
which causes society to become unstable and there develops
what Durkheim called 'anomie' (or normlessness) . 362 Anomie
is then conceived exclusively as the disjunction between
means and ends; in fact, in some cases the "cultural values
may help to produce behavior which is at odds with the man-
dates of the values themselves." 363
The phenomenal and empirical manifestation for Merton's
concept of anomie is deviant behavior. For Merton, "the ab-
errant behavior may be regarded sociologically as a symptom
of dissociation between culturally prescribed aspirations and
socially structured avenues for realizing these aspira-
tions." 364 Deviant behavior, specifically the rate of devi-
ancy and the particular adaptations to abnormal conditions,
is the primary social indicator of the existence of the con-
dition of anomie. Merton's basic premise and contention is
that the rate of deviant behavior should be differentially
distributed among the various social strata according to the
degree of internalization of goals and institutionalized,
normative opportunities to attain these goals.
By necessity Merton's formulation of anomie and deviant
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behavior is dependent upon and collateral to the specifica-
tion of the particular cultural goals and institutional norms
of the social system under observation. Since both concepts
denote an evaluation of a society in disequilibrium, these
judgments must be determined relative to the patterns of cul-
tural goals and norms posited as the constraints of the
theory. Literally, these two facets of the social structure
represent independent variables, constituting the foundation
for functional judgments. To illustrate his choices, Merton
selects the realm of competitive sports where "the aim of
victory is shorn of its institutional trappings and success
becomes construed as 'winning the game' rather than 'winning
under the rules of the game.'" 365 This admittedly trivial
example is the metaphor for the American success' ethic which
is defined as the cultural goal of the social system. What
is the justification for this choice? "The goal of monetary
success was selected for illustrative reasons on the assump-
tion that it, in particular, has been firmly entrenched in
American culture."-566 Thus, the success ethic in Merton's
conceptualization of anomie has been raised to a social end
itself, providing one of the constant components of the social
system. What about the set of institutional norms proscribed
for the attainment of monetary success? On this point, the
description of the social structure , Merton astonishingly is
almost silent. The most detailed definition is the follow-
ing: "by social structure is meant that organized set of
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social relationships in which members of the society or
group are variously implicated." 367 The very ambiguity and
neutrality of the definition makes it almost meaningless.
Though fond of quoting from the business journal, Nation'
s
Business
,
one is puzzled to find not a single mention of
capitalism, the divisison of labor, class conflict, or any
other concept implying some type of concrete description of
industrial society. It is as if Merton's social system ex-
ists in mid-air. Though acknowledging that the replacement
of technical or efficiency norms for institutional is one of
the primary causes of normlessness , the connection of effi-
ciency and monetary success explicitly to the economic struc-
ture of capitalism is never mentioned, let alone explored.
Although class or group differentials in the rate of deviancy
are a basic hypothesis of the theory, the composition of
these classes or the causes for their position in the social
hierarchy are not considered in the formulation. In his most
straightforward comment Merton observes that "contemporary
American culture appears to approximate the polar type in
which great emphasis upon certain success-goals occurs with-
36 8
out equivalent emphasis upon institutionalized means."
This leads to societal conditions where "money has been con-
secrated as a value in itself, over and above its expenditure
for articles of consumption. . . .
m369 Why these dismal con-
ditions exist in American society--the definitive question
for a social theorist--is beyond the purview of Merton's
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theory of social structure.
In lieu of a critical analysis of society, Merton ex-
plores individual adaptation to the success ethic among
those occupying various positions in the social structure.
Merton postulates a five element typology of adaptation to
the social structure; each mode of adaptation determined by
an individual's acceptance or rejection of cultural goals
and/or institutional means. Only one element of the typol-
ogy* conformity, which encompasses acceptance and internali-
zation of both cultural goals and legitimate means to attain
the goal, contributes to the stability and continuity of so-
ciety. The adaptational modes- - innovation
,
ritualism, re-
treatism, and rebellion- - are formulated as deviant behavior.
Each of thes'e adaptations rejects at least either the norma-
tive goals or means fundamental to the social structure.
Though conformity by logical necessity must be the modal re-
sponse in society, Merton's "primary interest centers on the
370
sources of deviant behavior. . . .
Merton labels the most frequent type of aberrant behav-
ior, innovation- -a generic name for crime and delinquency.
"This response," according to Merton, "occurs when the indi-
vidual has assimilated the cultural emphasis upon the goal
without equally internalizing the institutional norms govern
371
ing Kays and means for its attainment." Societies, such
as contemporary America, where "Americans are bombarded on
every side by precepts which affirm the right or, often, the
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duty of retaining the (success) goal without the social
structure providing the appropriate opportunities of pecuni-
ary success will invariably produce departures from legiti-
372
mate means. Individuals who find that the social struc-
ture deprives them of the avenues to success will then as a
"normal" response innovate "occupational opportunities" such
as crime or vice as an alternate practice to legitimate
means. Although Merton discusses the all pervasive presence
of a "cultural structure in which the sacrosanct goal virtual
ly consecrates the means" as expressed in the symbolism of
the robber barons in American history, it appears that "the
greatest pressures toward deviation are exerted upon the
lower strata." 373 * 374 Why the lower strata? Because the
lower classes are confined to manual labor jobs and lesser
white collar jobs which, according to survey research, have
37 5
been uniformly stigmatized by all social classes. This
consideration combined with "the absence of realistic oppor-
tunities for advancement beyond this level" results in "a
marked tendency toward deviant behavior."
376 Clearly, in
Merton' s formulation, neither the ascendency of the success
ethic nor the limitation of opportunities inherent in the
social structure are themselves conceived as anomic; rather,
the disjunction between the two elements leads to the process
of anomie and its phenomenal forum, crime and delinquency.
Societal disequilibrium is especially enhanced by
America's egalitarian ideology which emphasizes success
for
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the entire population while simultaneously restricting or
closing "access to approved modes of reaching these goals for
a considerable part of the same population.
. .
,"
377
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this society," according to Merton, "a cardinal American vir-
tue, 'ambition,' promotes a cardinal American vice, 'deviant
37 8behavior.'" By implication, anomie within this theory
could be averted in two manners: either by actually provid-
ing unlimited opportunities within the social structure to
match the exigencies of the success ethic, or curtailment of
the egalitarian ideology of capitalism. Either outcome would
moderate the contradiction between ends and means and cor-
respondingly lessen anomie and deviancy within the social
system. The latter alternative, though, would entail cer-
tain risks for the social system. Merton acknowledges that
"the victims of this contradiction between the cultural em-
phasis on pecuniary ambition and the social bars to full op-
portunity are not always aware of the structural sources of
their thwarted aspirations. . .those who do find its source
in the social structure may become alienated from that struc-
ture and become ready candidates for adaptation (rebel-
lion)." 379 Thus the logical solutions to innovation lead
either toward a classless capitalism or another type of de-
viancy .
If innovation is the primary adaptational type of lower-
class Americans, ritualism is the modal deviant pattern for
lower-middle class American and bureaucrats. "It involves,"
156
as defined by Merton, "the abandoning or scaling down of the
lofty cultural goals of great pecuniary success and rapid so-
cial mobility to the point where one's aspirations can be
satisfied. But though one rejects the cultural obligations
to attempt 'to get ahead in the world'.
. .one continues to
abide almost compulsively by institutional norms." 380 Indi-
viduals exhibiting this adaptation are apt to elicit a folksy
response from their co-workers such as "old Jonesy is certain-
ly in a rut." As this deviant act is a private response,
evidence confirming its occurence is difficult to find. To
buttress his argument, then, Merton draws from the field of
psychobiology . Though admittedly qualifying his argument,
Merton has received collaboratory evidence for this hypothe-
sis from studies of classical conditioning in sheep and
goats. These animals acquire ritualistic motor movements
which are triggered by clicks through the pairing of this
stimulus with electrical shock. Although not proclaiming an
homology, Merton does claim these animals have "more than a
passing resemblance to what we have described as 'the syn-
3 81drome of the social ritualist. . . '"
Merton' s fourth adaptation, retreatism, consists of the
total rejection of both cultural goals and institutionalized
means. This category includes "psychotics, artists, pariahs,
outcasts, vagrants, vagabonds, tramps, chronic drunkards, and
drug addicts";
382 people strictly speaking, "in the society
but not of it. Sociologically these constitute the true
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aliens of society.
"
JOJ Merton speculates that this mode of
adaptation occurs when the individual internalizes both the
success goal and the institutional norms but is unable to
achieve success through legitimate means and refuses to use
illegitimate means due to internal prohibitions. This con-
flict is resolved by a complete escape. Retreatism is par-
ticularly condemned by all members of society for "in con-
trast to the conformist, who keeps the wheels of society
running, this deviant is a non-product ive liability.
. .
."384
As a sociological explanation for chronic deviancy, however,
Merton' s theory is overly psychological and individualistic.
For a theory designed to explain differential rates of aber-
rant behavior according to social class, it is astounding
that Merton does not attempt to uncover the distribution of
such a wide variety of deviant behaviors in the population.
To explain psychosis, alcoholism, and drug addiction in terms
of psychological rationalization or drive reduction, is a pe-
culiar mode of discourse for the pre-eminent sociological
discussion of deviant behavior.
Rebellion, the final type of deviancy in Merton's
scheme, involves both rejection of cultural goals and insti-
tutionalized means and the concurrent substitution of a new
set which redefines the social system. "It presupposes ali-
enation from reigning goals and standards" which come to be
385
regarded as arbitrarily and consequently, illegitimate.
Merton's characterization of rebellion as involving "a genu-
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ine transvaluatioh, where the direct or vicarious experience
of frustration leads to full denunciation of previously
prized goals," again strikes one as peculiar for a sociolo-
gical explanation for a political act. 386 Merton's example--
"the rebellious fox simply renounces the prevailing taste for
3 8 7sweet grapes'"
--borders on the banal. By characterizing
rebellion as a mode of adaptation (! ) with such aberrant be-
havior as psychosis, crime, and alcoholism, Merton has im-
plicitly depoliticized the most political of all phenomena
and has labeled an historical and social phenomena as devi-
ant and consequently 'sick.' By tracing its roots to frus-
tration, he offers a singularly psychological and individ-
ualistic explanation to a complex, collective action.
Soc ial Structure and Anomie : Explanation or Symptom ?
As Merton's theory of anomie is admittedly derived from
Durkheim's concept of anomie suicide, Suicide
,
the question
of the degree of faithfulness to the original is of primary
significance in assessing the validity of Merton's claim to
Durkheimian lineage as well as his extension of the theory
to explain deviancy in all its various forms. Clearly in his
emphasis on a sociological explanation of aberrant behavior
and social structure, Merton is attempting to construct his
conceptualization on a Durkheimian foundation. In as much
as anomie is one of the essential components of his theory
and is demonstratively abstracted from Suicide , the corres-
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pondence of divergence between the two formulations will en-
able one to evaluate the validity of Merton's interpretation
of Durkheim's most famous work.
Merton clearly conceives of the strain toward anomie as
the disjunction between cultural goals and institutional
means. Specifically the defined goals and means are con-
stants within the formulation; anomie is defined relative to
the reduction of one or both of these independent variables.
However, when the monetary rewards supporting the competitive
system "are distributed throughout the entire range of activ-
ities and are not confined to the final result of 'success,'"
the social system will attain equilibrium with the resultant
reduction of anomie. Anomie is defined, as such, relative
to the cultural goals of the American success ethic and the
normative means of unlimited compet i tion- - the essentials of
capitalism. If one gains satisfaction of needs and desires
from both competition and success simultaneously, anomie
ceases within the social system.
The essentially conservative and normative content of
Merton's definition of anomie is apparent when compared to
Durkheim's discussion of anomy in Suicide . Merton has lit-
erally stood Durkheim on his head by essentially transform-
ing values which Durkheim identified as anomie into the
definitive, independent variables of his theory. Whereas
Merton's theory posits an equilibrium point consisting of
unlimited opportunities for success through competition, it
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was precisely the unlimited desires and insatiable quest for
success which Durkheim identified as a sign of morbidity.
For Durkheim competitive goals and endless desires "constant-
ly and infinitely surpass the means at their command; they
70Q
cannot be quenched ." Though Merton bemoans the emphasis
on success to the exclusion of means, it was the very success
ethic which Durkheim condemned. According to Durkheim "to
pursue a goal which is by definition unattainable is to con-
demn oneself to a state of perpetual unhappiness . "^90 where-
as Merton' s one normal type, the conformist, excels in a com-
petitive structure, Durkheim claims that "overwhelming ambi-
tion always exceeds the results obtained, great as they may
be, since there is no warning to pause here." 3 ^! In a so-
cial structure of limitless prospects "the state of crisis
39 2
and anomy is constant and, so to speak ,. normal .
"
Merton' s steady-state social system, therefore, corres-
ponds rather accurately to Durkheim' s formulation of anomy.
According to Durkheim, normlessness was inherent in an en-
vironment of limitless prospects and opportunities. Solid-
arity was engendered through the constraint of society on the
individual whose "capacity for feeling is in itself an insa-
tiable and bottomless abyss."
393 Merton' s normal type, the
conformist, would correspond precisely to Durkheim's aber-
rant personality. To elevate the American success ethic
into an element of the definition of anomie and claim line-
age to Durkheim is incompatible at best. Anomie, in
both
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The Division of Labor and Suicide
,
was an explicit critique
of unrestrained economic activity. Merton' s conceptualiza-
tion is a transfiguration of Durkheim's theory of anomie
which has deleted the critical and Utopian content and sub-
stituted conformist and normative values in their place. In
attempting to follow in Durkheim's footsteps, Merton has
taken a rather large detour.
Merton characterizes his explanation of anomie and so-
cial structure as a theory of the middle range in contrast
to classical theory as well as the more unified structural-
functional theory of Talcott Parsons. Certainly an integral
element of his drastic revision of the concept of anomie is
traceable to Merton' s concept of sociological theory. Al-
though repeatedly calling his theory a sociological approach
to anomie and deviant behavior, this concept, too, has under
gone an unfortunate revision. In contrast to classical
theory which posits a theory of society (totality), human
nature, and the dynamic processes between the two, Merton
uses the term sociological theory to refer "to logically in-
terconnected sets of propositions from which empirical uni-
formities can be derived." 394 According to Merton one looks
for "theoretically strategic variables" and then attempts to
measure them. Once theory has identified the variables, the
theoretical enterprise shifts to the working out of "the lo-
gic of empirical inquiry involving these variables; and tech
nique, which develops the tools and procedures for measuring
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variables." 395 This approach is necessary for "in no sphere
of systematic knowledge-
-whether it be mechanics, biology,
linguistics, or sociology-
- do specialists go on the fool's
errand of explaining every aspect of concrete phenomena." 396
Those who make claims to a full explanation of every aspect
of social organization are "pseudosociologis ts who turn up in
quantity whenever trouble is brewing in society and announce
their quickly designed cures for everything that ails soci-
397
ety." This type of pseudosociologist runs "the risk that,
as with modern decor, the furniture of his mind will be bare
and uncomfortable." 398
In contrast to such 'sociological pretenders,' Marx, of
course being the prime example, middle range sociologists at-
tempt "to develop special theories applicable to limited con-
ceptual ranges" which are "principally used in sociology to
guide empirical inquiry" by remaining conceptually "close
enough to observed data to be incorporated in propositions
that permit empirical testing." 399 ' 400 > 401 Specifically
Merton defines theories of the middle range as "theories that
lie between the minor but necessary working hypothesis that
evolve in abundance during day-to-day research and the all
inclusive systematic efforts to develop a unified theory that
will explain all the observed uniformities of social behav-
ior, social organization, and social change." Middle
range theory, as its name implies, is an average of hypothe-
sis testing and totalistic social theories, and includes both
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macrosociological and microsociological elements. Unfortun-
ately it incorporates the weaknesses of both in one theory:
a microsociological inquiry of a limited aspect of society
constructed on a foundation of macrosociological assumptions
hidden from view. For example, Merton's concept of anomie
employs a limited explanation of deviancy and conformity to-
tally abstracted from any discussion of such essential ele-
ments of the social structure such as the labor process
,
cap-
italism, unemployment, etc. Nonetheless, when one examines
the theoretical ground of the concept, it is apparent that
anomie is defined relative to the normative basis of American
capitalism, specifically incorporating competition and suc-
cess as the two constant criteria and reference points for
evaluations of function and dysfunction. Merton's middle
range approach, thus, incorporates the weaknesses of both
macro- and micro- analysis simultaneously in one formulation.
Approximately twenty years after Merton's revision of
the concept of anomie, American sociologists revived the
theory of alienation as a research topic. Specifically, in
Marvin Seeman's essay, On the Meaning of Alienation , the con-
cept undergoes an empirical reformulation, receiving a multi-
dimensional, operationalized definition suitable for empiric-
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al research. Though claiming derivation from Marx and em-
plying the same designation, the concept has been altered by
sociological practitioners to the point where the new con-
ceptualization has been transformed into an illustration of
the very phenomenon which it was originally formulated to
penetrate. Alienation, divested of its critical content and
its ontological basis in the labour process, has become a
socio-psychological construct indicating subjective feelings
about a multitude of factors and variables.
As Merton's reformulation of anomie afforded a primary
exemplification of functional analysis, contemporary usages
of alienation manifest today's dominant perspective, the sci-
entific method. What is most striking in contemporary formu-
lations is that theory and its philosophical underpinnings
have been replaced by method. Social scientists, who char-
actize their forebearers as ideologists who were lured into
excesses by their enthusiasm for their own prejudices, today
have joined the ranks of the natural and physical scientists.
They attempt to explore and analyze societal alienation as if
it were a new plant species or some unknown chemical. Though
predicating their objectivity and value neutrality on the
fact that the scientific method has liquidated philosophy,
they forget that the foundation on which they stand is also
a philosophy, regardless of the mathematical and methodolog-
ical notation involved in their studies. As Mills has argued,
every style of empiricism involves a metaphysical choice;
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namely, a choice of a phenomena which is most real for the
social scientist. 403 When one represses this fact and ac-
cords validity to data solely on the basis of the methodology
employed, the classifatory system, unbeknown to itself, be-
comes reified into an object which obscures, and in some
cases becomes a substitute for the social processes under
study. In the scientists' own words, the method has become
the independent variable and the social phenomenon the de-
pendent variable. In what today is termed sociological re-
search on the reality of alienation, method has supplanted
the concept to the point where the word has become meaning-
less precisely in its operationalized definition. As the ob-
jectivity of empirical sociology is an objectivity of method
rather than of the processes being investigated, this style
of thinking must be explored simultaneously with the discus-
sion of the content of the actual studies. Only when the
methodological assumptions are clarified and explicitly
stated, can one begin to understand the degree of the radic-
al revision of the contemporary concept of alienation rela-
tive to its historical roots.
Though the literature on alienation is extensive, the
vast majority of papers begin from one of the definitions
proposed in Seeman's writings. He has postulated five dis-
tinguishable meanings of the concept, each of which he has
attempted to operationalize in a precise manner in order "to
make the traditional interest in alienation more amenable to
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sharp empirical statement." 404 Where one would expect a de-
finition or theory explicating alienation via the labour pro-
cess, one receives a series of definitions in terms of ques-
tionnaire scales. Whatever questions constitute the survey,
as such, will determine what the researcher considers aliena-
tion. Adorno has identified precisely the circularity in-
volved in this reasoning: "The pretense is made to examine
an object by means of an instrument of research, which through
its own formulation, decides what the object is, in other
words we are faced with a simple circle." 4^ Through the
utilization of survey research and operational i zed defini-
tions, objectivity, the essence of the scientific method,
actually becomes entangled in subjectivity in a double sense.
Instead of studying a material phenomena which has multiple
manifestations (historical, social, political) and is inde-
pendent of any individual, objectivity is established by the
classifactory system per se. The socially objective pro-
cesses of the division of labour, the market, and political
institutions are ignored in lieu of a quantitative score on
a questionnaire which is accorded objectivity since it is a
number. The researcher's questions and scale, or his own
subjective categorization and construction of a social pro-
cess, are substituted for the historical analysis of socie-
ty's primary institutional relationships. Secondly, the
weight of subjective opinion as recorded in the respondent's
answers is accorded scientific validity based on the method
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of data collection and statistical analysis. Public opinion
is considered a sufficient explanation for social phenomenon.
Historically, this particular mode of explanation of social
processes in terms of facts and theories concerning the make-
up of individuals has been known as psychologism
. Resting
upon an implicit denial of social structure, psychologism at-
tempts to explain social phenomena as a sum or average of
individual reactions which possess properties that make it
legitimate to elicit them through appropriate questions or
other verbal techniques. Psychologism examines society as a
mere agglomeration of man's conscious feelings, attitudes,
and beliefs. When applied to the theory of alienation, it
transforms an evaluation and analysis of the labour process
into a subjective state of consciousness.
Alienation as a Soci al Learning Variable
In his major revision of the concept, Seeman informs the
reader that the purpose of recasting alienation into five
subjective dimensions is "to make more organized sense of one
of the great traditions in sociological thought." 406 Re-
search endeavors demand organization and clarity and the
classical tradition, unfortunately, is clearly ladden with
value implications; hence an operationalized definition is
needed to recast it into "a more researchable statement of
meaning." 407
Seeman chooses as an analogue to Marx's theory of alien-
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ation a dimension which he designates as the power lessness
factor of alienation. Though here Seeman appears to be
faithful to the theory's historical content by ascribing
this notion to Marx's view of the worker's condition in cap-
italist society and then makes brief references to Weber,
fiouldner, and C. Wright Mills, appearance belies reality.
Actually these references serve to mislead the reader who
may hastily assume that Seeman' s definition of powerlessnes
s
is in the tradition of the foregoing theorists. Contrary to
the sociological analysis of the proceeding authors, Seeman
offers the following psychological definition: "The expect-
ancy or probability held by the individual that his own be-
havior cannot determine the occurrence of the outcome, or
reinforcement he seeks.
Seeman, himself, admits that this definition is a socio-
psychological view and that it "does not treat powerlessness
from the standpoint of the objective conditions in socie-
ty .i409 0ne won(jers , then, where the social dimension of the
definition lies, if social structure is ignored in favor of
an individualistic, subjective feeling concerning behavioral
outcomes. For that matter, how can one postulate a sociolo-
gical definition without positing the primacy of society.
Of course, Seeman' s answer is to dispense with the question.
Besides, 'objective conditions in society' can be "handled
like any other situational aspect of behavior to be analyzed,
measured, ignored, experimentally controlled or varied, as
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the research question demands." 410 Although the researcher,
in his laboratory or imagination, can ignore or vary social
conditions, the rest of us must confront the material condi-
tions of the real world--the arena which Marx's theory of
alienation analyzes.
Moreover, for both methodological considerations as well
as value neutrality, Seeman's construction of "'powerless-
ness* clearly departs from the Marxist tradition by removing
the critical, polemic element in the idea of alienation." 411
Although to the uninstructed or the scientific mentality such
a revision is the sign of scientific objectivity and preci-
sion, this ablation of the critical content renders the con-
cept impotent and mocks the objectives of the great philoso-
phical and social tradition from which it arose.- The trivial
residue which Seeman has conjured in the name of scientific
exactitude has revoked precisely the intent and purpose of
Marx's concept; namely, the critique of the labour process in
capitalist society and the power relationships between
classes. To explicitly state that one is evaluating power-
lessness in capitalist society from the sociological view-
point, minus the critical content as well as the analysis of
industrial conditions, is to construct a theoretical nonen-
tity. Clearly, through Seeman's own admission, his reformu-
lation qualifies as an aspect of one of the problems which
Marx was attempting to unravel- -alienating thinking or ideo-
logy.
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Seeman offers three justifications for his shift from
the sociological to the psychological. First, from the re-
searcher's standpoint, he sees "little profit in arguing
about what is 'really- alienation so long as what is going on
at each point in the effort is clear." 412 Though Seeman may
see no interest in arguing about the specific nature of ali-
enation, the sociological tradition of theory is composed of
precisely such questions. However, his theoretical purview,
itself, seems to have been abandoned since he accords primary
social phenomenon, such as moral standards and social struc-
ture, equal significance with expectancy of reinforcement and
interpersonal feelings and attitudes. The researcher merely
chooses one of these 'variables' from his grab bag of opera-
tionalized definitions where all qualitative distinctions are
reduced to quantifiable variables. Besides, in the instance
of alienation, such a process avoids "building ethical or ad-
justmental features in the concept." 413
After his own admissions concerning his relationship to
the Marxist legacy, Seeman' s claim that the expectancy usage
is not as "radical a departure from the Marxian legacy as it
may appear" strains the reader's patience and credulity. 414
Seeman' s rationale for the similarity is the fact that Marx's
concept of alienation is a judgment of societal conditions
while his concept makes the same evaluation from the individ-
ual's expectations concerning the environment. Thus Seeman
claims a contribution to the Marxist legacy based on the va-
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lidity of psychologism.
Seeman's final argument, though, reveals the crucial
consideration for defining alienation or powerlessness as
expectancy for reinforcement; for by substituting these spe-
cific psychological categories for sociological ones he can
operationalize alienation as a variable within Julian Rot-
ter's theory of social learning. Since Rotter's theory of
"internal vs. external control of reinforcement" is the inte-
gral component of Seeman's revision, Rotter's theory of per-
sonality must be explored.
Rotter initially developed his paradigm of control of
reinforcement in response to the fact that traditional learn-
ing studies in psychology were generally conducted with ani-
mal subjects (i.e., rats or pigeons) or with human subjects
engaged in relatively simple tasks utilizing basic condi-
tioning techniques. Employing rigidly controlled, experi-
mental situations, choices and responses in most learning
tasks were severely limited for methodological considera-
tions. As Rotter noted, "studies with human subjects. . .
have tended to use simple conditioning procedures where sym-
bolic behavior and alternative responses were minimized."
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For behaviorists , such as B. F. Skinner, this very limitation
led these psychologists to postulate one basic mechanism to
account for all human behavior, the principle of reinforce-
ment. Specifically, the frequency of the occurrence of a be-
havior, itself redefined into a trivial concept of observable
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and quantifiable units, is dependent upon its external con-
sequences. Behavior increases if followed by a reinforcement
and decreases if followed by a punishment. In his clinical
studies, however, Rotter found that such a simplified gener-
alization, especially when applied to complex interpersonal
situations, was insufficient as an explanatory notion. In a
number of studies he and his colleagues demonstrated that un-
der conditions where human subjects perceived that they con-
trolled the reinforcements or in situations where skill was
involved, the learning pattern observed was significantly
different than the one predicted by behavioris ts . Thus Rot-
ter formulated the concept of internal control to designate
a situation where "the individual perceives that the event is
contingent upon his own behavior or his own relatively per-
manent characteristics" as contrasted with external control
which is perceived by the individual "as the result of luck,
chance, fate. . .or as unpredictable because of the great
complexity of forces surrounding him."
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In Rotter's scheme a designation of an individual as ei-
ther internally or externally controlled is exclusively based
on his subjective belief concerning the nature of the world.
Contrary to the typical behaviorist 1 s formulation of behavior
as controlled exclusively by external events, Rotter concept-
ualizes behavior as "a function of (a) the expectancy or pro-
bability held by the individual that a particular behavior
will, in a given situation, have a successful outcome, and
173
(b) the value of that outcome (i.e., the preference value or
.
.
.reinforcement value-
-that the individual assigns to the
goal in question)." 417 As both probability of behavioral oc-
currence and reinforcement value are subjective expectations,
it is not astonishing that the primary research instrument
employed in designating a subject's focus of control is a
questionnaire consisting of twenty-nine biserial items.
Since this survey is the foundation on which both Rotter and
Seeman construct their theories, an analysis of several ty-
pical questions is in order.
Each item in the Rotter scale is composed of two state-
ments, each offering the respondent a choice between an ex-
pression of mastery (internal control) or powerlessness
(external control) relative to the hypothetical situation.
Several examples follow:
a. --one of the major reasons why we have wars is because
people do not take enough interest in politics.
--There will be wars, no matter how hard people try
to prevent them.
b. --Becoming a success is a matter of hard work, luck
has little or nothing to do with it.
--Getting a job depends mainly on being in the right
place at the right time.
c. --The average citizen can have an influence in govern-
ment decisions.
--The world is run by the few people in power, and
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there is not much the little guy can do about it.
d. --People are lonely because they don't try to be
friendly
.
--There is not much use in trying too hard to please
people, if they like you, they like you.
If from this representative selection, one is first
struck by the glaring conspiciousness of the alternatives as
well as their simple mindness, a second reading will also
disclose that despite their conciseness the questions are
vague and ambiguous and allow no qualitative distinction be-
tween the alternatives. One must choose only one alternative
even though the respondent may partially agree with each
item. Furthermore, as evaluations of personal mastery or
powerlessness in objective situations, it is unclear whether
one alternative or the other should designate an evaluation
of alienation or non-alienation. Seeman arbitrarily decides
to equate the external locus evaluation to alienation. For
instance, Seeman in a study of workers' alienation utilizes
question b with the second alternative designating aliena-
tion. From the standpoint of a class conscious worker, how-
ever, one could argue that the first alternative, the belief
in hard work leading to success, is more indicative of an
'alienated' consciousness when judged relative to the object-
ive conditions of society. A cursory glance at other items
will show that this consideration can be applied to all of
418
them (cf. black critique of Rotter).
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From the foregoing, it is clear that Seeman's opera-
tionalized definition of power lessness , as one dimension of
his concept of alienation, is specifically Rotter's theory of
locus of control. Though claiming that the concept should
not merely be considered an index of personality, this is
precisely what Seeman has formulated. Although claiming that
this usage is not a radical departure from Marxism, Marx in-
vestigated social processes, not psychological states with
questionnaires. Seeman's reformulation is a personality
test, adequate for psychologists in their laboratories. When
compared to the intellectual richness of Marx's theory it
419
represents a drop in the ocean.
Powerlessness
,
though, is only one dimension of Seeman's
multi- faceted approach. He proposes four additional mean-
ings, each as sociologically and philosophically bankrupt as
his analogue to Marx's theory of alienation. Meaninglessness
is identified as the second variant of alienation. The clas-
sical tradition which Seeman is drawing upon is Karl Mann-
heim's proposition concerning functional and substantive ra-
tionality. Mannheim posits this distinction as an explana-
tion for the historical trend that with the increasing indus-
trialization and organization of society the average individ-
ual capacity for independent judgment and reflection seems to
decrease proportionally. For Mannheim, then, functional ra-
tionality implies "the organization of the activity of mem-
bers of society with reference to objective ends" whereas
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substantial rationality denotes "the capacity to act intel-
ligently in a given situation on the basis of one's own in-
signt into the interaction of events." 420 In other words,
functional rationality^ represents the hierarchical, frag-
mented order of the assembly line, scientific management,
and bureaucratic structures. On the other hand, substantial
rationality denotes critical, self - reflect ion of societal
processes. Mannheim's primary contention concerning the re-
lationship between the two types is that "functional ration-
alization, in its very nature, (is) bound to deprive the
average individual of thought, insight, and responsibility
and to transfer these capacities to the individuals who di-
rect the process of rationalization."^^ Thus increased
technical, instrumental knowledge inherently leads to a
state of affairs where sel f -reflect ion is surrendered to a
functional ly rationali zed complex of activities. Though each
particular societal atom is rationalized according to the
norm of productive efficiency, the totality, society, be-
comes irrational.
Seeman's reformulation of this conceptualization again
takes recourse in the terminology of social learning theo-
ry. According to Seeman one may "operationalize this as-
pect of alienation by focusing upon the fact that it is
characterized by a low expectancy that satisfactory predic-
4 2 2
tions about future outcomes of behavior can be made."
One speaks of high alienation, in the meaningless sense as
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a situation where "the individual's choice among alternative
beliefs has low 'confidence limits.'" 423 In the Rotterian
paradigm this definition refers essentially to the subject-
ive ability to predict behavioral outcomes whereas power-
lessness refers to the sensed ability to control outcomes.
Seeman's choice of an example of this dimension of ali-
enation is the post-war German situation described by Adorno
as meaningless "in the sense that the individual could not
choose with confidence among alternative explanations of the
inflationary diasters of the time.
. . ,
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Adorno, however, as an example of his psychological defini-
tion, Seeman both misleads the reader who may hastily assume
that this particular definition was formulated in such a
manner as ^o empirically test Adorno's broader conception,
and enlists the name of a social theorist whose lifelong
work was dedicated to refuting precisely the type of conspi-
cuous positivism employed by Seeman.
Still, there is a final irony in Seeman's effort which
even overshadows the foregoing. Seeman, unbeknown to him-
self, has postulated a definition of meaninglessness which
itself, according to Mannheim's discussion, would be labeled
as meaningless. For, Seeman's operationalized definition is
a prime example of functional rationality diminishing the
substantive content of a concept. By defining a complex
societal concept as a set of individual beliefs with a "low
confidence limit," discernable, one supposes, by the Rotter
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questionnaire, Seeman has attempted to functionally ration-
alize a self-reflective concept. Seeman fails to perceive
that by conceptualizing alienation as a mere agglomeration
of exactly, observable individual data, he has employed a
type of thinking which Mannheim has labeled methodological
asceticism due to its prohibition of substantial content in
favor of method. The best that can be said for Seeman'
s
version of meaningless is that its very inconsequential! ty
is evidence for Mannheim's argument.
Increduously
,
Seeman' s third variant of alienation is
a reformulation of Durkheim's concept of anomie or normless-
ness. On what theoretical or historical ground he bases
his evaluation of anomie as an element of an alienation ty-
pology is never revealed. Understandably, Seeman moves ra-
ther quickly from Durkheim and his complex, sociological
conception of anomie to Robert Merton's theory of anomie--
certainly one which is more manageable in the psychological
language of learning theory. Despite its sociological con-
ceptualizations, Seeman finds Merton's classic paper easily
translatable into social learning terminology. "First Mer-
ton's scheme," Seeman observes, "is thoroughly consistent
with Rotter's theory in that it is an analysis of one kind
of situation involving high goal values and low expectancies
for attainment of success." 425 Thus Merton's variable of
the cultural goal of success is translated into high rein-
forcement value, and class determined opportunities for sue-
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cess in the economic world into an individual's subjective
expectancy for attainment of success. Second, Merton's con-
ceptualization of deviance as the strain between normative
values and opportunities for success "is paralleled in Rot-
ter's theory by the psychological conception of strain--the
inconsistency between highly valued goals and low subjective
probabilities of achievement leading to mental illness." 426
That Merton's sociological theory can be reformulated into
psychological terms so easily is more a statement of its
shortcomings and inadequacies than it is a confirmation of
the validity of Seeman's effort of translation. Neverthe-
less, Seeman's attempt is a distortion, for Merton's theory
does take into account the prevailing social structure and
is attempting to discover class differentials in the rates
of deviancy, not the psychological reasons for illness. Re-
vision of Merton's theory in strictly subjective terms com-
pletely misses its sociological content.
Seeman's fourth version of alienation refers to isola-
tion, specifically the subjective feelings experienced by
intellectuals who reject popular culture and generally feel
estranged from society. For Seeman this variant is likewise
expressible in reward value: "the alienated in the isola-
tion sense are those who, like the intellectual assign low
reward value to goals or beliefs that are typically highly
valued in the given society." 427 This meaning of alienation
has been drawn principally from Merton's characterization of
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rebellion as the rejection of cultural goals and institu-
tionalized means and from a study done by Gynn Nettler which
defined alienation as a sense of isolation. Again, Seeman's
translation of Merton's functional adaptation, involving a
redefinition of the social system into the subjective as-
signment of low reward value to beliefs is inappropriate and
mistaken. Regardless of the shortcomings of Merton's writ-
ing pertaining to rebellion, they imply an evaluation of so-
cial structure; a calculation which is not possible in so-
cial learning theory. On the other hand, Nettler's study
does harmonize with Seeman's formulation. Nettler defines
the alienated individual as "one who has been estranged
from, made unfriendly toward, his society and the cultural
4 2 8
it carries.' As customary with socio-psychological de-
finitions, Nettler employs a questionnaire. Following is a
representative sample of items employed in this survey:
1. Do you enjoy TV?
2. Do you read the Reader's Digest?
3. What do you think of the new model American auto-
mobiles?
4. Do you like to participate in Church activities?
5. Do national spectator sports interest you?
The absurdity and simplemindness of such questions is com-
pounded by the fact that negative responses were tabulated
by Nettler as indicators of alienation. Moreover, the 'ali-
enated' subject population of thirty-seven subjects who were
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administered the survey consisted of approximately thirty
professionals (Ph.D.'s, M.D.'s, writers and business execu-
tives), some with an income in excess of $50,000 (and the
study was completed in 1957)!
Seeman's final version of alienation is designated as
self-estrangement. Although attempting to summarize several
other psychological versions of alienation (Fromm and Reis-
man)
,
for our purposes only his characterization of Marx's
descriptive of man's estrangement from his productive activ-
ity is of interest. Seeman refers to Marx's concept of ali-
enated labor "as that aspect of self- alienation which is
generally characterized as the loss of intrinsic meaning in
work- -the loss of pride in workmanship-
-which Marx saw as a
crucial loss touching the very essence of man. '. . ."429
From this description of Marx's usage, Seeman sees aliena-
tion "as the degree of dependence of the given behavior upon
anticipated future rewards, that is upon rewards that lie
outside the activity itself. "^"^ Apparently, alienated la-
bor can be sufficiently operationalized as an anticipated
reinforcement which is not related to the individual's ac-
tivity. Seeman's contention, nevertheless, that alienated
labor is a "loss of pride in workmanship," is ridiculous.
Not only does it subjectivize labor, the primary objective
category of reality, to a psychological feeling of satisfac-
tion or pride, but, in addition, removes the objective re-
ality of class conflict which is integral to all of Marx's
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concepts. To suggest that his definition bears any resem-
blance to the complexity of Marx's formulation is plainly
mistaken
.
Seeman is not unaware that for sociologists "it may
seem, at first reading, that the language of expectations
and rewards is somewhat strange, if not misguided .
"
431
Nevertheless
,
true to his psychological formulation, he as-
sures "the reader will find only that initial strangeness
which is often experienced when we translate what was senti-
mentally understood into a secular question." 432 Besides
Seeman feels that his choice of psychological language is
more traditional than it may seem since he experiences no
compunction in stating that the traditional meaning of val-
ues and expectations can be translated into reward value
and psychological expectancy. 433 Although the sociologist
must sacrifice the old, sentimental usage of the concept,
he will be rewarded with the knowledge that the problematics
of alienation "can be empirically rather than conceptually
solved." 434
Clearly, Seeman' s set of operational ized definitions of
alienation establishes a radical break with the historical
formulations of the classical theorists. As the commonality
between the new, scientific concept and the classical theo-
ries appears in name only, the question of Seeman' s intent
arises. Why call a rehash of J. Rotter's social learning
theory a definition and measure of alienation? For several
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decades psychologists have utilized the internal-external
scale in hundreds of studies and have been content to label
their findings as contributions to personality theory. Be-
sides, Rotter, a clinician, developed his theory in the con-
text of therapeutic analysis of patients who responded dif-
ferentially to new experiences depending upon their attri-
bution of the events to chance and luck or to their own be-
havioral control. Does Seeman's professional status, as a
sociologist, provide him with the authority to translate a
psychological construct into a sociological concept by mere-
ly appending a new name to it?
Assessment of the settings and methods Seeman employs
does suggest that denotation is his most powerful conceptual
tool. His first choice of an adequate setting to test his
hypothesis is a tuberculosis hospital. Why? Because "hos-
pitalization for treatment in a tuberculous hospital, repre-
sents a microcosm of the alienated features that are so
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often discussed in the literature." In fact "it con-
tains important elements of the model called 'mass society'"
which allows researchers to view the role of the patient as
a special instance of the power lessness the individual feels
A 7 £L
in a world of modern technology. This allows one to as-
sume "that the results obtained here have implications for
many other domains where the concept has been appl ied- -e . g .
,
implications for political behavior, mass communication, and
437
the life." 0
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Not only has a tuberculous hospital-
-which would not
even provide an adequate model for hospitals in general— be-
come a representation for the alienating conditions of mod-
ern life, but this setting also provides an adequate test
for the validity of the alienation thesis in general: "In
the response of patients to the microcosm of the hospital
and health, we hoped in some measure to read signs concern-
ing the general validity of the alienation thesis in the in-
A 7 O
terpretation of modern life." Thus the sociologist,
through a series of outlandish assumptions (i.e., aliena-
tion— score on I-E scale and T.B. hospital = mass society),
can utilize the results of his hypothesis testing to make
general statements concerning the degree of alienation in
society. Equipped with questionnaires and personality and
information tests, the sociologist can enter a very re-
stricted and controlled environment and extemporaneously
draw conclusions based on 'hard data* about the 'general
credibility of the alienation thesis.' The complex and
multiple problems of industrial society, which formed the
purview for Marx and Durkheim, are reduced to several tests
administered to hospital patients. Why designate this a
sociological study of alienation when the empirical measure
is clearly an operationali zed , psychological variable? What
about Seeman's own credibility in explicitly stating that
this set-up is a microcosm of the alienative features of
the modern world? It appears that if one is to concur with
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Seeman's assertions alleging the sociological relevance of
his research, he must accept Seeman's general assumptions
as a matter of faith, and/or be unacquainted with the clas-
sical meanings and theories of alienation in the sociologic-
al tradition.
For the moment, though, let us put these considerations
aside, and look at the actual experimental procedure. See-
man's hypothesis i s that pat ients with low alienation scores
as measured by the I-E scale will know more about hospital
procedure and their illness than highly 'alienated' pa-
tients. In choosing his sample population to test this hy-
pothesis, Seeman decides on an interesting matching process
common in experimental designs to control for extraneous
variability. Ironically, in a so-called study of aliena-
tion, this methodological consideration dictates that the
"females (26°6 of the total sample size) and the Negroes (30%
of the sample size)" be eliminated from the sample! Why?
"In the case of females, the elimination was based on the
fact that satisfactory occupational information was not
available for them. There were few pairs among the Negroes
that met the matching requirements and it seemed wisest not
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to introduce the racial factor in the analysis." Para-
doxically, in a study using a measure of subjective 'aliena-
tion,' two groups which even common sense would dictate
would probably be more 'alienated' (and in fact, studies
utilizing the I-E scale find females score significantly
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more external than men and Blacks more external than whites)
are eliminated from the study for reasons of statistical
analysis. Operating within these ludicrous methodological
inhibitions, Seeman statistically proves his hypothesis and
concludes that ".
. .our data- -which clearly support the
idea that alienation and knowledge are related-
- speak not
only about hospitals and patients, but also about the gen-
eral theme in contemporary life."^^
Thus Seeman would have one believe that this experi-
ment, performed within the confines of a hospital with a
specially selected sample of white males, is a significant
demonstration of the degree of 'alienation' and level of
knowledge in contemporary life. The logical proof of this
statement, however, is a tautology within Seeman's argu-
ment. In the paper's introduction, the correspondence be-
tween the experimental situation and society is stated in
the form of a fact. Then the hypothesis relating degree of
'alienation' and level of knowledge is proved statistically
in the limited and highly controlled environment. Finally,
the conclusion is drawn that the data speak about the gen-
eral theme of alienation. Nevertheless, if Seeman wishes
to extrapolate his findings to the real world, it is pre-
cisely the identities he states as assumptions which- must
be logically demonstrated. The act of simply declaring the
correspondence is no proof. Even for one to say that these
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results are generalizable to other types of hospitals would
be unfounded. To say that the data speak about the general
theme of alienation in society or are related in any manner
to the classical theories is ludicrous.
Though the majority of his studies investigate the
'alienation' thesis as it covaries with acquisition of know-
ledge, Seeman, utilizing identical methods, investigates
what he calls the personal consequences of alienated work.
In contrast to Marx's analysis, which emphasized the struc-
tural, historical, and institutional sources of the social
labor process, Seeman is measuring a subjective feeling and
attitude as determined by a series of questionnaires and in-
terviews. The objective phenomenon of labor is transformed
into the self-estrangement dimension of Seeman's formulation
of alienation. For Seeman, alienated labor is work which is
not intrinsically satisfying and causes the denial of per-
sonal fulfillment. It is measured by the total score on a
work alienation scale. Accordingly the assessment of the
nature of work is studied as a psychological artifact of
consciousness as it appears in the minds of the subject pop-
ulation. One's dissatisfaction with his job, or experience
of work as not being intrinsically rewarding or self-di-
rected, is the subjectivized substitute for Marx's repre-
sentation. Thus, Seeman's 'secularization' of the concept
and his attempt at an empirical demonstration mires itself
in psychologism--an unusual epistomological stand for a
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sociological study.
Again, setting aside the inadequacy of this definition,
how does Seeman propose to scientifically test the effects
of alienated work? Realizing that this usage is the core
of the alienation thesis, Seeman proposes to investigate
the generalized effects of alienated work as it appears in
other areas of social life. This generalization theme is
operationally tested by correlating a work alienation score
with six other questionnaire scores and examining the cross
correlations
.
The central measure of the study is the work alienation
score. The questionnaire is composed of seven items, four
of which are listed below.
1. Is your job too simple to bring out your best abil-
ities?
2. Can you do the work on the job and keep your mind
on other things most of the time, or not?
3. Does your job make you work too fast most of the
time, or not?
4. If you had the opportunity to retire right now,
would you prefer to do that or would you prefer to
go on working at your present job?
Clearly, this scale is measuring personal job satisfaction
and has nothing, whatsoever, to do with the nature of work
itself. Moreover, the survey, even as a measure of job sa-
tisfaction, is ambiguous and vague. For example, responses
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to question 2 may be equivocal. Someone on a rapidly moving
assembly line may have to devote full attention and concen-
tration to his job for strictly safety considerations, where-
as a high level executive may have plenty of time to day-
dream. What about the precise meaning of even simple ques-
tions such as 1? What is meant by a job 'too simple' to
bring out your 'best abilities'? Are these 'best abilities'
the abilities you actually possess, or wish you had? What
does it precisely mean to work 'too fast' most of the time?
Does it mean over 50°s, or 90% of the time? And what about
the whimsical character of the retirement question? Though
after tabulation of the questionnaire items, one has a quan-
tiative value, it is based upon the suppression of any qual-
itative difference or distinction which is manifested in
the meaning of the questions themselves.
Seeman - -
'
Some Dub ious Theses '
One of the interesting consequences of Seeman' s socio-
psychological theory is that the sociologist can argue that
the effects of alienation do not exist if his survey data
fails to find significant effects. As Seeman has not found
significant correlations between his work alienation scale
and the I-E Scale, as well as observing that these two mea-
sures of alienation correlate with other variables in oppo-
site directions, he claims that this evidence calls into
question not only Marx's work, but the writings of many
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other twentieth century theorists (Camus, Freud, and Mar-
cuse!). In a paper entitled "The Urban Alienations: Some
Dubious Theses from Marx to Marcuse," he argues that "to
speak of dubious theses about alienation is to suggest an
interest in secularizing this more or less 'sacred concept';
it is to suggest that there is something here about which an
empirical demonstration has to be made--the critical, evoca-
tive, and even romantic spirit that has infused the litera-
ture on alienation, whatever its very valid usage in some
respects, being no substitute for clarity or vigor." 441
The theses are dubious, therefore, because Seeman's re-
sults do not correspond to the hypothesized consequences of
his operationalized definitions. Still insisting that his
work alienation scale is "something very close to what Marx
meant," he claims that his empirical research discredits
Marx's analysis. As Seeman's research is based strictly
on survey data, he not only constructs a social reality on
a foundation of psychological artifacts, but also utilizes
this data to refute a complex historical, economic, and
philosophical critique of capitalism. The material condi-
tions of society can be uncovered by the sociologist by
superimposing the self-satisfied research enterprise over
what is investigated. 442 Once the primacy of the method
over the object is established, it is just a small step to
the abolishment of the object altogether. If the phenomenon
does not prove to be statistically verifiable, it does not
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exist for the sociologist. Moreover, it must not exist in
society, either, for the experimental environment has been
expressly chosen for its resemblance to society.
The validity of Seeman's argument, then, is ultimately
dependent on a rather generous extrapolation from the re-
search findings to the conditions prevalent in society. At
this point, however, his argument becomes entangled in a
contradiction involving the assumptions of his methodology.
Specifically, the act of operationalization of a concept
forbids generalization to other instances since the clarity
and scientific vigor of the formulation depends upon its
precise quantitative meaning. In Seeman's research these
definitions are determined by numerical scores on question-
naires. The determinate contradiction occurs "as soon as
there is any extrapolation from the instrumentally defined
concepts even to the conventionally common concepts - -and
this is almost inevitable- - research is guilty of the impur-
A A T
ity which it intended to eradicate with its definitions."
Of course, this paradox is amply demonstrated by Seeman, who
in one study eliminates Blacks and women from the subject
population and later claims that the results are representa-
tive of the general conditions of powerlessness in society.
Why should these findings be generalizable , considering the
study's design? In fact, the constraints of statistical
inference would not allow one even to generalize the results
to the entire patient population since the samples were not
randomly drawn. Paradoxically, the more rigorous the operational-
ized definition, the more grandiose the extrapolation. Employing
these methods, the greater the sociologist's success in controlling
and manipulating the experimental situation, the further he removes
himself from the actual processes and institutions of society. As
Seeman has stressed methodological purity and vigor in place of con-
tent, he has correspondingly travelled a rather large distance, not
only from society, but from the objectives of the philosophical tra-
dition of alienation research. We believe that in this context, See-
man's theses, rather than Marx's, are dubious and somewhat ludicrous.
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CHAPTER VI
Conclusion
Marx and Durkehim
Throughout, it has been emphasized that the respective veiw-
points of Marx and Durkheim are meaningful only within the context
of their general theoretical frameworks. One, then, cannot direct-
ly compare alienation and anomie to determine the points of conver-
gence and divergence. Instead, one must compare the respective un-
derlying presumptions of the broader theoretical perspectives of
Marx and Durkheim to ascertain the similarities between the concepts,
if any. The general theories, as well as the critical concepts, are
based on implicit perspectives of social processes, human .nature, and
the structual relationships through which the individual is molded by
society. Moreover, being critiques these concepts are also prescrip-
tive and explicitly convey political and ethical directives relating
to the future of society. As critical concepts, they imply the judg-
ment of society relative to an ethical ideal for their evaluations of
present conditions and future possibilities. Both theories, in addi-
tion, formulate their solutions to the crisis of modern society as at-
tainable outcomes of transformations of the present relationships and
institutions in society. Though in differing manner, these social
critics made the analysis of the division of labour and the law of con
tract the focal points of their critiques.
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Division of Labour
For Durkheim the significance of the division of labour was re-
presented in the moral solidarity inherent in the cooperation neces-
sary for functional specialization and interdependence of socializ-
ed labour. The solely economic operations of the division and con-
tract were clearly subordinate to their role in maintaining the dis-
cipline and the constraint of moral norms. The law of contract, the
act of exchange, and the division of labour are the expressions of
cooperation and reciprocity which form the components of organic
solidarity. The progression of organic solidarity, then, is neces-
sarily dependent upon the growth and penetration of the market and
the economy. Society becomes more capable of collective solidarity
simultaneously with the growth of individualism due to the increas-
ed specialization of tasks. Theoretically, the development of in-
dividualism contributes to solidarity because the division of labour
coordinates and regulates the particular and diverse elements of
social production. Social differentiation and the 'cult of the in-
dividual' is subordinate to and complementary with organic solidar-
ity.
When Durkheim turned to the actual conditions of his era, he
acknowledged that the effects of the division on social solidarity
were sometimes contradictory. To maintain the logical consistency
of his broader perspective, he designated these equivocal outcomes
as abnormal forms of the division of labour. The pathological forms,
the anomic and the forced division of labour, resulted from the fact
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that organic solidarity was still in the process of emerging to its
full potential. Only when the division of labour had become more
fully organized and the specialization of functions pushed to its
limits would societal equilibrium ensue.
Durkheim's argument clearly explains the anomic and forced divi-
sion of labour as independent and contrary phenomenon. The anomic
form, characterized by the developmental lag of rules and laws re-
lative to the growth of the division, results in the lack of regula-
tion in all phases of economic and social life. The market and human
needs are characterized by normlessness and limitlessness. Being un-
regulated, production and contractual relationships lead naturally
to periodic economic disturbances. On the other hand, the forced
division is the aftermath of the imposition of unfair rules which
interfere with the spontaneous allocations of jobs. For Durkheim
the spontaneous and normally functioning division would produce an
outcome where 'social inequalites exactly express natural inequali-
ties.' In reality, however, the distribution of social functions
does not represent the apportionment of natural talents since an ex-
ternal force discriminates against the lower classes by excluding
them through the force of law and custom from appropriate positions.
Thus the forced division illustrates a set of circumstances where
regulation and constraint are unjust and debilitating to social co-
hesion.
The outcome of Durkheim's analysis is equivocal. Though his
inquiry identifies the primary crisis points of modern industrial
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society, the abnormal forms are characterized as temporary and ex-
ogenous to the normal dynamic of the division. Being external to
the normal functioning of the division, these pathological forms
would eventually subside through the progressive evolution of the
economy and society. Moreover, the two aberrant forms, themselves,
are independent and illustrate polar circumstances -- the anomic
caused by lack of regulation, and the forced the outcome of unjust
and pervasive regulation. Durkheim argues the concurrent develop-
ment of anarchy in the market and external force in the workplace
are distinct conditions amenable by different remediations.
In Capital
,
Marx elaborates his fullest treatment of the divi-
sion of labour. In contrast to Durkheim, who emphasized the divi-
sion as the source of social cohesion, Marx's formulation, develop-
ed within the theoiy of value, explains why the structual arrange-
ments of the division of labour necessarily lead to coercion in the
workplace and disorder in the market place. Utilizing an analytical
framework which distinguishes between the division of labour in so-
ciety and in the workplace, Marx is able to uncover which factors
are a special creation of the capitalist mode of production. When
this schema is compared to Durkheim' s description of the division
of labour, it is evident that his 'aberrant forms' are the only ones
possible in the capitalist mode of production.
This distinction between the division of labour in society and
manufacture enables Marx to demonstrate the specific qualities of
the division in capitalism relative to the general characteristics
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which define any historical form of a social division of labour.
For Marx the division of labour in society designates the separation
of social production into its main divisions -- industry, agriculture,
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etc. Each of these production spheres has its own mode of produc-
tion and finished product which enables these different clusters to
come into contact and exchange their goods. In the division of labour
in society "exchange does not create the difference between the spheres
of production, but brings what is already different into relation, and
thus converts them into more or less interdependent branches of the
collective production of an enlarged society. Exchange between
different spheres socializes production and enhances the process of
specialization and individualization. Clearly, this discription is
similiar to Durkheim's theory of the division as the source of soli-
darity and increased cooperation in society.
Whereas the division of labour in society provides the whole of
Durkheim's formulation concerning the growth of organic solidarity
and social cohesion, Marx argues that in the capitalist epoch the
division of labour in society exists simultaneously with the divi-
sion of labour in manufacture. Both of these distinct divisions re-
act upon, develop, and multiply the other.
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The division of labour
in manufacture, the particular development of the capitalist mode
of production, can only appear if the division of labour in society
has attained a certain degree of development since the reproduction
of wage labour and the circulation of commodities are the necessary
prerequistes for capitalism. Within capitalism these two types of
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the division of labour exist side by side and interact with one another,
"but, in spite of the numerous analogies and links connecting them,
division of labour in the interior of society, and that in the inter-
ior of the workplace, differ not only in degree, but also in kind."446
As will latter be argued, this distinction was not made in Durkheim's
general schema of the normal development of the division but displac-
ed to his arguments concerning the abnormal forms.
Though the division of labour in society and the workplace are
inseparable and complementary in the capitalist mode of production,
their specific processes and internal dynamics are antithetical. In
Capital Marx maintains that each type is related to the product in a
qualitatively different manner. In the division in society the bond
between the independent activity of the producers is that their re-
spective products are commodities. Marx utilizes the example of shoe-
making to illustrate: the cattlebreeder produces the hides, the tan-
ner turns them into leather, and the shoemaker uses the leather to
make boots. In the workshop, on the other hand, "the detail labour-
er produces no commodity. It is only the common product of all labour-
ers that becomes a commodity." On the assembly line each worker
contributes to the finished product, but only at the final step in
the process is the object a commodity sellable on the market. In
the division of labour in society commodities are bought and sold
by independent producers, "while the connexion between the detail
operations in a workshop is due to the sale of the labour-power of
several workmen to one capitalist, who applies it as combined labour-
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448power." In both forms of the division all transactions take place
in the market according to the principle of equivalent exchange with
the critical difference being that in the workplace the commodity
exchanged is human labour-power.
Marx's formulation of these two structual arrangements of the
division is based upon the goal he assigns to both forms within capi-
talism; namely, the maximazation of surplus value. In contrast to
Durkheim's emphasis on the division of labour as the mediation of
social solidarity, Marx demonstrates why the division leads to the
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capitalist's accumulation of relative surplus value. Both forms
of the division are involved, though in different manners. Within
the workshop "the iron law of proportionality subjects definite num-
bers of workmen to definite functions", whereas "in the society out-
side the workshop, chance and caprice have full play in the distribu-
ting of the producers and their means of production among the various
4 SO
branches of industry." In the workshop the labour process is ra-
tionalized with each task broken down into simple fragments of the
whole with each worker repeating the same limited job over and over
under the coersion of the continous motion of the assembly line. In
the division of labour in society, the 'invisible hand' equilibrates
the market through a process incomprehensible to the human mind. Ex-
treme rationality in one sphere of production, and lawlessness in
the interactions and exchanges between the different departments of
of social production. "The a priori system on which the division
of labour, within the workshop is regularly carried out, becomes
in
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the division within society, an a posteriori, nature- imposed neces-
sity, controlling the lawless caprice of the producers, and percept-
ible in the barometrical fluctuations of the market prices. Division
of labour with the workshop implies the undisputed authority of the
capitalist over men... The division of labour within the society brings
into contact independent commodity-producers who acknowledge no author-
ity but that of competition..."451
Therefore capitalist production manifests two paradoxical social
conditions -- "anarchy in the social division of labour and despotism
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in that of the workshop." Marx argues that both forms are mutual
and inseparable conditions of one another. Both develop and grow
simultaneously as capitalist accumulation and production proceed.
Both are endogeneous to the very logic of the capitalist mode of pro-
duct ion and necessary for the generation of surplus value.
When this formulation is compared to Durkheim' s, one discerns
that at the descriptive level the two theories converge in spite of
the fact that the logical structure of the two conceptualizations
are polar opposites. What Durkheim characterized as transitory, ab-
normal forms of the division of labour, Marx considered as the neces-
sary, logical outcome of the capitalist mode of production. What
one thinker believed to be external to the logic of the normal func-
tioning of the division, the other designated as endogeneous to the very
dynamic of production. Although the anomic and forced divison de-
scribes the 'anarchy in the social divison of labour and despotism
in that of the workplace', Durkheim failed to penetrate the under-
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lying causes of these outcomes. By overemphasizing the solidarity
engendered by the division and neglecting its place within the over-
all economic and social system, he had to resort to labelling pre-
sent conditions abnormal. In order to maintain that the divison
enhances organic solidarity, he was forced to argue that the histori-
cal forms of his epoch deviated from the normal and would pass due
to the evolution of the division. To argue that Durkheim overempha-
sized the positive aspects of the division is not to deny that pro-
duction is socialized by the growth of the division and the market.
As Marx also explicitly contended, functional interdependence and
specialization leads to greater dependence and cooperation among
various sectors of society. Nevertheless, what Durkheim did not re-
cognize was the inherently contradictory nature of capitalist coopera-
>
tion and solidarity necessitated by the need for accumulation of sur-
plus value. Thus in one sector of social production order, control,
job fragmentation, and rationalization are prerequistes for maximaza-
tion of profit, while in the social division of labour chaos, lack
of regulation, and irrationality must rule to allow commodity pro-
ducers to meet in the market place uninhibited. Both contradictory
phases are necessary for the production and realization of surplus
value. Hence Durkheim' s anomic and forced division of labour must
exist side by side. These abnormal forms are in actuality, the norm.
It has been previously argued that since Durkheim' s era, all
forms taken by the division of labour would have been considered by
him to be abnormal. By employing Marx's conceptualization, one can
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understand the necessity of this outcome, and the historic rationales
which prohibited the abnormal forms from diminishing due to evolution-
ary pressures. The contradictory nature of capitalist reality, itself,
is equivocal. Social solidarity, as a sui generis force, is a contra-
dictory process. Rationality and control at the micro- level of the
division within manufacture leads necessarily to anomie and deregula-
tion at the macro-level of the social division of labour. Social
solidarity exhibits both phases since each leads to the other accord-
ing to the logic of accumulation. Utilizing Marx's paradigm, one can
realize the impossibility of Durkheim's task. If the totality, itself,
contains elements of rationality and irrationality, the concept of soli-
darity must reproduce these contradictory moments. Therefore both
functional interdependence and cooperation are expressed through the
t
anomic and forced division of labour. Although in capitalism individual
producers do have a certain solidarity, it must be expressed uncon-
sciously in terms of the value of their commodities. Though the sum
total of social labour constitutes a vast collective product, the dis-
tribution and rationalization of human labour must be in terms of homo-
geneous, quantitative units which are equalized through market exchange.
The fetish character of all commodities (things and labour-power) - "...
a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes,
the fantastic form of a relation between things" - forecloses the pos-
sibility that solidarity can be consciously planned and regulated.
The totality, society, simultaneously expresses and represses the con-
tradictions of the division of labour and commodity
exchange. The
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division of labour extends and continually reproduces its control
over society, but the constraint necessarily is both unconscious and
unplanned due to the needs of capitalist production. Society, sui
generis, succumbs to the primacy of accumulation.
Contract and Equivalent Exchange
The particular, empirical elements of the division of labour and
the free market have been conceptualized in two antithetical manners.
One approach has logically deduced social relationships from the con-
cept of the individual himself, whereas the second position has de-
monstrated the necessity of society as the prerequiste for the auto-
nomous individual. In social theory utilitarianism has been one of
the chief representatives of the former outlook. Though beginning
from differential understandings of the dynamic of society, Marx and
Durkheim converge in deriving the functions of the division and the
market place from their internal relationships articulated in society.
Both thinkers find the utilitarian's characterization of society as
an assemblage of independent members as illusionary. Economic indivi-
dualism - defined by egoism, self-interest, and unlimited freedom -
as the foundation of society, represented for both thinkers a psycho-
logical and ahistorical theory of society. In misconstruing appear-
ance for essence, utilitarianism leads to a characterization of society
as a battlefield where norms for any social action must be establish-
ed each time individual's interact. In contrast, Marx and Durkheim,
beginning with appearances (enroirical realtiy) , demonstrate the under-
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lying nature of contract, individualism, and equivalent exchange.
The market is the sphere of contract and exchange. According
to the utilitarians, when individuals freely exchanged their goods
by initiating contractual agreements, social harmony is spontaneous-
ly produced by the pursuit by each of his own interest. Social life
and solidarity is organized by the unconscious guidance of the 'invis-
ible hand'. By some unknowable process the market is equilibrated
and harmonized. Profit occurs as a natural by-product.
When Marx evaluates this description of the market place, he ack-
nowledges both its experiential validity, and its ideological gloss:
"This simple device is no sorcery ,but it contains the entire wisdom
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of the vulgar economists." In everyday experience the process of
market exchange does appear to be the fundamental cornerstone of society
A
Everyone enters the market daily as a buyer and seller or commodities
and initiates contractual agreements (i.e., rent, wage contracts, pur-
chase agreements) of equality -- equal values are exchanged. For the
utilitarians this analysis is a sufficient model for the economy and
society.
Beginning with the everyday appearances of the market place, Marx
asks several fundamental questions. If this description of the mar-
ket, as nothing other than a relationship between commodity owners
who exchange money and commodities in free and equal exchanges, is
true, how in the process of exchange is surplus value created? To
ascribe the cause of surplus to the 'invisible hand' or to systematic
unequal exchanges is insufficient. One explanation leads to the
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characteriztion of surplus as a product of the heavens, whereas the
other posits society as a battlefield. Moreover, what explains the
fact that the market is consistently generous to just one social class.
Why does one class smirk "self- importantly and is intent on business,"
while the "other is timid and holds back, like someone who has brought
his own hide to market and now has nothing to expect but -- a tanning."?
If one solely investigates the sphere of commodity exchange, the
problem of the source of surplus value remains insoluble. In the
market either commodities are exchanged for equivalents which fore-
closes the formation of surplus, or non-equivalents are exchanged
which would lead to a redistribution of existing value. Non-equiva-
lent exchanges, nevertheless, could not lead to the creation of new
value for even after an entire series of such exchanges the total
value in circulation would not increase by one iota. "However much
we twist and turn," Marx contends, "the final conclusion remains the
same. If equivalents are exchanged, no surplus value results, and
if non-equivalents are exchanged, we still have no surplus value.
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Circulation, or the exchange of commodities, creates no value."
On the other hand, surplus value must be realized in the process of
circulation since this sphere represents the sum total of the mutual
relationships between commodity owners. Though the commodity-owner
can create value by his labour (labour theory of value), the commodities
must be sold on the market to realize surplus value. Thus the forma-
tion of surplus value exhibits its contradictory nature in that it
cannot "arise from circulation, and it is equally impossible
for it
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to arise apart from circulation. It must have its origins both in
circulation and not in circulation."
Marx's solution to this paradox is his demonstration of the unique
character of the primary contractual relationship in capitalism - the
sale and purchase of labour-power. By distinguishing between labour
as a use value and labour -power as a commodity (exchange value) sold
on the market as any other thing, Marx explains the origins of surplus
value and class exploitation in a framework of equal exchange. The
so-called free worker -- free to dispose of his labour-power as his
own commodity and freed from all means of production -- must sell his
labour-power on the market to survive. Though the capitalist purchases
labour in the form of wages, he receives in return the right to con-
sume this commodity by setting the labourer to work under his control.
This transaction is comparable to any other commodity purchase with
the critical exception that labour-power is the source of all value.
The use value of labour-power, labour, is the only commodity whose
consumption creates more exchange value than was paid for it on the
market. Therefore, "in accordance with the laws of commodity ex-
change equivalent values change hands i.e., equal amounts of objecti-
fied labour. Although the one amount is objectified in a thing, the
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other in flesh and blood."
As long as one looks at the process of exchange of money for
labour-power, the exchange is equitable and fair. When one leaves
this sphere and proceeds to the immediate process of production, one
finds that exchange is an integral element of the capitalist labour
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process. The transformation of labour-power into labour by the capi-
talist is the primary link between the sphere of circulation and the
process of production. "Therefore, although the primary process, the
exchange of money for labour-power, or the sale of labour-power does
not enter as such the immediate process of production, it does enter
A CO
into the production of the relationship as a whole." The sale of
labour-power and hence the wage form is one of the essential mediat-
ing forms of the capitalist relations of production, and one constant
-
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ly reproduced by the relations themselves. To designate the pro-
cess of contractual exchange as something only superficially charac-
teristic of capitalism, or to regard it as the true essence of the
economy is false. Only by conceptualizing the two spheres as two in-
terrelated elements of the total production process can one uncover
*
the essential purpose of each.
By reconciling the formation of surplus value with the laws of
equal exchange, Marx has penetrated the illusionary guise of the
circualtion process. Although the sphere of circulation is a neces-
sary and integral moment of the exploitation of the worker, it appears
"in fact a very Eden of the innate rights of man. It is the exclusive
realm of Freedom, Equality, Property, and Bentham."
60
Freedom, be-
cause both buyer and seller are free to dispose of their property ac-
cording to their free wills; Equality, because of equivalent exchange;
Property, because even labour-power is a commodity; and Bentham,
be-
cause only self-interest, selfishness, and gain rule.
461 Therefore
the basic elements of ideology are anchored within the
structual re-
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lations of the market. The constant sale and purchase of labour-
power is a form of mediation which reproduces the worker's subjuga-
tion to capital. Though superficially, in the circulation process,
two equally matched commodity-owners confront each other, the true
relations of the inequality between labour and capital remains in-
tact, "but survives only as the illusionary reflection of the capital-
ist relation underlying it."
For Durkheim the concept of contractual law serves several pur-
poses in the Division of Labor . By examining the predominant forms
of law in society, Durkheim distinguishes between different types of
social solidarity and socio-economic formations. Laws are one of the
primary social phenomena which compose the base of Durkheim' s histori-
cal reconstruction of the evolution of society. Specifically, Durk-
heim' s hypothesis was that as social life became more complex and or-
ganized, the more numerous and diverse the forms of judicial codes
and laws. In documenting the progressive displacement of mechanical
by organic solidarity, Durkheim argues that restitutive law (contract)
replaces repressive law (penal) as the primary judicial relation of
society. In contrast to repressive law which authorizes punishment
for violations, restitutive law mandates that breeches of contractual
agreements be amended by the reinstatement of the contract to its
original state. Whereas repressive law formed one of the definitive
elements of the common conscience, restitutive law derived not from
the common conscience, but rather weaken it by leading to diversity
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and specialization of social function. Through the mediation of ad-
ministrative councils and bureaus, civil codes and technical rules
external to the common conscience regulate social functions. However,
restitutive law is not merely a regulator of private interest; rather,
it is a social force which adjudicates the rights of some particular
interest to the traditional rules of society. Therefore, while re-
pressive law was identified with religion and moral constraint, re-
stitutive law was exemplified by the body of real rights of the in-
dividual, particularly the law of property, contract, and exchange.
Contract and exchange, then, were identified as the primary mani-
festations of organic solidarity. Durkheim, however, clearly distin-
guishes his conception from that of the utilitarians, specifically
Herbert Spencer's view of contractual exchange. Spencer, by deriving
free exchange' and the market from the individual, formulates a con-
cept of society dependent upon the spontaneous accord of individual
interest. Analogous to Marx's critique of the vulgar economists (Mill
and Bentham) , Durkheim criticizes Spencer for characterizing contract
and exchange as strictly economic activities. As Durkheim argues, a
society based solely on the maximazation of private interest, would
soon disintegrate for there is nothing less constant nor more equivo-
cal than personal interest. For the utilitarians, contract and ex-
change were psychological rather than social phenomena.
Counterposed to the utilitarian discription of the market place,
Durkheim argues that all contracts of exchange are dependent upon two
social facts; the existence of society, per se, and a community of
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shared beliefs based upon cooperation. In contrast to the utilitar-
ians, who deduce society from the right of contract, Durkheim contends
that the contract is a mediator of social solidarity and constraint
and a regulator of individual behavior similiar to religious beliefs.
If all that individuals did was exchange their products in the market
place, rules and codes would have to be established between the con-
tractual parties for each exchange. Solidarity and cooperation would
be momentary, lasting only the duration of the agreement. However,
it is not sufficient for individuals to enter into an agreement, nor
even to feel the subjective state of mutual dependence during the dura-
tion of the contract for social solidarity to ensue. Social constraint
and cohesion, rather, is dependent upon the fact that contractual dutie
and rights be fixed and defined by society. Otherwise conflicts and
disagreements over the rules of exchange and property would be end-
less. A body of contract and civil law must explicitly define the
juridicial consequences of exchange as a prerequiste for extensive
social cooperation. Contract law, then, is the normative rule system
governing exchange and individual behavior. It is "a regulative force
of the greatest importance, since it determines what we ought to do
and what we can require."
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Rather than being an external party,
society represents the totality of conditions which presupposes any
system of contract.
In Professional Ethics and Civic Morals , Durkheim elaborates his
critique of the utilitarian theory of contract by arguing that all the
contractual solidarity of the market is derivable from the ritual,
a
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sacred representation. For Durkheim the classification of all things,
real and ideal, into the categories of the sacred and profane, is one
of the distinctive features of religious thought. The sacred is com-
posed of the "beliefs, myths, dogmas, and legends" which are attribut-
able to religious, moral, and social phenomena. These sacred repre-
sentations are not limited to concepts of a god or a spirit; rather,
any object ('a rock, a tree, or a peeble') or ritual may be a sacred
phenomena. To some extent a ritualized oath, ceremony, or symbolic
sacrafice always exhibit a sacred character. These sacred rituals
are superior in dignity and power to profane or everyday events.
Durkheim analyzes the development of the sacred quality of the
contract through a series of evolutionary stages. The first step is
that by degrees, sacredness, which had resided in things, passes in-
to the person; things are no longer sacred in themselves, but by vir-
tue of belonging to individuals who are themselves sacred. ^ There-
fore, for the sacred quality of property to emerge there had to be a
transition from collective to individual property. Although "it may
be surprising to see the right of individual property thus linked to
sacred concepts of ancient times," IXirkheim argues that this differen
tiation provided a moral structure which created a wide measure of
465
initiative for the individual.
The shift from collective to individual property, then, neces-
sitates the social relationship of exchange. Initially,, the contract
is ritualized by the forming of a convenant through a symbolic act or
oath, and by one of the parties handing over property to the other.
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The one who receives the property finds himself contracting an obli-
gation, that of handing over its equivalent. 466 Durkheim designates
this type of exchange a real contract, since the contract is "formed
only by the actual delivery or handing over of a thing."467 Historic-
ally, this form is followed by the solemn contract which is composed
of two elements: "a verbal nucleus, which is the formula, and the
outward ritual."468 This form of contract differs from the real con-
tract in that "the undertakings entered into by the two parties remain
to be carried out in full, even though the rites have been observed.
On both sides there are only promises and yet these promises commit
the two contracting parties."46^ In this exchange the irrevocability
of the will is made certain by the solemn nature of the exchange.
If one fails to honor this contract he is violating both a legal and
moral duty at once: "(1) I am committing sacriledge, because I am
committing an act forbidden by religion, I am trespassing on the re-
gion of sacred things. (2) I am disturbing another in his possession,
just as if I were a neighbor on his land; I am injuring him, or there
is a danger of it." Thus without the authority of society, reli-
gion, and tradition, contract could not survive since the contract it-
self could not constitute the foundation on which the right of contract
exists. Rather, it is the sacred and moral forces vvhich the contract
represents which forms its social nature and binding force.
With the onset of industrial capitalism, exchanges in trade great-
ly increase with the result that it becomes more difficult to keep
47
up the practice of the solemn contract with its hampering formalities.
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With sales and purchases going on all the time, the process of law
had to become more flexible to conform to social life. As Durkheim
argues, "it was not feasible to require every buyer and every seller
to take an oath... The day to day character, and continuity of these
4-7?
relations inevitable excluded all solemn ritual..." With the de-
mands of a busier life the importance of ritual formalities disappear-
ed leading to the transformation of the solemn contract, detached from
and rid of the solemn ritual , into the consensual contract.
For Durkheim the transition from the solemn to the consensual
contract was a 'truly revolutionary innovation in the law 1
,
represent-
ing the passage from mechanical to organic solidarity. The consensual
contract symbolized a point of convergence, incorporating elements
of the real contract (a true transfer) and the ritual verbal contract
(oath without transfer) . As soon as two parties engage in a verbal
agreement, the obligation for the transfer of a product or service is
established. The overt ritual of the solemn contract is shed, though
Durkheim contends that the consensual contract preserves the useful
effects of the solemn contract in an altered form. In the consensual
contract, the declaration of irrevocable wills made without reserva-
tions, or concealment of hypothetical conditions, between the two
parties symbolizes the solemn ritual and the morally binding force
of the agreement. The solidarity and moral force engendered by the
consensual contract is derived not from the actual words of the agree-
ment, but from the religious and sacred beliefs represented by the
words: "The contract by ritual was sacred only by magic and sacred
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processes: in the consensual form the given word acquired the same
security and the same objectivity through the effect of the law alone"473
The distinguishing characteristic of the consensual contract , then,
was the dominant part played in it by the declaration of individual
will. The assumption governing this development was that the consent
by both parties must be freely given for the agreement to be valid.
"Anything that lessens the liberty of the contracting parties," Durk-
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heim argues, "lessens the binding force of the contract." This
legal precept, as such, presupposes a concept of man as a free agent.
Thus the emergence of the contract of mutual consent coincides with
a new form of common conscience in society, the cult of the individual
-
a cult in behalf of personal and human dignity.
For Durkheim the cult of the individual is a social product,
the antithesis of the utilitarian concepts of egoism and individual-
ism. Though a "verbal similarity has permitted the belief that 'in-
dividualism' necessarily derived from the 'individual' and therefore
egoistic feelings," the individual is a product rather than a cause
4 7 5
of society. Durkheijii lavishes scorn and ridicule on the 'strict
utilitarianism and egoism of Spenser and the economists 1
,
who reduce
society to nothing more than a vast apparatus of production and ex-
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change. In contrast to the utilitarian's f crass commercialism'
and 'egoistic cult of the self, Durkheim argues for the concept of
individualism of the Enlightment as portrayed in the works of Kant
and Rosseau. What the utilitarians considered as the basis of human
interaction, exemplified for these idealists the very source of evil
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within society. In lieu of personal interest and competition as the
goals of human conduct, these theoreticains established the general
will, or humanity in the abstract, as the standard of moral judgment.
In this form of individualism, morality consists in disregarding all
that derives from ones empirical individuality, "in order to seek
out only that which our humanity requires and which we share with all
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our fellowman." This ideal of the general will, based upon the
foundation of a generalized humanity is what partakes of the sacred.
This transcendent quality, symbolizing man's life, libery, and honor,
receives its outward appearance in the cult of the individual, a re-
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ligion "in which man is at once the worshopper and the god." This
form of individualism, then, derives its moral dignity from the supra-
individual character of the rights and duties embodied in the social
collectivity. It is the new religion, or common conscience, which
directs man to subordinate his private aims to the needs of humanity.
In supplanting traditional religious beliefs, which have been weaken
by the growth of industrial society, it is the new source of social
cohesion and moral constraint. "It springs not from egoism but from
sympathy for all that is human, a broader pity for all sufferings,
for all human miseries, a more ardent need to combat and mitigate
them, a greater thirst for justice." Individualism, itself, is a
socially instituted relationship, a result rather than a cause of
society. Compared to the fatuous solemnities and banal observations
of the utilitarians concerning human nature and society, this
form
of individualism fixes an ideal of justice which is the source of
216
reason in society.
When the ideals and beliefs represented by the cult of the in-
dividual are applied to the contract, the contract of mutual con-
sent is altered by the addition of a new condition, that of equity
between contracting parties. It is no longer sufficient for a con-
tract to be merely consented to by two parties to establish an ob-
ligation. To conform to the ideals of the cult of the individual,
the contract can only be recognized and given moral sanction by
society provided that an equal exchange is negotiated and neither
of the contracting parties is exploited. The outward criterion of
fairness is that the contract mediate an exchange which is objective-
ly equal. Durkheim is very emphatic in distinguishing subjective
intention from objective reality and placing primacy on the latter:
"The state or condition of the parties, taken subj ectively , is no
longer the single condition. Now, it is only the objective conse-
quences of the undertaking contracted that have bearing on their
worth."480 Therefore, "in the same way as the contracts by mutual
consent sprang form the ritual and the real contracts, so in turn
did a new form begin to grow out of the consensual. This was the
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just contract, objective and equitable."
Though the transition from the contract of mutual consent to
one of equity appears as minor shift, in fact, the transition repre-
sents a new stage and principle in the institution. According to
Durkheim, the establishment of the just contract redefined the con-
tractual criterion of fairness, altered the legal concepts of
intent
217
and constraint as appied to the contracting parties, and a posited a
new precondition for equity. In all of these instances, the changes
in the institution resulted from compliance to the sacred beliefs of
the common conscience.
In the contract of equality, consent is no longer the outward
criterion of fairness and justice. Hence even when an individual
voluntarily enters into a contract in which he is objectively ex-
ploited, society cannot be forced to enforce it. "There is," Durk-
heim contends, "something about this exploitation of one man by
another that offends us and rouses our indignation, even if it is
agreed to by the one who suffers it and has not been imposed by actual
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constraint." A free contract, unfettered by external constraint,
is no longer a sufficient condition for equity. "A just contract is
not simply any contract that is freely consented to, that is without
coercion; it is a contract by which things and services are exchanged
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at their true and normal value, in short, at their just value."
For the obligatory effect of the contract to be complete, however,
Durkheim postulates one further condition; namely, that for equivalence
to be the rule it is necessary for the parties to be in conditions of
external equality. The fundamental condition for ensuing the recipro-
city of services is that the "weapons of the contracting parties must
match as nearly as possible. Then and only then alone, there will
be neither victor nor vanquished; this means that things will be ex-
484
changed so as to balance exactly and to be equal in value." Durk-
heim is not postulaing a society of absolute equality for he
argues
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that the unequal merits and abilities of men will always bring them
into unequal relationships. But these inequalities are merely the
external appearance of internal differences in persoanl aptitudes.
These natural biological variations do not violate the preconditions
for equal exchange. However, circumstances are quite different when
one of the contracting parties has a priviledged position due to ex-
ternal circumstances, such as wealth and power. Durkheim's selection
of the contract between labour and capital as his illustration of an
unequal exchange aptly portrays the reality of industrial society:
"If, for instance, the one contracts to obtain something to live on,
and the other only to obtain something to live better on, it is clear
that the force of resistence of the latter will far exceed that of
the former, by the fact that he can drop the idea of contracting if
he fails to get the terms he wants. The other cannot do this. He is
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therefore obliged to yield and to submit what is laid down for him."
This inequality of wealth between capital and labour "falsifies the ,
moral conditions of exchange" and forces labour "to take any price
c ,,486for its services."
Durkheim attributes the cause of class differentials and the
negation of the just contract to the institution of inheritance. "It
is obvious," he argues, "that inheritance by creating inequalities
among men from birth, that are unrelated to merit or services, invali-
487
dates the whole contractual system at its very roots." Inheritance
creates two main classes, which imposes a relationship between them
which makes the precondition of equality impossible to attain. For
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Durkheim, then, the exchange of labour for wages can never, in prin-
ciple, be a fair and equitable one. What, in the market, appears to
be an equitable exchange between labour and capital, in actuality,
is unjust due to the differential power and wealth of social classs.
•Therefore as long as such sharp class differences exist in society,
fairly effective palliatives may lessen the injustice of contracts;
but in principle, the system operates in conditions which do not allow
488
for justice." The contract of equality is objectively illusionary,
though the contracting parties may subjectively believe it is fair.
However, the illustion has a social purpose; for the contract of
equality has been transformed into a socially mediated institution
of oppression. "It is not only to cover certain particular points,"
Durkheim argues, "that 'lion's share' contracts can be entered into,
but the contract represents the lion' s share system as far as any
other relations of the two classes are concerned .
"
4^9
The just and
equitable contract, the designed guarantor of the sacred qualities
of humanity and the individual, has been stood on its head. Because
of class inequalities it has become the symbol and mediator of the
'lion's share' system.
Durkheim does propose a remedy, which in its implications would
lead to far reaching changes in society. The only reform which is
sufficient, he claims, "is the discontinuance of inheritance ab intestat
or by next of kin and above all of obligatory succession, allowed by
our Code of Civil Law in the case of direct descent."
490
Who would
be the new benefactors, without familial heirs? Durkheim suggests
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the various occupational and professional groups would be the recip-
ients of the property of its own members. Periodically the organiza-
tion would divide things up and distribute the property to its members
The distribution would be guided "in relation to the social deserts
of each one. The propertys of individuals should be the counterpart
of the services they have rendered in society."491 Inheritance, then,
must be abrogated for "it no longer corresponds to anything in our
ethics and could be abolished without disturbing the moral structure
of our societies in any way."492 Only by instituting this reform
could the contract of equality become a social fact.
Marx, IXirkheim and the Utilitarians
Social theorists, who have emphasized the market place as a model
for social interaction, have constructed their formulations on the
theroy of free exchange between autonomous individuals. Somehow, the
effects of egoism, competition, and self-interest, mediated through
market mechanisms, shape a spontaneous, social harmony. Society does
not have to intervene to assure this equilibrium. Rather, harmony
is a consequence of the unconscious guidance of mysterious forces.
This depiction of social interaction is both utilitarianism's strength
and weakness. By concluding that the description of the market's ap-
pearance is a sufficient explanation of its underlying logic, the
utilitarians profoundly misunderstand the root factors which govern
and shape exchange and social cooperation. Both Marx and Durkheim
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castigate the utilitarians for this conceptual failure. At the point
where they end, Marx and Durkheim begin their analysis of contractual
exchange. Though employing different theoretical perspectives, both
theorists unravel the complexities of exchange and the contract to
yield an explanation of the market's fundamental elements -- the
realization of surplus value and the reproduction of social coopera-
tion and cohesion. as oppression of the working class.
When one compares their analyses, it is remarkable that both,
employing such disparate theoretical rationales, converge in their
unmasking of the illusionary nature of the contract of equality between
capital and labour. Both theorists, by distinguishing between sub-
jective perception of an exchange from its objective consequences,
demonstrates that the contract between capital and labour, in prin-
ciple, cannot be one of equity or equal values. Clearly, Marx's
analysis of the causes and ramifications of unequal exchange is su-
perior to Durkheim' s contention that the institution of inheritance
is the impediment to justice. Whereas Durkheim begs the question,
Marx demonstrates how the sale of labour-power enters into the cre-
ation and appropriation of surplus value by reconciling the formation
of surplus value with the laws of equal exchange. Moreover, the cease-
less sale and resale of labour-power to the capitalist, shows how the
contract of equality becomes a representation of the " 'lion's share'
system as far as other relations of the two classes are concerned."
Both thinkers agree that the contract, itself, mediates the constant
reproduction of the inequality between classes. But Marx's examination
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is the more powerful theoretical statement.
Although the contract of equality is objectively illusionary,
illusion has supplanted reality for the institution of market ex-
change is the primary means of cooperation in industrial society.
Man's understanding of society and his own social life, then, is be-
clouded since equal exchange is a falsehood masquerading as the truth.
Marx identifies the basic elements of man's false consciousness as
originating in the structual mechanisms of the market. Though the
market appears as ' a very Eden of the innate rights of man '
,
this
is the sphere where labour's subservience and exploitation is begun
through the wage contract. Marx, nonetheless, is not forthcoming
with a detailed explanation of these phantoms of the market, nor the
symbolic forces which bind man to this sphere. In other words, why
do most individuals believe that their wage is fair and equitable?
At this juncture an interpretation of IXirkheim's analysis of contract
can supply some possible answers.
In his examination of contract Durkheim reconstructed the various
stages of the contract from its beginning in religious ritual. Where-
as real and solemn contracts were initiated with overt and explicit
ritualized pledges and oaths, the consensual and equity contract dis-
carded the outward ritual, but retained the sacred qualities of the oath
in the declaration of wills. Therefore the contract of equity is, in
part, a sacred agreement embodying the spiritual dignity and authority
of society. As a ritualized expression of morality, it is one of the
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essential mediators of organic soldiarity. The contract, as such,
is much more than merely an economic agreement binding two parties
together. Rather, it is the representation of human justice and
social ethics. It is the objective manifestation of the common con-
science, or the sacred beliefs of which man is both worshiper and
god. The contract, then, partakes of the secular religion in a double
sense; objectively as a ritual of cooperation and subjectively as a
concept standing for the religion of man. A violation of its terms
would be both a legal crime and a religious sacriledge. Society's
moral and ethical code, in addition to economic necessity, are
mediating man's attachment to the symbols of the market. The con-
tract of equality, as the primary symbol and representation of the
sacred in everyday social action, transforms the sacred into the
profane.
When the members of a single social group have nothing in com-
mon among themselves except the secular religion, the contract, like
the division of labour, becomes the prop of civil society. Although
the contract of equality is, in fact, one of inequality, the exploita-
tion of labour is accomplished through an agreement which is the sym-
bol of justice. The exchange of equivalents is a dialectical contra-
diction -- an exchange which is subjectively equal and objectively
unequal. Like the division of labour, the contract also has an ab-
normal form. Likewise, all of the elements of Durkheim's secular
religion -- the division of labour, the contract of equality, the
cult of the individual, and the professional and occupational
groups -
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have been transformed into abnormal forms. The division of labour
into the anomic and forced division, the cult of the individual into
the egoistic cult of the self, and the contract of equality into the
representation of the 'lion's share* system. In each instance the
de-poetized and disenchanted form of the concept remains, minus the
substantive content. The ideal and sacred aspect of each social
ritual has been abrogated, leaving only the rationalized representa-
tion. In the capitalist era profit, rationalization, growth, and
accumulation are the only remaining 'sacred' beliefs. All others
eventually become commodified into merchandise and incorporated in-
to the system. The components of Durkheim's secular religion persist
as mere platitudes and empty phrases; cliches for the politicians to
draw upon in their banal sermons. What remains is ideology, the
sacred in name only. Though the remnants of the secular religion
contribute to social solidarity, they do so only at the price of
compounding man's ignorance and degradation.
Critical Theory and the Positivist Spirit
As theoretical reflections upon society, the works of Marx and
Durkheim represented two classical responses to the industrial revo-
lution and the principles of the Enlightment. In the twentieth cen-
tury one would not expect theoretical undertakings of similiar mag-
nitude and scone. Nevertheless, one would presume that current
the-
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oreticians would build upon the works of their classical predecessors
when they borrowed their concepts and categories. As has been argued
throughout, this circumstance has not been the case. In fact, it is
hardly an exaggeration to say that twentieth century, American sociology
has transmuted components of the sociological tradition into a per-
spective which mocks the purpose and intent of the origianl concepts.
What has made this positivist transformation such a grotesque exercise
is that the concepts of alienation and anomie served as metaphors of
Marx's and' Durkheim' s critique of society. Merton's and Seeman's
translation of these theories into the language of instrumental ration-
ality has rendered the terms meaningless. The new, objective opera
-
tionalized definitions of these critical concepts as variables repre-
sents a radical break with the tradition of social philosophy. What
factors can account for the 'unfortunate fate' of these theories?
Throughout it has been emphasized that once the social sciences were
established on so-called scientific methods, all systems of thought ,
which predated the method had only a curosity value. How has the
internalization of the criteria and standards of the natural sciences
effected social theory? By comparing the writing of Marx and Durk-
heim to today's theorists, one can document a profound alteration of
the following elements of social theory: (1) historic sensibility,
(2) the concept of social totality, and (3) the formulation of value
judgements.
History
In the \^itings of Marx and Durkheim, history and sociology are
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inseparable. For both theorists the underlying causes and functions
of social phenomena were sought through the study of past forms. Both
thinkers explained the social structures of their day by the compara-
tive method. Historical understading is so integral to their respec-
tive formulations that when their works are dehistoricized by inter-
preters, the aftermath invariable distorts and nullifies the meaning
of the original analysis.
Historical understanding is Marx's method. Human nature, know-
ledge, labour, and social institutions and production relations are
historical phenomena. At every point in his analysis, Marx demonstra-
tes that the timeless, eternal appearances of the categories of poli-
tical economy are expressions of reified thought and conceptual crude-
ness. When historical sensibility is ablated, the present is trans-
muted into the eternal. Appearances, the set of 'pure' facts accumu-
lated through observation, replace developmental processes. The
social institutions of capitalism are proclaimed as the only ones
possible. "Marx opposes to them," Luckacs brillantly argues, "a
theory of theory and a consciousness of consciousness. The critical
philosophy implies above all historical criticism. It dissolves the
rigid, unhistorical, natural appearance of social institutions; it
reveals their historical origins and shows therefore that they are
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subject to history in every aspect including decline." Social
phenomena are intelligiable only as aspects of a historical process,
and this espcially applies to theoretical labours. As Marx observes:
"In the succession of the economic categories, as in any other his-
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torical, social science, it must not be forgotten that their subject -
here modem, bourgeois society - is always what is given, in the head
as well as reality, and that these categories therefore express the
forms of being
,
the characteristics of existence
. . . and that therefore
this society by no means begins only at the point where one can speak
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of it as such." To understand social reality, the forms of social
life which appear to be the most obvious starting points - commodity,
exchange, division of labour, etc. - must be historicized, instead of
being passively accepted as immutable, natural facts of human exist-
ence.
Although Durkheim has been commonly interpreted as an ahistori-
cal theorist by strue tual- functionalists, the historical dimension is
essential to his writings. As Robert Bellah has acknowledged, it is
nearly impossible to understand any of Durkheim' s studies, including
his analysis of suicide, without recourse to his use of the histori-
cal method. For Durkheim the underlying causes of social phenomena
as well as facts are discernable only by reconstructing their evolu-
tion by the comparative method. The understanding of the present
is only possible by deciphering the past. For instance, the function
of the division of labour cannot be understood apart from the transi-
tion from mechanical to organic solidarity. Likewise, the present
form of the common conscience and the contract is meaningless unless
their histories are reconstructed. On several occasions Durkheim
ui 496 j
actually stated that sociology and history are inseparable. In
a response to a statement by a historian who argued that
the two dis-
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ciplines represented two different points of view, he answered: "In
his exposition, M. Seignobos seemed to oppose history and sociology
as if they were two disciplines using different methods. In reality,
there is nothing in my knowledge of sociology which merits the name,
which doesn't have a historical character. . .There are not two methods
or two opposed conceptions. That which will be true of history will
497be true of sociology."
The transition from Marx and Durkheim to contemporary theorists
is characterized by the exchange of the historical method for the para-
digms of the natural sciences. Historical analysis and understanding
has been replaced by quantitative methodologies and statistical tech-
niques. Today's sociologist attempts to study social phenomena in
a manner analogous to a chemist analyzing the interaction of two com-
A
pounds. Utilizing data generated by questionnaires, he postulates a
body of hypotheses, deductively organized and experimentally establish-
ed by the method, to explain social manifestations. In place of Durk-
heim' s criteria for establishing a social fact -- that the truth
content of a fact depended upon it exercising social constraint and
independence from the individual consciousness-- .the contemporary
theorist establishes objectivity by utilizing the method, itself, as
the standard of truth. This constructs a standard of relevance and
validity where, as Marcia Westkott has argued, "anything discovered
through the scientific method is worth while simply because the dis-
covery occurs through the application of the methods of science...
Hence, how something is discovered is the criterion that determines
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the acceptibility of that which is known."498 Historical understand-
ing is not only irrelevant for the methodologist
, but is actually anti-
thetical to the logic of the scientific method. Mimicking the natural
scientist, sociologists look for general and universal principles of
social interaction which are ahistorical. Since the historical method
demonstrates the transitory and changing character of all social phe-
nomena, history must be consciously and systematically ignored by the
methodologist. For those searching for mathematical laws of predic-
tion, history becomes a field of inquiry which is outdated.
Hence, when one looks for an historical dimension in the work
of today's sociologist, he searches in vain. Usually, the only his-
torical reference in contemporary studies is found in the date of the
journal where they appear. Occasionally, an historical factor will
be incorporated in a study; but, then, only as a variable to be opera-
tionally defined and statistically analyzed.
What social factors account of this development? Luckacs, in
his discussion of the problem of history for bourgeois thinkers in
History and Class Consciousness
,
quotes the following passage from
Capital : ,rMan's reflections on the forms of social life and conse-
quently also his scientific analysis of these forms, takes a course
directly opposite to that of their actual historical development.
He begins post festum, with the results of the process of develop-
ment ready to hand before him. The characters... have already ac-
quired the stability of natural self-understood forms of social life,
before man seeks to decipher not their historical character (for in
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his eyes they are immutable) but their meaning."499 Luckacs' choice
of this particular passage is illuminating for this statement is tak-
en from the chapter of the fetishism of commodities. In this passage
Marx is describing man's reflections on the charcters "...which stamp
products as commodities and which are therefore the preliminary re-
quirements for the circulation of commodities..."500 The penetra-
tion of the commodity form into man's consciousness eliminates his
understanding of the origins of his own labour. Man's social exis-
tence is fragmented by the principle of calculability and rational
mechanization. Reification is the result of the production process.
Man's historic sensibility is abrogated by the universal form of
social reality, the commodity. Although there has been a past, capi-
talism ushers in the 'end of history'.
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Capitalism, in its effort
to eliminate its own transcendent possibilities, abolishes history
to fossilize the present. Accordingly today's social thinkers natural
ly have found historical studies an artifact of outmoded nineteenth •
century thought.
The abrogation of historical understanding also has a very Strang
effect on the understanding of the present. Specifically, along with
the end of history, there is the end of the present. In fact, con-
tempoarary social theory lias eradicated the concept of time altogeth-
er. Why? Because, if the present is represented as a time duration,
history would eventually confront the social scientist sometime in
the future. Even if the past is represented as nothing more
than the
negative of today, history will reemerge as a concept. Again,
theore-
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tical reflection has been transformed by the production process.
Luckacs asserts that in the capitalist era, "time sheds its qualita-
tive, variable, flowing nature; it freezes into exactly delimited,
quantifable continuum filled with quantifiable things... in short, it
502becomes space ." Luckacs abstracts this interpretation form Marx's
analysis of the assembly line and the concept of socially, necessary
labour time as a technical law of production. Marx argues that when
"we look at the workshop as a complete mechanism, we see the raw material
in all stages of production at the same time... The different stages of
the process, previously successive in time, have become simultaneous
and continuous in space.
"
50
^ As Luckacs comments "...time is trans-
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formed into abstract, exactly measurable space..." Thus we are
not surprized that one of the favorite discriptions of society by
today's social scientists is the social system as one collasal labora-
tory where the investigator captures "images of a social reality
willy-nilly, with no basis from which to focus."
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Totality
Although the concept of totality is incorporated within their
respective theories in different forms, totality is central to Marx's
and Durkheim's conception of social theory. For both thinkers the in-
dividual elements of the social system must be defined and analyzed
in their relationship to the social whole. Moreover, the social system,
itself, is greater than the sum of its parts. Society, conceptualized
as a sui generis phenomena, governs the function and structure of its
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constitutive parts. In the theories of Seeman and Merton, by compari-
son, the concept of totality has been relegated to a position external
to the realm of theory. To varying degrees in their theoretical en-
deavors, social phenomena are studied as isolated and self-contained
factors. If elements are referred to a broader perspective at all, it
is to construct discrete mathematical functions. The social system is
replaced by an elementary and amorphous social calculus.
The category of concrete totality is one of the cornerstones of
Marx's social theory. Capitalism, as a system of production which
penetrates every aspect of social life, is the category of totality
that governs reality. This does mean that the whole reduces its ele-
ments to an undifferntiated uniformity, but that the particular aspects
of social life mast explained in their relationship to. the logic of
capitalism. Relations of the particular to the universal are developed
through the category of mediation. The intermediate, mutual connections
between factors and the whole are explored to demonstrate that the in-
terdependence of the components of the system has primacy over indivi-
dual elements. "The intelligibility of objects develops," Luckacs
writes, "in proportion as we grasp their function in the totality to
which they belong. This is why only the dialectical conception of
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totality can enable us to understand reality as a social process.
The significance of the category of totality is readily apparent
in Marx's theory of alienation as well as his theory of value. In the
Paris Manuscripts , Marx portrays man's existence in a reality where
all the fundamental relations which comprise the unity of man and nature
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are fragmented by the logic of the production process. By defining
man as a specific part of nature ("the self
-mediated being of nature")
and labour as the universal process of object ification, he shows that
the various aspects of alienated labour are specific and necessary con-
sequences of one type of social formation, capitalism. Through the
exploration of wage labour, commodity, private property, and social
class, he dissolves the fetishistic appearances of these social pheno-
mena. The same philosophical presuppositions, likewise, are inherent
in the logic and structure of Capital
.
Beginning with the commodity,
the elemental form of appearance, Marx interrelates every stage of
the processes of circulation and production as these spheres contri-
bute to the logic of accumulation. In a particularly complicated pas-
sage analyzing the sale and purchase of commodities, Marx discusses
the unity and opposition of the primary elements of capitalism as a
concrete totality: "To say that these mutually independent and anti-
thetical processes (i.e., purchase and sale) form an internal unity
is to say also that their internal unity moves forward through exter-
nal antithesis. These two processes lack internal independence be-
cause they complement each other. . .There is an antithesis, immanent
in the commodity, between use -value and value , between private labour
which simultaneously counts as merely social labour , and a particular
concrete type of labour which simultaneously counts as merely abstract
labour ; between the personification of things and the reification of
persons ; the antithetical phases of the metamorphosis of the commodity
. ,,507
are the developed forms of motion of this immanent contradiction.
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The independent and antithetical forms of capitalist production form
a unity in contradiction. At each step in the spheres of production
and circulation, the socially necessary form for capitalist production
C exchange value, social labour, abstract labour, and personification
of things -fetishism ) must express itself as its negative ( use value,
private labour, concrete labour, reification of persons ) to conform
to the logic of accumulation. Capitalism is an upside-down reality
where appearance masks essence. Therefore, the intelligibility of
any one aspect depends exclusively upon ones grasp of the concrete
whole.
In the framework of Durkheim's work, the category of totality
is expressed in the concept of collective representation. All the
characteristic manifestations of collective life - the common con-
science, the precepts of law, the rules of morality, and the rituals
of religion - are expressions of social obligation which govern the
behavior of individuals. As exemplifications of sui generis forces,
collective representations are independent of any particular mind or
group of minds. For instance, Durkheim contends that the common con-
science is a transcendental, Dsychic representation of society. It
is defined as the "totality of beliefs and sentiments common to average
citizens of the same society forming a determinate system which has
its own life. ..it has not a specific organ as a substratum; it is by
508
definition, diffuse in every reach of society." This set of beliefs,
which forms the basis of social solidarity and the norms of conduct
for social interaction, is the ground from which individual behavior
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must be explained.
Throughout his writings, Durkheim stresses that collective re-
presentations cannot be understood by constructing a model from the
individual elements. Rather, the whole, itself, is a sacred repre-
sentation which surpasses its elements. "We must, then," Durkheim
argues, "explain phenomena that are the product of the whole by the
characteristic properties of the whole, the complex by the complex,
social facts by society, vital and mental facts by the sui generis
combination by which they result." 509 The category of totality is
liken to a chemical synthesis "which concentrates and unifies the
synthesised elements and by that transforms them. Since this syn-
thesis is the work of the whole, its sphere is the whole. The re-
sultant surpasses the individual as the whole the part."510
Within the framework of Merton's middle-range functionalism and
Seeman's instrumental ism, the concept of concrete totality has wither-
ed with the result being what Adorno has called 'sociology minus society*
Due to the shift from social theory to hypothesis testing of empiri-
cal propositions, the concept of totality has been reformulated to mean
a set of formally interdependent functions, interpretated as relations
between behavioral variables.
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Concepts, which Marx and Durkheim
had defined as structual relations between social phenomena, are trans-
formed by operational ization into a set of variables. Beginning with
these variables, hypotheses are derived which are then tested by the
utilization of questionnaires and other empirical tools. This data,
obtained from x number of subjects, is tabulated to derives average
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scores which are analyzed by statistical techniques. At all stages
of the testing procedure, the rules of the methodology dictate what
can be observed and what can be incorporated into theory.
Implicitly, the upshot of contemporary methodology is that the
social whole can be constructed from the sum of its parts. Since
the method is reductive and atomistic, reconstruction from indivi-
dual oarts is the only path open to describe the whole. If one could
accumulate a sufficient amount of individual observations of behavior,
a unified theory could be constructed. It is not by accident that
the opinion poll has become today's primary method of research. In-
terestingly, IXjrkheim, who is supposedly one of the founding fathers
of this style of research, succintly pointed to its central fallacy:
".
.
.
objective evaluation and averarge evaluation should not be con-
fused: it is that the reactions of the average individual continue
to be individual reactions. Because a certain condition is found in
a large number of people , it is not for that reason objective . Simply
because there are many people who like something in a certain way,
it does not follow that the appreciation has been imposed upon them
by some external reality. This phenomenon of unanimity may be en-
tirely due to subjective causes, notably a sufficient homogenity of
individual temperaments. Between 'I like this ' and 'a certain num -
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bcr of us like this 1 there is no difference ." If one could, hypo-
thetically, collect questionnaires from an entire population, one
would still not have initiated a sociological analysis according to
Durkheim's criterion. For Durkheim the mean or average score, the
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principal representation of totality for methodologists , is no diff-
erent than a single response for purposes of a sociological explana-
tion.
Value Judgements
The theoretical revision which contemporary sociologists most
readily acknowledge concerns the so-called value freedom of their
concepts as compared to the classical formulations. In contrast to
the definitions of Marx and Durkheim which are clearly value-ladden
since they make explicit evaluations of the social structure, today's
theorists claim as one of their prime virtues the fact that they have
divested the original concepts of their radical and ideological pre-
suppositions. Contemporary thinkers believe that they circ.imvent
judgements of value by employing the precepts of the scientific method.
The method, itself, somehow guarantees the 'objectivity' and 'neu-
trality' of the social scientist who faithfully follows the standard
procedures. Scientist ic technique and statistics are the building
blocks which have supposedly elevated sociology from its ideological
ground to the heights of a natural science.
When methodological presuppositions replace philosophical pre-
cepts, and the concepts of alienation and anomie are operationaiized,
the ensuing formulations become meaningless relative to the inten-
tions of the classical concepts. Why? Simply, becauses these con-
cepts are value judgements which entail philosophically grounded
critiques of the institutions and social conditions of industrial
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society. Being critical concepts, they embodied explicit value judge-
ments of society relative to an ethical ideal in terms of some future
and as yet unrealized possibilities. These thinkers, in responding
to the social conditions of their day, interpreted problems and pro-
posed solutions in terms of explicit value systems: Durkheim judging
society relative to the ethics of Kant, Rosseau, and The Rights of
Man, and Marx evaluating social conditions relative to the concept
of objective reason as defined in Hegel's philosophy. In altering
and obsecuring the original meanings by divesting these concepts of
their Utopian values, social scientists have changed these forumla-
tions from evaluations of things into things, themselves. Nor has
their methodological liturgy of value freedom, neutrality, and ob-
jectivity enabled today's practitioners to avoid the task of value
judgement. In the first place, their decision to recast the clas-
sical definitions into technical language is a far reaching value
judgement, itself. The determination to operational ize alienation
and anomie is dictated by the method, but the transformation of these
conceptualizations into measureable things entails a philosophical
judgement that the only philosophy of sociology which is acceptable
is the Scientific Method. Moreover, when the radical, Utopian values
are removed, these critical concepts become de facto, conformist ex-
pressions of social deviancy and psychological abnormality. It is
not surprising that Merton's theory of anomie literally created the
field of deviancy research and that Seeman's theory is a reworking
of a personality theory popular in clinical psychology. By shifting
39
the analysis from the critical interpretation of social institutions
and the human condition to the identification and explanation of in-
dividual deviancy, the values, goals, and standards of .American capi-
talism become the criteria rather than the objects of evaluation. By
necessity, the appearance of value freedom and objectivity masks the
passive acceptance of prevailing values and goals as the foundation
for contemporary theory. By confusing consensus and conformity with
objectivity, the method "has come to mean the desire to restrict the
range of one's activities to the immediate surroundings in which one
CI "7
is placed, and to abjure strictly all that may smack of speculation."
Value judgements, which were disclaimed for the sake of objectivity,
return with a vengeance. By restricting sociology to the applica-
tion of scientific procedures and the collection of 'facts', the pre-
cepts of the method help produce a conservative predisposition in
today's research.^
14
This circumstance has been variously described
as methodological inhibition by Mills, methodological asceticism by
Mannheim, and methodological puritanism by Adorno.
51
All are re-
ferring to a sociology which has trivalized it subject matter by ob-
sessively following a procedure which inhibits speoalation, creativity,
and conceptual thinking. Method has replaced society as today's sui
generis force. There is no clearer proof of this circumstance, then
the fate of the concepts of alienation and anomie. When incorporated
into today's prevailing research methods, these critical concepts
retain their name but lose their substantive content.
240
FOOTNOTES
Ik Emile Durkheim, Socialism
, Alvin Gouldner, editor (New York:
Harper and Row, 1965) p. v.
2. Frank Johnson, "Psychological Alienation: Isolation and Self-
Estrangement," The Psychoanalytical Review
,
Vol.62, No. 3 (Fall, 197 5)
p. 104.
3. Robert Nisbet, The Quest for Community
,
(New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 1953) p. 15.
4. Eric Kahler, The Tower and the Abyss
,
(New York: Braziller, 1957)
p. 43.
5. Man Alone: Alienation in Modern Society , Eric and Mary Josephson,
editors (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1962)
6. John Horton, "The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A
Problem in the Ideology of Sociology," British Journal' of Sociology ,
Vol. XV, No. 4 (Dec. 1964) p. 288.
7. Ibid
. ,
p. 288.
8. Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociolo -
gical Review
,
Vol.24, No. 6 (Dec. 1959) p. 783.
9. Ibid., p. 784.
10. Ibid
., p. 791.
11. Ibid
. ,
p. 736.
12. Ibid
., p.791.
13. Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure , revised
and enlarged edition (Glencoe, 111.: The Free Press, 1957) p. 162.
14. John Horton, "The Dehumaniztion of Anomie and Alienation" A
Problem in the Ideology of Sociology," p. 294.
15. Robert K Merton, "Social Problems and Sociological Theory,"
Contemporary Social Problems , Robert Merton and Robert
Nisbet, editors
241
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1961) pp. 723-724.
16. Maurice Stein, "Psychoanalysis and the Sociological Inquiry,"
Psychoanalysis and the Psychoanalytic Review
,
No. 49 (Summer, 1962)p.23
17. A favorite theorist for middle range sociologists has been
Max Weber. Simplified versions of his theory of bureaucracy have
provided a plethora of empirical research papers. Stanley Udy, for
instance, reformulates seven of Weber's ideal-types into three bureau-
cratic and four rational variables and searches for positive and
negative coreelations. Stanley Udy, MBureacracy and Rationality in
Weber's Organization Theory: An Empirical Study," American Sociologi -
cal Review
,
Vol.24, No. 6 (dec ,1959)p.791.
18. John Horton, 'The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A
Problem in the Ideology of Sociology," p. 295.
19. Max Horkheimer, 'Traditional and Critical Theory," Critical
Theory: Selected Essays , Matthew J. O'Connel, translator (New York:
The Seabury Press, 1972) p. 208.
20. Ibid
.
,
p. 209.
21. G.W.P. Hegel, Encycolpedia (New York:The Philosophical Library,
1967) P. 18.
22. Ibid . , Introduction," Sec. . 17.
23. G.W.F Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind , J.B. Baillie, trans-
lator (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) p. 131.
24. Ibid ., pp. 131-132.
25. Ibid .
,
pp. 131-132.
26. John O'Neill, "Introduction: Hegel and Marx on
History as Human
History," Studies on Marx and Hegel , Jean Hyppolite(New
York: Harper
242
Torchbooks, 1969) p.Xlll.
27. Mitchell Franklin, "On Hegel's Theory of Alienation and its
Historic Force," Tulane Studies in Philosophy
,
Vol. IX (1960) pp. 50-100.
28. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind
, pp. 660-661.
29. Sholomo Avineri, "Labor, Alienation, and Social Class in Hegel's
Realphilosophie ," The Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of the Marguette
Hegel Symposium
, J.J. O'Malley and K.W. Algozin, editors(The Hague,
Netherlands: Martinus Mijhoff, 1973) p. 203.
30. Ibid
. ,
p. 202.
31. Sholomo Avineri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971) P. 13.
32. Karl Marx, "Letter to his Father: On a Turning Point in Life
(1837) ," Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society , Loyd D.
Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, editors and translators (New York: Anchor
Books, 1967) p. 42.
33. Ibid
.
, p. 43.
34. Ibid .
,
p. 45.
35. Ibid
.
,
p. 45.
36. Ibid .
,
p. 45.
37. Ibid . , p. 46.
38. Ibid ., p. 46.
39. Ludwig Feuerbach, "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philoso-
phy," The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach ,
Zawar
Hanfi, translator (New York: Anchor Books, 1972) p. 155.
40. Ludwig Feuerbach, 'Towards a Critique of Hegel's
Philosophy,"
243
The Fiery Brook
, p. 86.
41. Ibid
., p. 87.
42. Ludwig Feuerbach, "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy,"
p. 156.
43. Ludwig Feuerbach, The Essence of Christainity
,
George Eliot,
translator (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957) p. 8.
44. Ibid
.
,
p. 27.
45. Ibid
.
,
p. 27.
46. Ibid
.
, pp. 26-28.
47. Ludwig Feuerbach, "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy,"
p. 154.
48. Karl Marx, "Letter to Arnold Ruge (1843), quoted in The Fiery
Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach
,
p. 38.
49. G.W.F. Hegel, Philosophy of Right
, T. M. Knox, translator (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1975) p. 10.
50. Dick Howard, The Development of the Marxian Dialectic (Carbondale:
Southern University Press, 1972) pp. 52-53.
51. Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," Writings
of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society
,
p. 164.
52. Dick Howard, The DeveloT3ment of the Marxian Dialectic
,
pp. 52-60.
53. Karl Marx, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," p. 187.
54. Ibid
.
,
p. 163.
55. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844
(New York, International Publishers, 1972) p. 173.
56. Ibid.
,
p. 177.
244
57. Ibid
., p. 175.
58. Ibid
., p. 177.
59. Ibid
., p. 175.
60. Ibid
. , p. 189.
61. Ibid
.
,
p. 189.
62. Ibid
.
,
p. 177.
63. Dirk J. Struik, "Introduction," The Economic and Philosophical
Manuscripts of 1844
, p. 44.
64. Istvan Meszaros, Marx's Theory of Alienation (New York: Harper
Torchbooks,1970) p. 76.
65. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
p. 188.
66. Ibid
., p. 129.
67. Istvan Meszarous, Marx's Theory of Alienation
,
pp. 163-164.
68. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
p. 177.
69. Istvan Meszarous, Marx's Theory of Alienation
,
p. 163.
70. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts, P. 188.
71. Herbert Marcuse, 'The Foundations of Historical Materialism,"
Studies in Critical Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1972) p. 14.
72. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts , p. 112.
73. Ibid
., pp. 113-114.
74. Ibid
.
,
p. 113.
75. Ibid
. ,
p. 113.
76. Ibid., p. 114.
77. Micheal Kosok, "Dialectics of Nature," Towards a New Marxism ,
Bart Grahl and Paul Piccone, editors, (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1973) p.
245
78. Herbert Marcuse, "The Foundations of Historical Materialism," p. 18.
79. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
, p. 138.
80. Karl Marx, Grundrisse fNew York: Vintage Books, 1973) P .84.
81. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
, p. 137.
82. Ibid
.
, pp. 181-182.
83. Ibid
., p.lll.
84. Ibid
., p. 110.
85. Karl Marx, "Wage, Labour and Capital," Selected Works (New York:
International Publishers, 1968) p. 75.
86. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
p. 117.
87. Ibid., d.110.
*
88. Ibid., p.lll.
89. Karl Marx, "Wage, Labour and Capital," p. 75.
90. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
p. 65.
91. Ibid
., p. 72.
92. Ibid., p. 121.
93. Ibid
.
,
p. 110.
94. Bertell Oilman, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973) p. 144.
95. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
p. 108.
96. Ibid
., p. 108.
97. Ibid
., p. 108.
98. Ibid., p. 118.
99. Ibid . . p. 119. /
100. Ibid
.
,
p. 136.
246
101. Ibid
.
,
p. 139.
102. Ibid ,, p.147^
103. John Maguire, Marx's Paris Writings: An Analysis (London: G. M.
Mac Millian, 1972) p. 74.
104. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
, p. 165.
105. Ibid
.
,
p. 166.
106. Ibid
., p468.
107. Ibid
.
,
p. 167.
108. Sholomo Avincri, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx
, p
109. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
p. 117.
110. Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: P.P. Collier and
Son Company, 1909) pp. 36 -37.
111. Karl Marx, The Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts
,
p. 117.
112. Ibid
.
,
p. 106.
.113. I.I. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value (Detroit : Black
and Red, 1972) p. 57.
114. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1974),
Vol.1, p. 71.
115. Georg Lukacs, History and Class Consciousness , Rodney Livingston,
translator (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1972) p. 83.
116. Ibid , p. 83
117. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 197 4)
,
Vol. Ill,p. 797.
118 Karl Marx, Capital , Vol.1, p. 573
119. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, p. 35.
,
120. Ibid., Vol.1, p. 36.
247
121. Karl Marx, Critique of Political Economy fNew York: International
Publishers, 1970) p. 36.
122. Karl Marx, Capital
,
Vol.1, p. 37.
123. Ibid. . Vol.1, p. 37.
124. Karl Marx, Capital (London: Penguin Books, 1976), Vol.1, p. 128.
125. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, pp. 165-166.
126. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 165.
127. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 165.
123. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, pp. 165-166.
129. Norman Geras, "Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism in
Marx
• s Capital , ' New Left Review ,\To .65. (January - Feburary
,
1971), p . 3 1
.
130. I.I. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value
,
p. 57.
131. Karl Korsch, Karl Marx (Mew York: Russel and Russel,1963) p. 131.
132. I.I. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value , p. 58.
133. Georg Luckacs, "The Old Culture and the New Culture," Towards
a New Marxism
, pp. 21-30.
134. Karl Marx, Critique of Political Economy
,
p. 30.
135. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1974) p. 58.
136. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 44.
137. Norman Geras, "Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism
in Marx's Capital , "p. 31.
138. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1974) pp. 165-166
139. Ibid ., Vol.1, p. 166.
140. Ibid., Vol.1, p. 167.
141. Ibid., Vol.1, p. 170.
142. Bertell Oilman, Alienation
, p. 173.
143. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1974)
Vol.1, p. 176.
144. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 176.
145. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 169.
146. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 714.
147. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, p. 168.
148. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 183.
149. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, pp. 184-185.
150. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, p. 185.
151. Maurice Dobb, "Introduction," Critique of Political Economy
,
p. 12.
152. Ibid
.
,
p. 14.
153. Ibid
.
,
p. 13.
154. Karl Marx, Capital
,
Vol.1, p. 167.
155. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, p. 175.
156. Ibid., Vol.1, p. 193.
157. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 171.
158. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, p. 190.
159. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, p. 194.
160. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, P. 194.
161. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, p. 593.
162. Ibid
. ,
Vol.1, p. 540.
163. Karl Marx, Capital , Vol. Ill, p. 791.
164. Ibid
.
, Vol. Ill, d.791.
165. Karl Marx, Capital, Vol.1, p. 80.
249
166. Ibid., Vol.1, p. 80. -
167. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 81.
168. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 75.
169. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 81.
170. I.I. Rubin, Essays on Marx's Theory of Value
, p. 120.
171. Anthony Giddens, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An
Analysis of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge
:
Cambridge University Press, 1971) p. 65.
172. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York:
The Free Press, 1968), Vol.1, p. 507.
173. Alvin W. Gouldner, "Introduction," Socialism
,
p. 23.
174. Robert K. Merton, "Durkheim' s Division of Labour," .American
Journal of Sociology (1934), pp. 319-328.
175. Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomie," Philosophy, Politics
and Society , 3rd Series, Peter Laslett and W.G. Runciman, editors,
(New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc.) p. 145.
176. Robert Nisbet, Emile Durkheim (Mew Jersey: Prentice Hall, Inc.
1965) p,29.
177. Ibid
. ,
p.36
178. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society , George
Simpson, translator (New York: The Free Press, 1964) p. 412.
179. Ibid., p. 64.
180. Auguste Comte, "Operations Necessary for Reorganizing
Society," Auguste Comte and Positivism , Gertrud Lenzer, ed. (New
York: Harper Torchbooks, 1975) p. 34.
250
181. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society , p. 64.
182. Ibid
.
, p. 64.
183. Emile Durkhcim, The Rules of the Sociological Method fNow
York: The Free Press, 1966) p. 2.
184. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
, p. 399.
185. Ibid., p. 68.
186. [bid
187. Ibid
188. Ibid
189. Ibid.
190. Ibid
191. Ibid
192. Ibid
193. Ibid
194. Ibid
195. Ibid.
196. Ibid.
197. Ibid
p. 66.
p. 66.
p. 32.
p. 129
p. 130
p. 130
p. 130
p. 70.
p. 73.
p. 79.
n.80.
p. 80.
198. Steven Lukes, "Alienation and Anomic," p. 152.
199. Emile Durkhcim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
p. 178.
200. Ibid
.
,
p. 169.
201. Ibid
.
,
p. 169.
202. Maurice Dobb, Studies in the Development of Capital ism Hew
York: International Publishers, 1975) p. 35.
203. Emile Durkhcim, The Division of Labor in Society, p. 111.
251
204. Ibid., p.m. • -.
205. Ibid., p.m.
206. Ibid., P . ii2.
207. Ibid., p . ii2.
208. Ibid., p . 113.
209. Ibid., p. us.
210. Ibid., p.117.
211. Ibid
.
, p. 119.
212. Ibid
.
, p. 119.
213. Ibid
.
, p. 124.
214. Ibid
.
, pp. 124-125.
215. Ibid
. , p. 123.
216. Ibid
. , p. 125.
217. Ibid
. , p. 127.
218. Ibid.
, p. 80 and p. 152.
219. Ibid
. , p. 131.
220. Ibid
. , p. 131.
221. Ibid.
, p. 131.
222. Ibid
.
, pp. 171-172.
223. Ibid
., p. 357. .
224. Ibid
. , p. 357.
225. Ibid
.
,
p. 557.
226. Alvin Gouldner, "Introduction," Socialism
, pp. 12-15.
227. Robert Nisbet, The Sociology of Emilc Durkheim (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1974) p. 27.
228. Rmile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
, p. 201
229. Ibid., p. 201.
230. Ibid
.
,
p. 201.
231. Ibid., d.203.
*
232. Ibid
., p. 203.
233. Ibid
.
,
p. 203.
234. Ibid
.
, p. 203.
235. Ibid
.
, p. 205.
236. Ibid
.
,
p. 212.
237. Ibid
.
,
p. 213.
238. Ibid
.
,
p. 214.
239. Ibid
.
,
p. 214.
240. Ibid
. ,
p. 215.
241. Ibid'
.
,
p. 215.
242. Ibid
.
,
p. 227.
243. Ibid
.
,
p. 228.
244. Ibid
.
,
p. 228.
245. Ibid., p. 353.
246. Alvin Gouldner, "Introduction," Socialism
,
p. 25.
247. Emile Durkheim, The Divsion of Labor in Society
,
p. 553.
248. Ibid
.
,
p. 354.
249. Ibid
.
,
p. 354.
250. Ibid
.
,
p. 365.
251. Ibid
.
,
p. 366.
252. Ibid.
,
p. 366.
253. Ibid
.
,
p. 366.
254. Ibid
.
, pp. 366-367.
255. Ibid
., p. 367.
256. Ibid
.
,
p. 367.
257. Ibid
. , p. 367.
258. Ibid
.
,
p. 367.
259. Ibid
. , p. 368.
260. Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work (New York:
Harper and Row, 1972) p. 193.
261. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society, n.370.
262. Ibid
. , p. 370.
263. Ibid
. ,
p. 370.
264. Ibid
.
,
p. 371.
265. Ibid
.
,
p. 371.
266. Ibid
. , p. 371.
267. Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Hrorks
,
p. 174.
268. Ibid
. , p. 174.
269. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
p. 372.
270. Ibid
.
,
p. 374.
271. Ibid
. ,
p. 375.
272. Ibid
., p. 375.
• 273. Ibid
. ,
p. 376.
274. Ibid.
,
p. 374.
275. Ibid
.
,
p. 376. /
276. Ibid.
,
p. 377.
254
277. Ibid
.
,
p. .377.
278. Ibid., p. 377.
279. Ibid
., p. 377.
280. Ibid
. , p. 372.
281. Ibid
.
, pp. 382-383.
282. Ibid
. ,
p. 383.
283. Ibid
., p. 384.
284. Ibid
. , p. 384.
285. Georges Friedman, The Anatomy of Work
,
Wyatt Rawson, trans-
lator (New York: The Free Press, 1961) p. 81.
286. Ibid
. ,
p. 82.
287. Ibid
.
,
p. 75.
288. Ibid
.
,
p. 75.
289. Alvin Gouldner, "Introduction," Socialism
, pp. 24-25.
290. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
p. 290.
291. The first American reviewer comments: "Published when the
author was thirty- five years old, the work accepts as accurate the
crude misconceptions of the 1880' s concerning the life of primitive
man as set forth in the books of those who were no more competent to
describe them than a botanist would be to write a treatsie in his
field without having even seen a plant... Not to be severe with a
writer who, forth-one years ago, accepted what is now known to be
untenable, it would at least seem that extended discussion of the
argument based on abounded premises might be considered an unneces-
sary expenditure of energy;" Faris, American Journal of Sociology ,
Vol. XL, (1934), p. 376.
255
292. Robert K. Merton, "Durkheim' s Division of Labor in Society »
-—
— — j y
The American Journal of Sociology
.
Vol. XL, (1934), pp. 319-328.
293. Ibid
. , p. 328.
294. Ibid
., p. 328.
' 295. Ibid
., p. 322.
296. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
, p. 203.
297. Robert Nisbet, Emile Durkheim (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1965) p. 36.
298. Ibid
. , p. 36.
299. Ibid
. , p. 36.
300. Ibid
.
,
p. 36.
301. Ibid
. , p. 36.
302. Ibid
., p. 36.
303. Ibid
.
,
p. 36.
304. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
p. 353.
305. Ibid
.
, d.401.
306. Ibid
.
,
p. 401.
307. Robert Nisbet, Emile Durkheim
,
p. 37.
308. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
p. 2.
309. Alvin Gouldner, "Introduction," Socialism
,
p. 21.
.
310. Ibid
.
,
p. 22.
311. George Simpson, "Editor's Introduction," Suicide , Emile
Durkheim (New York: The Free Press, 1966) p. 7.
312. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society , pp. 233-234
313. Ibid., p. 234.
314. Ibid
.
,
p. 245.
315. Ibid., p. 246.
316. Ibid
., p. 246.
317. Ibid., p. 247.
318. Ibid
. ,
p. 249.
I 319. Ibid
., p. 249.
320. Ibid
., p. 249.
321. Steven Lukes, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work
, pp. 195-196.
322. Emile Durkheim, Suicide
, John A. Spaulding and Georgre
Simpson, translators (New York: The Free Press, 1966) p. 391. .
323. Ibid
.
,
p. 391
.
324. Ibid
., p. 246.
325. Ibid
., p. 247.
326. Ibid., p. 247.
327. Ibid
.
,
p. 251.
328. Ibid., p. 252.
329. Ibid
.
,
p. 252.
330. Ibid
.
,
p. 253.
331. Ibid
.
,
p. 253.
332. Ibid
. ,
p. 255.
333. Ibid
., p. 256.
334. Ibid
. ,
p. 256.
335. Ibid
. ,
p. 257.
336. Ibid
.
,
p. 256. /
337. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action (New York:
257
The Free Press, 1968), Vol.1, p. 334.
338. Anthony Giddens, "Introduction: Durkheim's writings in
sociology and social philosophy," Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1974) pp. 40-41.
339. Ibid
.
, pp. 39-42.
340. Talcott Parsons, The Structure of Social Action
,
Vol.1, p. 304.
341. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 304.
342. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, pp. 304-305.
343. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 323. H
344. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 324.
345. Anthony Giddens, "Introduction: Durkheim's writings in
sociology and social philosophy," p. 42.
346. Emile Durkheim, The Rules of the Sociological Method
, p. 122.
347. Ibid., p. 123.
348. Theodor Adorno, "Sociology and Psychology," New Left Review
,
Number 47.
349. Richard Schacht, Alienation (New York: Ancher Books,
Doubleday and Company, Inc. 1970) pp. 161-164.
350. Marshall B. Clinard, "The Theoretical Implications of Anomie
and Deviant Behavior," Anomie and Deviant Behavior ^Marshall Clinard,
ed.(New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964) p. 10.
351. Robert K. Merton, "Social Structure and Anomie," Social
Theory and Social Structure
,
p. 132.
352. Ibid ., p. 132.
353. Ibid.
,
p. 162.
354. Ibid., p. 133.
355. Ibid
. , p. 162.
356. Ibid
.
, p. 133.
357. Ibid
.
, p. 133.
358. Ibid
.
, p. 134.
359. Ibid
.
, p. 134.
360. Ibid
., p. 134.
361. Ibid
.
,
p. 162.
362. Ibid
.
, p. 162.
363. Ibid
.
, p. 162.
364. Ibid
.
, p. 152.
365. Ibid
.
,
p. 134.
366. Ibid.
, p. 167.
367. Ibid., d.162.
368. Ibid
.
, p. 136.
369. Ibid
. , p. 136.
370. Ibid
.
,
p.141-.
371. Ibid., d.141.
________
* *
372. Ibid
.
,
p. 137.
373. Ibid
.
,
p. 142.
374. Ibid
.
,
p. 144.
375. Ibid
.
,
p. 145.
376. Ibid
.
,
p. 145.
377. Ibid
.
,
p. 146.
378. Ibid., p. 146.
259
379. Ibid
. , p. 147.
380. Ibid
.
, pp. 150-151.
381. Ibid
.
, p. 186.
382. Ibid
., p. 153.
383. Ibid
.
, p. 153.
384. Ibid
. , p. 153.
386. Ibid
.
, p. 155.
387. Ibid
. , p. 155.
388. Ibid
.
, pp. 131-160.
389. Emile IXirkheim, Suicide
,
n.247.
390. Ibid
.
,
p. 248.
391. Ibid
.
,
p. 248.
392. Ibid
.
,
p. 258.
393. Ibid
.
,
p. 253.
394. Robert K. Merton, "On Social Theories of the Middle Range,"
On Theoretical Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1967) p. 39.
395. Robert K. Merton, "Continuities in the Theory of Social
Structure and Anomie," Social Theory and Social Structure
,
p. 175.
396. Robert K. Merton, "Social Problems and Sociological Theory,"
Contemporary Social Problems (2nd Edition), Robert K. Merton and Robert
Nist>3t, editors{New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World, 1966) p. 778.
397. Ibid
.
,
p. 778.
398. Robert K. Merton, "On Sociological Theories of the Middle
Range," On Theroetical Sociology
,
p. 51.
399. Ibid.
,
p. 51.
260
400. Ibid
. ,
p. 39.
401. Ibid
., p. 39.
402. Ibid
., p. 39.
403. C. Wright Mills, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford
University Press, 1967) pp. 50-75.
404. Melvin Seeinan, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American
Sociological Review
,
Vol.24, No. 6, (Dec. 1959), p. 783.
405. Theodor Adorno, "Sociology and Empirical Research," The
Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, Glyn Adey and David Frisby,
editors (London: Heinemann, 1976) p. 73.
406. Melvin Sceman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," p. 785.
407. Ibid ., pp783-784.
408. Ibid
. ,
p. 784.
409. Ibid
., p. 784.
410. Ibid., p. 784.
411. Ibid ., p. 784.
412. Ibid . , p. 784.
413. Ibid ., p. 785.
414. Ibid ., p. 785.
415
- Willian H. James and Julian Rotter, "Partial and 100% Rein-
forcement under Chance and Skill Conditions," Journal of Experimental
Psychology
,
Vol.55 1,- No.S, (May, 1958), p. 383.
416. Julian B. Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Internal
versus External Control of Reinforcement," Psychological
Manuscripts,
1966, No.l, (Whole No. 609).
261
417. Melvin Seeman, "Social Learning Theory and the Theory of
Mass Society," Paper read at the Annual Meeting of the American Sociolo-
gical Association, Los Angles, September, 1963, p. 397.
418. Julian Rotter, "Generalized Expectancies for Internal ver-
sus External Control of Reinforcement,"
419. Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," pp. 783-791.
420. Karl Mannheim, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction
,
(New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1940) p. 58.
421. Ibid
.
,
p. 58.
422. Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," p. 786.
423. Ibid
. , p. 786.
424. Ibid
.
,
p. 786.
425. Melvin Seeman, "Social Learning Theory and the Theory of
Mass Society," p. 398.
426. Ibid
. ,
p. 398.
427. Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," pp. 788-789.
428. Gwynn Nettler, "A Measure of Alienation," American Sociolo -
gical Review
,
Vol.22, No. 6, (Dec. 1957) pp. 671 -672.
429. Melvin Seeman, "On the Meaning of Alienation," p. 791.
430. Ibid
.
,
p. 790.
431. Ibid
., p. 791.
432. Ibid
., p. 791. .
433. Ibid ., p. 791.
434. Ibid .
,
p. 786. /
435. Melvin Seeman and John W. Evans, "Alienation and Learning
262
in a Hospital Setting," American Sociological Review
, Vol.27, No. 6,
(Dec. 1962) p. 773.
436. Ibid
., p. 773.
437. Ibid., p. 773.
438. Ibid
., p. 774.
439. Ibid
.
, p. 774.
440. Ibid
., p. 782.
441. Melvin Seeman, "The Urban Alienation: Some Dubious Theses
from Marx to Marcuse," Journal Of Personality and Social Psychology
,
Vol.19, No. 2, (Aug. 1972) pp. 135-143.
442. Ibid
.,
443. Theordor Adorno, "Sociology and Empirical Research," The
Positivist Dispute in German Sociology
,
p. 73.
444. Karl Marx, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1974)
,
Vol.1, p. 351.
445. Ibid ., Vol.
446. Ibid ., Vol.
447. Ibid ., Vol.
448. Ibid ., Vol.
449. Ibid ., Vol.
450. Ibid ., Vol.
451. Ibid ., Vol.
452. Ibid., Vol.
,
p. 352.
, pp. 351-356
,
p. 355.
,
p. 355.
,
p. 355.
,
p. 355.
,
p. 356.
,
p. 356.
453. Karl Marx, Capital (London, Penguin, 1976) , Vol.1, p. 1002
454. Ibid., Vol.1, p. 280.
455. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 266.
456. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 268.
457. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 1009.
458. Ibid
. , Vol.1, p. 1006.
459. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 1064.
460. Ibid
.
,
Vol.1, p. 280.
461. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 280.
462. Ibid
., Vol.1, p. 1063.
463. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
464. Emile Durkheim, Profession Ethics and Civil Morals , Cornelia
Brookfield, translator (London: Routledge and Kegan Ltd., 1957) p. 171.
465. Ibid
. ,
p. 171.
466. Ibid
., p. 181.
467. Ibid
., p. 181.
468. Ibid
., p. 190.
469. Ibid
. ,
p. 191.
470. Ibid
., p. 191.
471. Ibid
., p. 191.
472. Ibid
., p. 191.
473. Ibid
.
,
p. 194.
474 # Ibid . , p. 194.
475. Emile Durkheim, "Individualism and the Intellectuals,"
Emil Durkheim: On Morality and Society , Robert M. Bellah, translator
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973) p. 54.
476. Ibid., P. 44.
264
477. Ibid
. , p. 45.
478. Ibid., d.46.
479. Ibid
. , pp. 48-49.
480. Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals
, p. 207.
481. Ibid
. ,
p. 208.
482. Ibid
.
, pp. 210-211.
483. Ibid
. ,
p. 211.
484. Ibid
. ,
p. 213.
485. Ibid
., p. 213.
486. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society
,
p. 384.
487. Emile Durkheim, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals
,
p. 213.
488. Ibid
.
,
p. 213.
489. Ibid
.
,
pp. 213-214.
490. Ibid
. ,
p. 216.
491. Ibid
. ,
p. 214.
492. Ibid
.
,
p. 214.
493. Georg Luckacs, "Class Consciousness," History and Class
Consciousness ,p.47.
494. Karl Marx, Grundrisse , Martin Nicolaus, translator (New York:
Vintage Books, 1975) p. 47.
495. Robert Bellah, "Durkheim and History," Emile Durkheim , Robert
Nisbet, translator (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1965) pp. 153-155.
496. Ibid . , p. 154.
497. Ibid .
,
pp. 154-155.
498. Marcia Westkott, "Conservative Method," Unpublished Manuscript,
D.3.
ii
265
499. Karl Marx, quoted in "Class Consciousness," Georg Luckacs,
History and Class Consciousness
, p. 47.
500. Karl Marx, Capital (London: Penguin, 1976),Vol. I, p. 168.
501. Georg Luckacs, "Class Consciousness," pp. 47-49.
502. Georg Luckacs, "Reification and the Consciousness of the
Proleteriant," History and Class Consciousness
,
p. 90.
503. Karl Marx, Capital
,
vol.1, p. 464.
504. Georg Luckacs, "Reification and the Consciousness of the
Proleteriant," p. 90.
505. Marcia Westkott, "Conservative Method," p. 4.
506. Georg Luckacs, "What is Orthodox Marxism," History and
Class Consciousness
,
p. 13.
507. Karl Marx, Capital
,
Vol.1, p. 209.
508. Emile Durkheim, The Division of Lahor in Society .
509. Emile Durkheim, "Individual and Collective Representations,"
Sociology and Philosophy
, D.F. Pocock, translator (New York: The Free
Press, 1974) p. 29.
510. Ibid
. ,
p. 26.
511. Jurgen Habermas, ".Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics,
The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology , pp. 132-134.
512. Emile Durkheim, "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality,"
Sociology and Philosophy
,
p. 83.
513. Karl Mannheim, "Conservative Thouhgt," From Karl Manneheim ,
Kurt H. Wolff, editor(New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) p. 160.
514. Marcia Westkott, "Conservative Method," p. 5.
515. Theodor Ado™,
"Intoduction .« Th^PosUivHtM^
<*~i^, PP.5S-S6; C. Wright Mills
, J,^^^^^
PP - 73 " 75; ««™ "^rican Soci^^~^~
Trail, Maurice Stein and Arthur via^u j-a .Arth Vidich, editors (New Jersey: Prentice
Hall, 1963) pp. 3-11.
267
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adorno, Theodor W.
,
"Sociology and Empirical Research," The Positivist
Dispute in German Sociology , Glyn Addey and David Frisby, trans-
1ators (London: Heinemann, 1976)
Adorno, Theodor W.
,
"Introduction," The Positivist Dispute in German
Soc io 1ogy (London : Heinemann, 1976)
Adorno, Theodor W.
,
"Sociology and Psychology," New Left Review
,
No. 47.
Avineri, Sholmo, "Labor, Alienation, and Social Class in Hegel's
Realphilosonhie ," The Legacy of Hegel: Proceedings of the Mar -
qutte Hegel Symposium- J.J. O'Malley, K.W. Algozin, et.al.,
editors (The Hague , Netherlands : Martin Nijhoff, 1973) pp. 196-215.
Avineri, Sholomo, The Social and Political Thought of Karl Marx
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1971)
Clinard, Marshall B. , 'The Theoretical Implications of Anomie and
Deviant Behavior," Anomie and Deviant Behavior , Marshall Clinard,
editor (New York: The Free Press of Glcncoe, 1964)
Comte, Auguste, "Onerations Necessary for Reorganizing Society,"
Auguste Comte and Positivism , Gertrud Lenzer, editor (New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1975)
Dobb, Maurice, Studies in the Development of Capital ism (New York:
Internat ional Publishers, 1975)
Dobb, Maurice, "Introduction," A Contribution to the Critique of
Politica l Economy , Karl Marx (New York: Internat ion Publishers,
WHT)
Durkheim, Emile, The Division of Labor in Society , George Simpson,
translator (New York: The Free Press, 1964)
Durkheim, Emile, The Rules of the Sociological Method (New York: The
Free Press, 1966)
Durkheim, Emile, Suicide , John A. Spaulding and George Simpson,
translators (New York: The Free Press, 1966)
Durkheim, Emile, The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life , Joseph
Ward Swain, translator (New York: 'Ihe Free Press, i9br>)
Durkheim, Emile, Professional Ethics and Civic Morals, Cornelia
Brookfield, translator (London: Routiedge and Kegan Paul, LTD., 13b/
J
268
Durkheim, Emile, Socialism
,
Alvin Gouldner, editor (New York- Harper
and Row, 1965}
IXirkheim, Emile, "Individualism and the Intellectuals," Emile Durk-
heim: On Morality and Society
, Robert N. Bellah, translator and
editor (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1973)
Durkheim, Emile, "The Dualism of Human Nature and Its Social Condi-
tions," Emile Durkheim: On Morality and Society (Chicago : The
University of Chicago Press, 1973)
Durkheim, Emile, "Value Judgments and Judgments of Reality," Sociology
and Philosophy, D.F. Pocok, translator (New York: The Free Press,
1974)
Durkheim, Emile, "individual and Collective Representations," Sociology
and Philosophy, D.F. Pocock, translator (New York: The Free Press,
TV7T)
Feuerbach, Ludwig, "Preliminary Theses on the Reform of Philosophy,"
The Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach
,
Zawar
Hanfi, translator (New York: Anchor Books, 1972)
Feuerbach, Ludwig, "Towards a Critique of Hegel's Philosophy," The
Fiery Brook: Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach (New York:
Anchor Books, 1972)
a
Feuerbach, Ludwig, The Essence of Christainity
,
George Elliot, trans-
lator (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1957)
Franklin, Mitchell, "On Hegel's Theory of Alienation and its His-
toric Force," Tulane Studies in Philosophy , Vol. IX, (1960) pp. 50-100
Friedman, Georges, The Anatomy of Work
,
Wyatt Rawson, translator (New
York: The Free Press, 1961)
Geras, Norman, "Essence and Appearance: Aspects of Fetishism in Marx's
Capital ," New Left Review , No. 65, (January- Feburary, 1971) pp. 69-85.
Giddens, Anthony, Capitalism and Modern Social Theory: An Analysis
of the Writings of Marx, Durkheim and Max Weber (Cambridge: Cam-
Bridge University Press, 1971)
Giddens, Anthony, "Introduction: Durkheim' s Writings in Sociology
and Social' Philosophy," Emile Durkheim: Selected Writings (Cam-
bridge University Press, 1974)
Gouldner, Alvin W. , The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology (New York:
Equinox Books, Avon, 19/0)
Gouldner, Alvin W. , "Introduction," Socialism , Emile Durkheim(New York:
Harper and Row, 1965)
269
Habermas, Jurgen, "Analytical Theory of Science and Dialectics,"
The Posit ivist Dispute in German Sociology (London: Hainemann,1976)
Hegel, G.W.P., The Phenomenology of Mind
,
J.B. Baillie, translator
(New York: Harper and Row, 1967)
Hegel, G.W.P., Encyclopedia (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1967)
Hegel,G.W.P.
,
Philosophy of Right
, T.M. Knox, translator (Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press, 1975)
Horkheimer, Max, "Traditional and Critical Theory," Critical Theory :
Selected Essays
,
Matthew J. O'Connel, translator (New York: The
Seabury Press, 1972)
Horton, John, "The Dehumanization of Anomie and Alienation: A Pro-
blem in the Ideology of Sociology," Britisli Journal of Sociology,
Vol. XV, No. 4, (Dec. 1964)
Howard, Dick, The Development of the Marxian Dialectic (Carbondale
:
Southern University Press, 1972)
Johnson, Frank, "Psychological Alienation: Isolation and Self- Estrange
ment." The Psychoanalytical Review
,
Vol.62, No. 3, (Fall, 1975)
Josephson, Eric and Mary, Man .Alone: Alienation in Modern Society (New
York: Dell Publishing Co. ,1962)
Kahler, Eric, The Tower and the Abyss (New York: Braziller, 1957)
Korsch, Karl, Marxism and Philosophy , Fred Hallidary, translator (New
York: Monthly Review Press, 1970)
Korsch, Karl, Karl Marx (New York: Russel and Russel, 1963)
Kosok, Micheal, "Dialectics of Nature," Towards a New Marxism , Bart
Grahl and Paul Piccone, editors (St. Louis: Telos Press, 1973)
Luckacs, Georg, History and Class Consciousness , Rodney Livingston,
translator (Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 1972)
Lukes, Steven, Emile Durkheim: His Life and Work (New York: Harper
and Row, 19~7Tj
Lukes, Steven, "Alienation and Anomie," Philosophy, Politics and
Society, 3rd Scries , Peter Laslett and W. G. Runciman, editors
(New York: Barnes and Noble, Inc., 1967)
Mannheim, Karl, Man and Society in an Age of Reconstruction (New York:
Harcourt, Brace, 1940)
270
Mannheim, Karl, "American Sociology," Sociology on Trail MauriceStem and Arthur Vidich, editors (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 1963)
Mannheim, Karl /'Conservative Thought," From Karl Mannheim
, Kurt H.
Wolff, editor (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971)
Marcuse, Herhert, "The Foundations of Historical Materialism," Studies
in Critical Philosophy (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1972)
Marcuse, Herbert, Reason and Revolution: Hegel and the Rise of Social
Theory (Boston: Beacon Hill, 1970) ~
Maquire, John, Marx's Paris Writings: An Analysis (London: G.M. Mac-
Millian, lWT) L
Marx, Karl, The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (New York:
International J>ublishers, 1972)
'
Marx, Karl, Capital (New York: International Publishers ,1974) , Vol.1.
Marx, Karl, Capital (New York: International Publishers, 1974) , Vol. III.
Marx, Karl, Capital (London, Penguin Books, 1976) Vol.1.
Marx, Karl, Grundrisse (New York: Vintage Books, 1973)
Marx, Karl, A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy (New
York : International Publishers, 1970)
Marx, Karl, "Wage, Labour and Capital," Selected Writings of Marx
and Engles (New York: International Publishers, 1969)
Marx, Karl, "Letter to his Father on a Turning Point in Life ( 1837),"
Writings of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society
,
Lyod D.
Easton and Kurt H. Guddat, editors and translators (New York:
Anchor Books, 1967)
Marx, Karl, "Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of the State," Writings
of the Young Marx on Philosophy and Society (New York: Anchor
Books, 1967}
Marx, Karl, "Letter to Arnold Ruge(1843)," quoted in The Fiery Brook :
Selected Writings of Ludwig Feuerbach (New York: Anchor Books, 1972)
Marx, Werner, Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit , Peter Health, transla-
tor (New York: Harper and Row, Publishers, 1975)
Merton, Robert K. , "Social Structure and Anomie," Social Theory and
Social Structure , revise and enlarged edition(Glencoe, ill. : The
Free Press, 19b/)
271
Merton, Robert K.
,
"Continuities in the Theory of Social Structure
and Anomie," Social Theory and Social Structure (Glencoe, 111- The
Free Press, 1957) —
Merton Robert K.
,
"Durkheim's Division of Labor," American Journal
Ot Sociology ,
Merton, Robert K.
,
"Social Problems and Sociological Theory," Con-
temporary Social Problems (2nd Edition), Robert K. Merton anZ
Robert Nisbet, editors (New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World,
1966)
Merton, Robert K.
,
"On Social Theories of the Middle Range," On
Theoretical Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1967)
Merton, Robert K. , "On the History and Systematics of Sociological
Theory," On Theoretical Sociology (New York: The Free Press, 1967)
Meszaros, Istvan, Marx's Theory of Alienation (New York: Harper Torch-
books, 1970)
Mills, C. Wright, The Sociological Imagination (Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 196711
Nettler, Gwynn, "A Measure of Alienation," American Sociological Review
,
Vol.22, No. 6, (Dec. 1957) pp. 670-677.
Nisbet, Robert, Emile Durkheim (New Jersey: Prentice Hall Inc., 1965)
Nisbet, Robert, The Sociology of Fmile Durkheim (New York: Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1974)
Nisbet, Robert, The Ouest for Community (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1953^
'
Nisbet, Robert, The Sociological Imagination (New York: Basic Books,
Inc., Publishers, 1966)
Kolakowski, Leszek, Toward a Marxist Humanism , Jane Zielonko, trans-
lator (New York: Grove Press, Inc., 1968)
Oilman, Bertell, Alienation: Marx's Conception of Man in Capitalist
Society (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975)
O'Neill, John, "Introduction: Hegel and Marx on History and Human
History,
"
studies on Marx and Hegel , Jean Hyppolite(New York:
Harper Torchbooks, 1975)
Parsons, Talcott, The Structure of Social Action (New York: The Free
Press, 1968), Vol.1.
272
R°tte
^!arn ^ V'GffaliZed Expectancies for Internal Versus Ex-
Rotte
T
r
'/uljf1 and Jfef ? Willie J., "Partial and 100% ReinforcementUnder Chance and Skill Conditions," Jornal of Experimental Psycho-logy, Vol.55, No.5,(May,1958)DP . 397^uX ^ SYC °
^^IgyZ)
*
'
Essays on Mar ' s Theory of Value fDetroit: Black and Red,
Schacht, Richard, Alienation (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday and
Company, Inc.
,
1970) y
Seeman, Melvin, "On the Meaning of Alienation," American Sociological
Review, Vol.24, No. 6, (Dec. ,1959)
,
pp. 783-791:
—~ h
Seeman, Melvin, "Social Learning and the Theory of Mass Society,"
Paper read at the .Annual Meeting of the .American Sociological
Association, Los .Angles, Septermber, 1963.
Seeman, Melvin and Evans, John, "Alienation and Learning in a Hospi-
tal Setting, .American Sociological Review, Vol.27, No. 6, (Dec
1962), pp. 772-781:
Seeman, Melvin, "The Urban Alienation: Some Dubious Theses from Marx
To Marcuse," Journal of Personality and Socia l Psvcholo<rv, Vol.19,
No. 2, (Aug, 1972), pp. 155-143.
"
Simpson, George, "Editor's Introduction," Suicide
, Emile Durkheim
(New York: The Free Press, 1966)
Smith, Adam, The Wealth of Nations (New York: P.F. Collier and Son
Company, 1909"!
Soil, Ivan, An Introduction to Hegel's Metaphysics (Chicago: The Uni-
versity of Chicago Press, 1969)
Struik, Dirk J. /'Introduction," The Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts ,
Karl Marx (New York: International Publishers, 1972)
Sweezy, Paul, The Theory of Capitalist Deveolpment (New York: Monthly
Reveiw Press, 1968)
Udy, Stanley, "Bureacracy and Rationality in Weber's Organizational
Theorv: An Empirical Study," .American Sociological Review , Vol.24,
No. 6,' (Dec. ,1959)
Westkott, Marcia, "Conservative Method," Unpublished Manuscript.


